[Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening
Carl Wallace
carl at redhoundsoftware.com
Wed Sep 18 22:28:52 EDT 2013
On 9/18/13 5:50 PM, "Viktor Dukhovni" <cryptography at dukhovni.org> wrote:
>On Wed, Sep 18, 2013 at 08:47:17PM +0000, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Sep 18, 2013 at 08:04:04PM +0100, Ben Laurie wrote:
>>
>> > > This is only realistic with DANE TLSA (certificate usage 2 or 3),
>> > > and thus will start to be realistic for SMTP next year (provided
>> > > DNSSEC gets off the ground) with the release of Postfix 2.11, and
>> > > with luck also a DANE-capable Exim release.
>> >
>> > What's wrong with name-constrained intermediates?
>>
>> X.509 name constraints (critical extensions in general) typically
>> don't work.
>
>And public CAs don't generally sell intermediate CAs with name
>constraints. Rather undercuts their business model.
The inability to constrain trust anchors doesn't help matters much either.
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