September 2013 Archives by date

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Starting: Sun Sep 1 07:11:06 EDT 2013
Ending: Mon Sep 30 23:50:10 EDT 2013
Messages: 891

[Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Thoughts about keys Ben Laurie
[Cryptography] Functional specification for email client? Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis John Kelsey
[Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Thoughts about keys Faré
[Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis James A. Donald
[Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Thoughts about keys Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Thoughts about keys Faré
[Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis Anne & Lynn Wheeler
[Cryptography] Thoughts about keys Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis Christian Huitema
[Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Google's Public Key Size (was Re: NSA and cryptanalysis) Jeffrey I. Schiller
[Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis Jack Lloyd
[Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Backup is completely separate John Kelsey
[Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis Jon Callas
[Cryptography] FIPS, NIST and ITAR questions radix42 at gmail.com
[Cryptography] Keeping backups (was Re: Separating concerns Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis Jon Callas
[Cryptography] Backup is completely separate Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] FIPS, NIST and ITAR questions Alexander Klimov
[Cryptography] A strategy to circumvent patents? Faré
[Cryptography] FIPS, NIST and ITAR questions radix42 at gmail.com
[Cryptography] FIPS, NIST and ITAR questions Jon Callas
[Cryptography] FIPS, NIST and ITAR questions Richard Salz
[Cryptography] FIPS, NIST and ITAR questions Faré
[Cryptography] FIPS, NIST and ITAR questions radix42 at gmail.com
[Cryptography] FIPS, NIST and ITAR questions radix42 at gmail.com
[Cryptography] Three kinds of hash: Two are still under ITAR. Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Three kinds of hash: Two are still under ITAR. radix42 at gmail.com
[Cryptography] FIPS, NIST and ITAR questions Richard Salz
[Cryptography] FIPS, NIST and ITAR questions james hughes
[Cryptography] A strategy to circumvent patents? Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] FIPS, NIST and ITAR questions Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] IPv6 and IPSEC Bill Stewart
[Cryptography] FIPS, NIST and ITAR questions Bill Stewart
[Cryptography] Thoughts about keys Jeremy Stanley
[Cryptography] IPv6 and IPSEC Lucky Green
[Cryptography] IPv6 and IPSEC Taral
[Cryptography] Popular curves (was: NSA and cryptanalysis) ianG
[Cryptography] IPv6 and IPSEC Lucky Green
[Cryptography] Three kinds of hash: Two are still under ITAR. Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Hashes into Ciphers (was Re: FIPS, NIST and ITAR questions) Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] FIPS, NIST and ITAR questions Faré
[Cryptography] Hashes into Ciphers Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Hashes into Ciphers Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Hashes into Ciphers Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] FIPS, NIST and ITAR questions Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Hashes into Ciphers Ben Laurie
[Cryptography] IPv6 and IPSEC Taral
[Cryptography] Popular curves (was: NSA and cryptanalysis) Jose Luis Gomez Pardo
[Cryptography] FIPS, NIST and ITAR questions Faré
[Cryptography] IPv6 and IPSEC Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Hashes into Ciphers (was Re: FIPS, NIST and ITAR questions) Stephan Neuhaus
[Cryptography] Google's Public Key Size (was Re: NSA and cryptanalysis) Andy Steingruebl
[Cryptography] Google's Public Key Size (was Re: NSA and cryptanalysis) Paul Hoffman
[Cryptography] Google's Public Key Size (was Re: NSA and cryptanalysis) Andy Steingruebl
[Cryptography] Thoughts about keys Jeremy Stanley
[Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis Joachim Strömbergson
[Cryptography] Hashes into Ciphers (was Re: FIPS, NIST and ITAR questions) Joachim Strömbergson
[Cryptography] Google's Public Key Size (was Re: NSA and cryptanalysis) Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] NY Times: "NSA Foils Much Internet Encryption" Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] The Guardian: "US and UK spy agencies defeat privacy and security on the internet" Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] ADMIN: Please, please, please don't top post. Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Eric Murray
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Bernie Cosell
[Cryptography] Bruce Schneier in The Guardian on BULLRUN etc. Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Eric Murray
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Tim Dierks
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" arxlight
[Cryptography] Is ECC suspicious? Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" John Kelsey
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Lance James
[Cryptography] Thoughts about keys Jeremy Stanley
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Eric Murray
[Cryptography] tamper-evident crypto? (was: BULLRUN) John Denker
[Cryptography] Is ECC suspicious? Jon Callas
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] tamper-evident crypto? (was: BULLRUN) Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] ADMIN: less Snowden, more Crypto Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Suite B after today's news Dan McDonald
[Cryptography] tamper-evident crypto? (was: BULLRUN) Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Peter Fairbrother
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] tamper-evident crypto? (was: BULLRUN) Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Implementations, attacks on DHTs, Mix Nets? Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] Why human-readable IDs (was Re: Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks) Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] Keeping backups (was Re: Separating concerns Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] tamper-evident crypto? (was: BULLRUN) Richard Clayton
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" David Mercer
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Suite B after today's news Jon Callas
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] tamper-evident crypto? (was: BULLRUN) Charles Jackson
[Cryptography] Suite B after today's news Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Jon Callas
[Cryptography] Suite B after today's news Jon Callas
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Suite B after today's news Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Jon Callas
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Jon Callas
[Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks Bill Frantz
[Cryptography] Can you backdoor a symmetric cipher (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN") Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Jon Callas
[Cryptography] Can you backdoor a symmetric cipher (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN") Jon Callas
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" John Kelsey
[Cryptography] Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption james hughes
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" John Kelsey
[Cryptography] FIPS, NIST and ITAR questions John Kelsey
[Cryptography] FIPS, NIST and ITAR questions John Kelsey
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Kristian Gjøsteen
[Cryptography] Keeping backups (was Re: Separating concerns Dirk-Willem van Gulik
[Cryptography] Is ECC suspicious? Dirk-Willem van Gulik
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" ianG
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" ianG
[Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis ianG
[Cryptography] Can you backdoor a symmetric cipher (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN") Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Eugen Leitl
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" James A. Donald
[Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? Jaap-Henk Hoepman
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Can you backdoor a symmetric cipher Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Aside on random numbers (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN") Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Suite B after today's news Ralph Holz
[Cryptography] Sabotaged hardware (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN") Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Aside on random numbers (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN") Bill Squier
[Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS (was Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption) Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Benjamin Kreuter
[Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS (was Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption) Peter Saint-Andre
[Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS (was Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption) Raphaël Jacquot
[Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS (was Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption) Ben Laurie
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Tim Dierks
[Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS (was Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption) Daniel Veditz
[Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS Ben Laurie
[Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] IA side subverted by SIGINT side John Gilmore
[Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS Ben Laurie
[Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS Ralph Holz
[Cryptography] Sabotaged hardware (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN") Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Aside on random numbers (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN") Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS (was Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption) Peter Fairbrother
[Cryptography] Suite B after today's news Jack Lloyd
[Cryptography] Matthew Green on BULLRUN Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] tamper-evident crypto? John Denker
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" ianG
[Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS (was Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption) ianG
[Cryptography] Bruce Schneier has gotten seriously spooked Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] 1024 bit DH still common in Tor network Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS (was Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption) Anne & Lynn Wheeler
[Cryptography] Bruce Schneier has gotten seriously spooked Eugen Leitl
[Cryptography] Bruce Schneier calls for independent prosecutor to investigate NSA Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Bruce Schneier has gotten seriously spooked Harald Koch
[Cryptography] Suite B after today's news Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] Washington Post: Google racing to encrypt links between data centers Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Bruce Schneier has gotten seriously spooked Lodewijk andré de la porte
[Cryptography] Washington Post: Google racing to encrypt links between data centers Marcus D. Leech
[Cryptography] Washington Post: Google racing to encrypt links between data centers Lodewijk andré de la porte
[Cryptography] Suite B after today's news Jon Callas
[Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS James Cloos
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Jon Callas
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" John Gilmore
[Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS The Doctor
[Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS The Doctor
[Cryptography] Bruce Schneier has gotten seriously spooked Chris Palmer
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Jon Callas
[Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS Chris Palmer
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Derrell Piper
[Cryptography] ADMIN: Reminder, yet again... Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] NYTimes: Legislation Seeks to Bar N.S.A. Tactic in Encryption Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help Marcus D. Leech
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Kevin W. Wall
[Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? Jon Callas
[Cryptography] NSA hates sunshine John Gilmore
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Derrell Piper
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Samuel Weiler
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Bruce Schneier has gotten seriously spooked The Doctor
[Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS The Doctor
[Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? Marcus D. Leech
[Cryptography] Using Raspberry Pis Ben Laurie
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Jon Callas
[Cryptography] I have to whistle to blow... Dan McDonald
[Cryptography] Using Raspberry Pis Marcus D. Leech
[Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? Jaap-Henk Hoepman
[Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? Jon Callas
[Cryptography] XORing plaintext with ciphertext Dave Horsfall
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Gregory Perry
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" ianG
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" ianG
[Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS ianG
[Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? ianG
[Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? Jaap-Henk Hoepman
[Cryptography] XORing plaintext with ciphertext Jon Callas
[Cryptography] Bruce Schneier has gotten seriously spooked Brian Gladman
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Eugen Leitl
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" ianG
[Cryptography] XORing plaintext with ciphertext Dave Horsfall
[Cryptography] [liberationtech] Random number generation being influenced - rumors Eugen Leitl
[Cryptography] XORing plaintext with ciphertext Carl Ellison
[Cryptography] XORing plaintext with ciphertext Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? Jeffrey I. Schiller
[Cryptography] Protecting Private Keys Jeffrey I. Schiller
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help Bill Stewart
[Cryptography] Suite B after today's news Ralph Holz
[Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? Bill Stewart
[Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? Naif M. Otaibi
[Cryptography] Bruce Schneier has gotten seriously spooked Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] [tor-talk] NIST approved crypto in Tor? Eugen Leitl
[Cryptography] Bruce Schneier has gotten seriously spooked Dan McDonald
[Cryptography] Bruce Schneier has gotten seriously spooked Chris Palmer
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Gregory Perry
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Paul Wouters
[Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? Christian Huitema
[Cryptography] Bruce Schneier has gotten seriously spooked Gregory Perry
[Cryptography] Protecting Private Keys Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Washington Post: Google racing to encrypt links between data centers Thor Lancelot Simon
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" David Mercer
[Cryptography] Protecting Private Keys Jim Popovitch
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Anne & Lynn Wheeler
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Bruce Schneier has gotten seriously spooked Gregory Perry
[Cryptography] XORing plaintext with ciphertext Florian Weimer
[Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Protecting Private Keys Jeffrey I. Schiller
[Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] [cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG Eugen Leitl
[Cryptography] In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] Protecting Private Keys Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Suite B after today's news Ben Laurie
[Cryptography] Washington Post: Google racing to encrypt links between data centers Richard Outerbridge
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Gregory Perry
[Cryptography] In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help Peter Fairbrother
[Cryptography] Washington Post: Google racing to encrypt links between data centers Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] Washington Post: Google racing to encrypt links between data centers Eugen Leitl
[Cryptography] Washington Post: Google racing to encrypt links between data centers Eugen Leitl
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Gregory Perry
[Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? Derrell Piper
[Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help james hughes
[Cryptography] How to get really paranoid Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] New task for the NSA Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Bruce Schneier has gotten seriously spooked Brian Gladman
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Jeffrey I. Schiller
[Cryptography] Symmetric cipher + Backdoor = Public Key System Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Bruce Schneier has gotten seriously spooked Gregory Perry
[Cryptography] Does NSA break in to endpoints (was Re: Bruce Schneier has gotten seriously spooked) Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] ElGamal, DSA randomness (was Re: Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?) Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] ElGamal, DSA randomness (was Re: Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?) Jon Callas
[Cryptography] ADMIN: Volume, top posting, trimming, SUBJECT LINES Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Replacing CAs (was Re: Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?) Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? Lodewijk andré de la porte
[Cryptography] In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help John Kelsey
[Cryptography] Bruce Schneier has gotten seriously spooked James A. Donald
[Cryptography] XORing plaintext with ciphertext John Kelsey
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" John Gilmore
[Cryptography] Symmetric cipher + Backdoor = Public Key System Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Suite B after today's news Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? John Kelsey
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] [cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG John Kelsey
[Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? Christian Huitema
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help Marcus D. Leech
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" John Kelsey
[Cryptography] Bruce Schneier has gotten seriously spooked Bill Stewart
[Cryptography] Speaking of EDH (GnuTLS interoperability) Viktor Dukhovni
[Cryptography] MITM source patching [was Schneier got spooked] Tim Newsham
[Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? Andrea Shepard
[Cryptography] Protecting Private Keys Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] Suite B after today's news Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] Does NSA break in to endpoints (was Re: Bruce Schneier has gotten seriously spooked) ianG
[Cryptography] Suite B after today's news Ralph Holz
[Cryptography] [cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG Eugen Leitl
[Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] MITM source patching [was Schneier got spooked] Eugen Leitl
[Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? Jaap-Henk Hoepman
[Cryptography] MITM source patching [was Schneier got spooked] Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Trapdoor symmetric key Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] [tor-talk] NIST approved crypto in Tor? Eugen Leitl
[Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] A Likely Story! Peter Fairbrother
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Daniel Cegiełka
[Cryptography] Trapdoor symmetric key Faré
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Peter Bowen
[Cryptography] Bruce Schneier has gotten seriously spooked james hughes
[Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] [tor-talk] NIST approved crypto in Tor? Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] MITM source patching [was Schneier got spooked] Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Trapdoor symmetric key Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Suite B after today's news Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Trapdoor symmetric key ianG
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Jon Callas
[Cryptography] [cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] [cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG Jon Callas
[Cryptography] MITM source patching [was Schneier got spooked] Tim Newsham
[Cryptography] Points of compromise Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Suite B after today's news Ben Laurie
[Cryptography] Why are some protocols hard to deploy? (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN") Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware (Re: Suite B after today's news) Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Impossible trapdoor systems (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN") Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Market demands for security (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN") Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware (Re: Suite B after today's news) Thor Lancelot Simon
[Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help Anne & Lynn Wheeler
[Cryptography] Usage models (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help) Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware Thor Lancelot Simon
[Cryptography] Market demands for security (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN") John Kelsey
[Cryptography] In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help Max Kington
[Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware John Kelsey
[Cryptography] Market demands for security (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN") John Denker
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Eugen Leitl
[Cryptography] Usage models (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help) Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Market demands for security (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN") Christian Huitema
[Cryptography] Der Spiegel: "NSA Can Spy on Smart Phone Data" Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware John Kelsey
[Cryptography] AES state of the art... Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Market demands for security (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN") Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware Viktor Dukhovni
[Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? Peter Saint-Andre
[Cryptography] Usage models (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help) Peter Saint-Andre
[Cryptography] In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help james hughes
[Cryptography] Der Spiegel: "NSA Can Spy on Smart Phone Data" Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Der Spiegel: "NSA Can Spy on Smart Phone Data" Tony Naggs
[Cryptography] Paper on Tor deanonymization: "Users Get Routed" Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware Kent Borg
[Cryptography] Impossible trapdoor systems (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN") James A. Donald
[Cryptography] Market demands for security (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN") James A. Donald
[Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Jeffrey I. Schiller
[Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware Kent Borg
[Cryptography] Suite B after today's news Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Der Spiegel: "NSA Can Spy on Smart Phone Data" Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] "Is DNSSEC is really the right solution?" [djb video] Paul Wouters
[Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware James A. Donald
[Cryptography] In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help james hughes
[Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Der Spiegel: "NSA Can Spy on Smart Phone Data" Christian Huitema
[Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? Christian Huitema
[Cryptography] Market demands for security (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN") Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] [cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG David Johnston
[Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware ianG
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" ianG
[Cryptography] The One True Cipher Suite ianG
[Cryptography] very little is missing for working BTNS in Openswan Eugen Leitl
[Cryptography] Why are some protocols hard to deploy? (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN") ianG
[Cryptography] SSH uses secp256/384r1 which has the same parameters as what's in SEC2 which are the same the parameters as specified in SP800-90 for Dual EC DRBG! Eugen Leitl
[Cryptography] IETF: Security and Pervasive Monitoring Eugen Leitl
[Cryptography] Der Spiegel: "NSA Can Spy on Smart Phone Data" Nap van Zuuren
[Cryptography] Points of compromise Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] [cryptography] SSH uses secp256/384r1 which has the same parameters as what's in SEC2 which are the same the parameters as specified in SP800-90 for Dual EC DRBG! Kristian Gjøsteen
[Cryptography] Market demands for security (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN") ianG
[Cryptography] Usage models (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help) Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] [cryptography] SSH uses secp256/384r1 which has the same parameters as what's in SEC2 which are the same the parameters as specified in SP800-90 for Dual EC DRBG! Alexander Klimov
[Cryptography] Impossible trapdoor systems (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN") Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] AES state of the art... Alexander Klimov
[Cryptography] Market demands for security (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN") Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] A Likely Story! Alexander Klimov
[Cryptography] Thoughts about keys Guido Witmond
[Cryptography] Scott Aaaronson: NSA: Possibly breaking US laws, but still bound by laws of computational complexity Eugen Leitl
[Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware Kent Borg
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Andreas Davour
[Cryptography] [cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG Owen Shepherd
[Cryptography] auditing a hardware RNG John Denker
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Salz, Rich
[Cryptography] The One True Cipher Suite Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Salz, Rich
[Cryptography] What TLS ciphersuites are still OK? Ben Laurie
[Cryptography] A Likely Story! Peter Fairbrother
[Cryptography] Thoughts about keys Peter Fairbrother
[Cryptography] Seed values for NIST curves Nemo
[Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? Jeffrey I. Schiller
[Cryptography] AES state of the art... Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] What TLS ciphersuites are still OK? Hanno Böck
[Cryptography] What TLS ciphersuites are still OK? james hughes
[Cryptography] ADMIN: traffic levels Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] What TLS ciphersuites are still OK? Stephen Farrell
[Cryptography] [cryptography] SSH uses secp256/384r1 which has the same parameters as what's in SEC2 which are the same the parameters as specified in SP800-90 for Dual EC DRBG! Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] AES state of the art... Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] [cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG James A. Donald
[Cryptography] Seed values for NIST curves Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] how could ECC params be subverted & other evidence Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] ADMIN: differing subscription and sender addresses Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] [cryptography] SSH uses secp256/384r1 which has the same parameters as what's in SEC2 which are the same the parameters as specified in SP800-90 for Dual EC DRBG! Peter Fairbrother
[Cryptography] Some protection against replay attacks Faré
[Cryptography] [cryptography] SSH uses secp256/384r1 which has the same parameters as what's in SEC2 which are the same the parameters as specified in SP800-90 for Dual EC DRBG! Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] What TLS ciphersuites are still OK? Phil Pennock
[Cryptography] What TLS ciphersuites are still OK? james hughes
[Cryptography] Points of compromise John Gilmore
[Cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG John Kelsey
[Cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] What TLS ciphersuites are still OK? Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] Squaring Zooko's triangle James A. Donald
[Cryptography] What TLS ciphersuites are still OK? Yaron Sheffer
[Cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG ianG
[Cryptography] Thoughts about keys Guido Witmond
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Andreas Davour
[Cryptography] Suite B after today's news Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] Suite B after today's news Ben Laurie
[Cryptography] Seed values for NIST curves Joachim Strömbergson
[Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] [cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG Eric Young
[Cryptography] The One True Cipher Suite Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] What TLS ciphersuites are still OK? Ben Laurie
[Cryptography] What TLS ciphersuites are still OK? Ben Laurie
[Cryptography] What TLS ciphersuites are still OK? Stephen Farrell
[Cryptography] Fw: how could ECC params be subverted & other evidence Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] What TLS ciphersuites are still OK? Peter Fairbrother
[Cryptography] What TLS ciphersuites are still OK? james hughes
[Cryptography] Thoughts on hardware randomness sources Marcus D. Leech
[Cryptography] Reports: NSA, GCHQ used forged certs to impersonate Google Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] [TLS] New Version Notification for draft-sheffer-tls-bcp-00.txt james hughes
[Cryptography] Thoughts on hardware randomness sources Rob Kendrick
[Cryptography] Usage models (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help) Walter van Holst
[Cryptography] Time for djb's Edwards curves in TLS? Viktor Dukhovni
[Cryptography] Thoughts on hardware randomness sources Marcus D. Leech
[Cryptography] Availability of plaintext/ciphertext pairs (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help) Nemo
[Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS zooko
[Cryptography] Thoughts about keys Peter Fairbrother
[Cryptography] Squaring Zooko's triangle Peter Fairbrother
[Cryptography] Seed values for NIST curves Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] Thoughts on hardware randomness sources Sandy Harris
[Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS Ben Laurie
[Cryptography] The One True Cipher Suite Bill Stewart
[Cryptography] Thoughts about keys Guido Witmond
[Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS (was Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption) Bill Stewart
[Cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG John Kelsey
[Cryptography] Usage models (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help) Max Kington
[Cryptography] Fw: how could ECC params be subverted & other evidence John Kelsey
[Cryptography] Availability of plaintext/ciphertext pairs (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help) Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Joe Abley
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Ben Laurie
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Joe Abley
[Cryptography] Fw: how could ECC params be subverted & other evidence Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Availability of plaintext/ciphertext pairs (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help) Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] soft chewy center bmanning at vacation.karoshi.com
[Cryptography] how could ECC params be subverted & other evidence Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] The One True Cipher Suite Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Availability of plaintext/ciphertext pairs (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help) Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] ADMIN: Ending thread "The One True Cipher Suite" Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG James A. Donald
[Cryptography] soft chewy center Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] EFF press release on latest FISA opinions release Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Availability of plaintext/ciphertext pairs (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help) Nemo
[Cryptography] soft chewy center bmanning at vacation.karoshi.com
[Cryptography] Usage models (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help) James A. Donald
[Cryptography] Availability of plaintext/ciphertext pairs (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help) Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Evaluating draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305 William Allen Simpson
[Cryptography] Availability of plaintext/ciphertext pairs (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help) ianG
[Cryptography] Evaluating draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305 William Allen Simpson
[Cryptography] History and implementation status of Opportunistic Encryption for IPsec Paul Wouters
[Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Chris Palmer
[Cryptography] Availability of plaintext/ciphertext pairs (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help) Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Availability of plaintext/ciphertext pairs (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help) Raphael Jacquot
[Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? zooko
[Cryptography] Suite B after today's news Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] Thoughts about keys Eugen Leitl
[Cryptography] Laws and cryptography Grégory Alvarez
[Cryptography] What TLS ciphersuites are still OK? Alan Braggins
[Cryptography] Evaluating draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305 Alexandre Anzala-Yamajako
[Cryptography] SPDZ, a practical protocol for Multi-Party Computation Eugen Leitl
[Cryptography] Squaring Zooko's triangle Paul Crowley
[Cryptography] About those fingerprints ... Andrew W. Donoho
[Cryptography] NIST reopens RNG public comment period Eugen Leitl
[Cryptography] Evaluating draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305 Adam Langley
[Cryptography] Evaluating draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305 Adam Langley
[Cryptography] Evaluating draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305 William Allen Simpson
[Cryptography] Defenses against pervasive versus targeted intercept Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] About those fingerprints ... Salz, Rich
[Cryptography] Evaluating draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305 William Allen Simpson
[Cryptography] Evaluating draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305 William Allen Simpson
[Cryptography] ADMIN: Please pick appropriate Subject lines... Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] About those fingerprints ... Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] SPDZ, a practical protocol for Multi-Party Computation Max Kington
[Cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Introducing strangers. Was: Thoughts about keys Guido Witmond
[Cryptography] Books on modern cryptanalysis Bernie Cosell
[Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS (was Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption) Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Books on modern cryptanalysis Andrew Righter
[Cryptography] About those fingerprints ... Tim Dierks
[Cryptography] Availability of plaintext/ciphertext pairs (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help) Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Books on modern cryptanalysis Max Kington
[Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS (was Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption) Viktor Dukhovni
[Cryptography] About those fingerprints ... Ramsey Dow
[Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS (was Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption) Bill Stewart
[Cryptography] Books on modern cryptanalysis Jonathan Katz
[Cryptography] About those fingerprints ... Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] What TLS ciphersuites are still OK? Yaron Sheffer
[Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS (was Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption) Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Laws and cryptography John Gilmore
[Cryptography] Summary of the discussion so far Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Squaring Zooko's triangle Peter Fairbrother
[Cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Availability of plaintext/ciphertext pairs (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help) Nemo
[Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Squaring Zooko's triangle Guido Witmond
[Cryptography] Evaluating draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305 Adam Langley
[Cryptography] Availability of plaintext/ciphertext pairs (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help) Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Radioactive random numbers Dave Horsfall
[Cryptography] Killing two IV related birds with one stone Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Summary of the discussion so far Nemo
[Cryptography] Radioactive random numbers Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Availability of plaintext/ciphertext pairs (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help) Nemo
[Cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG James A. Donald
[Cryptography] Radioactive random numbers Chris Kuethe
[Cryptography] Killing two IV related birds with one stone Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Radioactive random numbers Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] Killing two IV related birds with one stone Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Radioactive random numbers Marcus D. Leech
[Cryptography] Radioactive random numbers Dan Veeneman
[Cryptography] Perfection versus Forward Secrecy John Gilmore
[Cryptography] Impossible trapdoor systems (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN") Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Matthew Green on BULLRUN: briefly censored John Gilmore
[Cryptography] Evaluating draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305 William Allen Simpson
[Cryptography] About those fingerprints ... Andrew W. Donoho
[Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] Radioactive random numbers Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] NIST announcement about Dual_EC_DRBG John Kemp
[Cryptography] Finding Entropy Isn't That Hard Kent Borg
[Cryptography] Killing two IV related birds with one stone Yaron Sheffer
[Cryptography] Radioactive random numbers Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Radioactive random numbers Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Killing two IV related birds with one stone Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Finding Entropy Isn't That Hard Kent Borg
[Cryptography] Perfection versus Forward Secrecy Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] real random numbers John Denker
[Cryptography] Books on modern cryptanalysis Jose Luis Gomez Pardo
[Cryptography] About those fingerprints ... Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] [cryptography] very little is missing for working BTNS in Openswan Nico Williams
[Cryptography] Killing two IV related birds with one stone Nico Williams
[Cryptography] Summary of the discussion so far Nico Williams
[Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? Nico Williams
[Cryptography] Perfection versus Forward Secrecy Guido Witmond
[Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS (was Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption) John Kelsey
[Cryptography] [cryptography] very little is missing for working BTNS in Openswan Paul Wouters
[Cryptography] [cryptography] very little is missing for working BTNS in Openswan Taral
[Cryptography] Thoughts on hardware randomness sources Thor Lancelot Simon
[Cryptography] Radioactive random numbers Thor Lancelot Simon
[Cryptography] Thoughts on hardware randomness sources Marcus D. Leech
[Cryptography] Perfection versus Forward Secrecy Eugen Leitl
[Cryptography] Introducing strangers. Was: Thoughts about keys Eugen Leitl
[Cryptography] Radioactive random numbers Eugen Leitl
[Cryptography] Stealthy Dopant-Level Hardware Trojans Eugen Leitl
[Cryptography] Finding Entropy Isn't That Hard Marcus Leech
[Cryptography] Stealthy Dopant-Level Hardware Trojans Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Finding Entropy Isn't That Hard Kent Borg
[Cryptography] Summary of the discussion so far Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Security is a total system problem (was Re: Perfection versus Forward Secrecy) Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Other curves and algos used in France Erwann ABALEA
[Cryptography] Summary of the discussion so far Nico Williams
[Cryptography] prism proof email, namespaces, and anonymity John Kelsey
[Cryptography] one time pads John Kelsey
[Cryptography] Summary of the discussion so far Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] prism proof email, namespaces, and anonymity Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] [cryptography] very little is missing for working BTNS in Openswan Nico Williams
[Cryptography] Credit for Trusting Trust Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Thoughts on hardware randomness sources Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Thoughts on hardware randomness sources Marcus D. Leech
[Cryptography] Summary of the discussion so far Max Kington
[Cryptography] Credit for Trusting Trust Jonathan Thornburg
[Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength Peter Fairbrother
[Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] prism proof email, namespaces, and anonymity Max Kington
[Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength Paul Hoffman
[Cryptography] Key management, key storage. (was Re: prism proof email, namespaces, and anonymity) Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength ianG
[Cryptography] Key management, key storage. (was Re: prism proof email, namespaces, and anonymity) Trevor Perrin
[Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength Peter Fairbrother
[Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength Adam Back
[Cryptography] Perfection versus Forward Secrecy Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] Quantum Computers for Shor's Algorithm (was Re: Perfection versus Forward Secrecy) Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] real random numbers John Denker
[Cryptography] Quantum Computers for Shor's Algorithm (was Re: Perfection versus Forward Secrecy) Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] Quantum Computers for Shor's Algorithm (was Re: Perfection versus Forward Secrecy) Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] real random numbers Kent Borg
[Cryptography] Security is a total system problem (was Re: Perfection versus Forward Secrecy) John Kelsey
[Cryptography] real random numbers John Kelsey
[Cryptography] Thoughts on hardware randomness sources Bill Stewart
[Cryptography] real random numbers Bill Stewart
[Cryptography] Security is a total system problem (was Re: Perfection versus Forward Secrecy) Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] real random numbers Sandy Harris
[Cryptography] real random numbers John Denker
[Cryptography] A lot to learn from "Business Records FISA NSA Review" John Gilmore
[Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] real random numbers Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] real random numbers ianG
[Cryptography] real random numbers Kent Borg
[Cryptography] prism proof email, namespaces, and anonymity Adam Back
[Cryptography] Security is a total system problem (was Re: Perfection versus Forward Secrecy) Dirk-Willem van Gulik
[Cryptography] real random numbers John Denker
[Cryptography] real random numbers John Kelsey
[Cryptography] real random numbers Watson Ladd
[Cryptography] prism proof email, namespaces, and anonymity John Kelsey
[Cryptography] real random numbers Kent Borg
[Cryptography] ADMIN: entropy of randomness discussion is falling... Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] prism proof email, namespaces, and anonymity StealthMonger
[Cryptography] djb's McBits (with Tung Chaou and Peter Schwabe) ianG
[Cryptography] real random numbers Joachim Strömbergson
[Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength Tero Kivinen
[Cryptography] A lot to learn from "Business Records FISA NSA Review" Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Broken RNG Generating Taiwanese Citizen Digital Certificates Kent Borg
[Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing Bill Frantz
[Cryptography] Apple and Certificate Pinning Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] End to end Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] End to end Ben Laurie
[Cryptography] MITM source patching [was Schneier got spooked] Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] End to end Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Radioactive random numbers Dave Horsfall
[Cryptography] AES [was NSA and cryptanalysis] Tim Newsham
[Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing Bill Frantz
[Cryptography] AES [was NSA and cryptanalysis] Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing Watson Ladd
[Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing Bill Frantz
[Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] End to end Christoph Gruber
[Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing ianG
[Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing ianG
[Cryptography] AES [was NSA and cryptanalysis] Dave Howe
[Cryptography] AES [was NSA and cryptanalysis] William Muriithi
[Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Radioactive random numbers Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing Sandy Harris
[Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] paranoid cryptoplumbing is a probably not defending the weakest point Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Radioactive random numbers Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Ivan Ristić blog post on TLS best practices Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] paranoid cryptoplumbing is a probably not defending the weakest point Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Ars Technica on the Taiwanese National ID smart card break Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] paranoid cryptoplumbing is a probably not defending the weakest point Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] End to end Max Kington
[Cryptography] paranoid cryptoplumbing is a probably not defending the weakest point Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] paranoid cryptoplumbing is a probably not defending the weakest point Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing Stephan Neuhaus
[Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening John Kemp
[Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS (was Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption) Paul Crowley
[Cryptography] paranoid cryptoplumbing is a probably not defending the weakest point Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] Johns Hopkins round table on NSA and Crypto Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Viktor Dukhovni
[Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing Bill Frantz
[Cryptography] An NSA mathematician shares his from-the-trenches view of the agency's surveillance activities John Gilmore
[Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing John Kelsey
[Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing Dan McDonald
[Cryptography] Gilmore response to NSA mathematician's "make rules for NSA" appeal John Gilmore
[Cryptography] An NSA mathematician shares his from-the-trenches view of the agency's surveillance activities John Gilmore
[Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing Bill Frantz
[Cryptography] FISA court releases its "Primary Order" re telephone metadata John Gilmore
[Cryptography] FISA court releases its "Primary Order" re telephone metadata Alfie John
[Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing John Kelsey
[Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing John Kelsey
[Cryptography] End to end Christoph Gruber
[Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Christian Huitema
[Cryptography] An NSA mathematician shares his from-the-trenches view of the agency's surveillance activities ianG
[Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening ianG
[Cryptography] End to end Max Kington
[Cryptography] Some (limited) info about Apple A7 security for fingerprints, keychains Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] An NSA mathematician shares his from-the-trenches view of the agency's surveillance activities Lodewijk andré de la porte
[Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Albert Lunde
[Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Viktor Dukhovni
[Cryptography] An NSA mathematician shares his from-the-trenches view of the agency's surveillance activities Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Gilmore response to NSA mathematician's "make rules for NSA" appeal Walter van Holst
[Cryptography] An NSA mathematician shares his from-the-trenches view of the agency's surveillance activities Pat Farrell
[Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Ben Laurie
[Cryptography] Gilmore response to NSA mathematician's "make rules for NSA" appeal Kent Borg
[Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening John Kemp
[Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Viktor Dukhovni
[Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Bill Frantz
[Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength Lucky Green
[Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Viktor Dukhovni
[Cryptography] Gilmore response to NSA mathematician's "make rules for NSA" appeal Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Robin Alden
[Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Carl Wallace
[Cryptography] [cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength Joachim Strömbergson
[Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening ianG
[Cryptography] The Case for Formal Verification Derek Jones
[Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Salz, Rich
[Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] A lot to learn from "Business Records FISA NSA Review" Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Cryptographic mailto: URI Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Bill Frantz
[Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Ben Laurie
[Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Max Kington
[Cryptography] Johns Hopkins round table on NSA and Crypto Jens Kubieziel
[Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Cryptographic mailto: URI Dirk-Willem van Gulik
[Cryptography] The Case for Formal Verification Tim Newsham
[Cryptography] Cryptographic mailto: URI Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength Ben Laurie
[Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products. Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Specification: Prism Proof Email Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products. Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] The Case for Formal Verification Tim Newsham
[Cryptography] InfoRequest: How to configure email clients to accept encrypted S/MIME Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Russell Nelson
[Cryptography] Specification: Prism Proof Email Bill Frantz
[Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength Patrick Pelletier
[Cryptography] What is Intel® Core™ vPro™ Technology Animation d.nix
[Cryptography] MITM source patching [was Schneier got spooked] grarpamp
[Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products. Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening John Kelsey
[Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength Stephen Farrell
[Cryptography] The Case for Formal Verification Derek Jones
[Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength Bill Frantz
[Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength Viktor Dukhovni
[Cryptography] What is Intel® Core™ vPro™ Technology Animation Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] What is Intel® Core™ vPro™ Technology Animation d.nix
[Cryptography] The hypothetical random number generator backdoor Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] What is Intel® Core™ vPro™ Technology Animation Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Fwd: Re: What is Intel® Core™ vPro™ Technology Animation d.nix
[Cryptography] Cryptographic mailto: URI Dirk-Willem van Gulik
[Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products. ianG
[Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength ianG
[Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength Peter Fairbrother
[Cryptography] Gilmore response to NSA mathematician's "make rules for NSA" appeal John Kelsey
[Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening ianG
[Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength David Kuehling
[Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength Ralph Holz
[Cryptography] The hypothetical random number generator backdoor Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products. Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength Kelly John Rose
[Cryptography] Gilmore response to NSA mathematician's "make rules for NSA" appeal Kelly John Rose
[Cryptography] Hardware Trojan Protection Bill Frantz
[Cryptography] The hypothetical random number generator backdoor Gerardus Hendricks
[Cryptography] The hypothetical random number generator backdoor John Kelsey
[Cryptography] The hypothetical random number generator backdoor Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] The hypothetical random number generator backdoor Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Gilmore response to NSA mathematician's "make rules for NSA" appeal james hughes
[Cryptography] The hypothetical random number generator backdoor Alan Braggins
[Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] Gilmore response to NSA mathematician's "make rules for NSA" appeal Eugen Leitl
[Cryptography] forward-secrecy >=2048-bit in legacy browser/servers? (Re: RSA equivalent key length/strength) Adam Back
[Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products. Kristian Gjøsteen
[Cryptography] Hardware Trojan Protection Lodewijk andré de la porte
[Cryptography] Gilmore response to NSA mathematician's "make rules for NSA" appeal Anne & Lynn Wheeler
[Cryptography] The hypothetical random number generator backdoor Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products. Alan Braggins
[Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength ianG
[Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products. ianG
[Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products. Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] The hypothetical random number generator backdoor Nico Williams
[Cryptography] Gilmore response to NSA mathematician's "make rules for NSA" appeal John Kelsey
[Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength Bill Frantz
[Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products. Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength Peter Fairbrother
[Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products. Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] forward-secrecy >=2048-bit in legacy browser/servers? (Re: RSA equivalent key length/strength) Peter Fairbrother
[Cryptography] forward-secrecy >=2048-bit in legacy browser/servers? (Re: RSA equivalent key length/strength) Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products. ianG
[Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products. ianG
[Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength ianG
[Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products. Dave Horsfall
[Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products. Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] psyops David Honig
[Cryptography] Gilmore response to NSA mathematician's "make rules for NSA" appeal james hughes
[Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength John Gilmore
[Cryptography] [cryptography] Asynchronous forward secrecy encryption Eugen Leitl
[Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] heterotic authority + web-of-trust + pinning John Denker
[Cryptography] Gilmore response to NSA mathematician's "make rules for NSA" appeal Stephen Farrell
[Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength Viktor Dukhovni
[Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength ianG
[Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength James A. Donald
[Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products. James A. Donald
[Cryptography] TLS2 ianG
[Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products. Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products. Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength Lodewijk andré de la porte
[Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength James A. Donald
[Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength James A. Donald
[Cryptography] NIST about to weaken SHA3? Christoph Anton Mitterer
[Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength Viktor Dukhovni
[Cryptography] NIST about to weaken SHA3? James A. Donald
[Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products. James A. Donald
[Cryptography] NIST about to weaken SHA3? Viktor Dukhovni
[Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength Taral
[Cryptography] TLS2 Stephen Farrell
[Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength David Kuehling
[Cryptography] NIST about to weaken SHA3? James A. Donald
[Cryptography] TLS2 Adam Back
[Cryptography] check-summed keys in secret ciphers? ianG
[Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ized ianG
[Cryptography] TLS2 ianG
[Cryptography] TLS2 Adam Back
[Cryptography] [cryptography] TLS2 Ben Laurie
[Cryptography] three crypto lists - why and which Adam Back
[Cryptography] TLS2 Hanno Böck
[Cryptography] NIST about to weaken SHA3? Viktor Dukhovni
[Cryptography] TLS2 dan at geer.org
[Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ized Mark Atwood
[Cryptography] check-summed keys in secret ciphers? Bill Frantz
[Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ized Salz, Rich
[Cryptography] check-summed keys in secret ciphers? John Kelsey
[Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Salz, Rich
[Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength Peter Fairbrother
[Cryptography] check-summed keys in secret ciphers? Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] NIST about to weaken SHA3? James A. Donald
[Cryptography] TLS2 James A. Donald
[Cryptography] NIST about to weaken SHA3? Christoph Anton Mitterer
[Cryptography] TLS2 Philipp Gühring
[Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength John Kelsey
[Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength John Kelsey
[Cryptography] TLS2 Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Bill Frantz
[Cryptography] NIST about to weaken SHA3? Watson Ladd
[Cryptography] TLS2 Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] NIST about to weaken SHA3? Viktor Dukhovni
[Cryptography] check-summed keys in secret ciphers? arxlight
[Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength James A. Donald
[Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength James A. Donald
[Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ized James A. Donald
[Cryptography] check-summed keys in secret ciphers? Bill Frantz
[Cryptography] Sha3 John Kelsey
[Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ized Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] NIST about to weaken SHA3? Bill Frantz
[Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening d.nix
[Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ized Mark Atwood
[Cryptography] NIST about to weaken SHA3? James A. Donald
[Cryptography] NIST about to weaken SHA3? James A. Donald
[Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ized Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] Sha3 James A. Donald
[Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ized Mark Atwood
[Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ized Jerry Leichter

Last message date: Mon Sep 30 23:50:10 EDT 2013
Archived on: Tue Oct 1 12:04:49 EDT 2013

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