[Cryptography] What TLS ciphersuites are still OK?

[Yaron Sheffer]

On 09/11/2013 12:54 PM, Alan Braggins wrote:
> On 10/09/13 15:58, james hughes wrote:
>> On Sep 9, 2013, at 9:10 PM, Tony Arcieri <bascule at gmail.com
>> <mailto:bascule at gmail.com>> wrote:
>>> On Mon, Sep 9, 2013 at 9:29 AM, Ben Laurie <ben at links.org
>>> <mailto:ben at links.org>> wrote:
>>>
>>>     And the brief summary is: there's only one ciphersuite left that's
>>>     good, and unfortunately its only available in TLS 1.2:
>>>
>>>     TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
>>>
>>> A lot of people don't like GCM either ;)
>>
>> Yes, GCM does have implementation sensitivities particularly around the
>> IV generation. That being said, the algorithm is better than most and
>> the implementation sensitivity obvious (don't ever reuse an IV).
>
> I think the difficulty of getting a fast constant time implementation on
> platforms without AES-NI type hardware support are more of a concern.

Is this any different from plain old AES-CBC?