MITM attack against WPA2-Enterprise?

[Florian Weimer]

* Donald Eastlake:

> It's always possible to make protocols more secure at higher cost.

On the other hand, group key vulnerabilities are nothing new.  It's
just that many protocol designers seem to not understand them.  Back
when Cisco proposed XAUTH for IPsec, there was a heated discussion
about password strength and other irrelevancies, but as far as I could
later reconstruct the discussion, no one objected to the group key
concept as such.  It was only much later, when people used XAUTH in
large deployments for providing general Internet access over insecure
media, that the group key was recognized as a vulnerability.

It's amazing that people still fail for this group key thing.  There
is quite a simple rule: If you choose the secret bits without
constraints (except length and formatting), and proceed to share those
bits, there can be no protection from those with whom you share, no
matter what cryptographic algorithms you use.

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