A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II
Paul Tiemann
paul.tiemann.usenet at gmail.com
Tue Jul 27 19:14:06 EDT 2010
On Jul 27, 2010, at 3:34 PM, Ben Laurie wrote:
> On 24/07/2010 18:55, Peter Gutmann wrote:
>> - PKI dogma doesn't even consider availability issues but expects the
>> straightforward execution of the condition "problem -> revoke cert". For a
>> situation like this, particularly if the cert was used to sign 64-bit
>> drivers, I wouldn't have revoked because the global damage caused by that is
>> potentially much larger than the relatively small-scale damage caused by the
>> malware. So alongside "too big to fail" we now have "too widely-used to
>> revoke". Is anyone running x64 Windows with revocation checking enabled and
>> drivers signed by the Realtek or JMicron certs?
>
> One way to mitigate this would be to revoke a cert on a date, and only
> reject signatures on files you received after that date.
I like that idea, as long as a verifiable timestamp is included.
Without a trusted timestamp, would the bad guy be able to backdate the signature?
Paul Tiemann
(DigiCert)
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