August 2016 Archives by thread

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Starting: Thu Aug 4 08:22:08 EDT 2016
Ending: Wed Aug 31 16:34:26 EDT 2016
Messages: 280

• [Cryptography] ChaCha20 DRNG   Stephan Mueller
  • [Cryptography] ChaCha20 DRNG   Jason Cooper
    • [Cryptography] ChaCha20 DRNG   Stephan Mueller
      • [Cryptography] ChaCha20 DRNG   Jason Cooper
  • [Cryptography] ChaCha20 DRNG   Patrick
    • [Cryptography] ChaCha20 DRNG   Stephan Mueller
    • [Cryptography] ChaCha20 DRNG   Jason Cooper
  • [Cryptography] [patch chacha20_drng 0/4] Small cleanups for chacha20_drng   Jason Cooper
    • [Cryptography] [patch chacha20_drng 1/4] Add .gitignore file   Jason Cooper
    • [Cryptography] [patch chacha20_drng 2/4] doc: Update license block to match source code   Jason Cooper
    • [Cryptography] [patch chacha20_drng 3/4] API: Remove version macros   Jason Cooper
    • [Cryptography] [patch chacha20_drng 4/4] API: Make _versionstring return snprintf() errors   Jason Cooper
    • [Cryptography] [patch chacha20_drng 0/4] Small cleanups for chacha20_drng   Stephan Mueller
      • [Cryptography] [patch chacha20_drng 0/4] Small cleanups for chacha20_drng   Jason Cooper
• [Cryptography] Service-to-Service Object Integrity   Jomama
• [Cryptography] Generating random values in a particular range   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] Generating random values in a particular range   Sidney Markowitz
    • [Cryptography] Generating random values in a particular range   John Levine
      • [Cryptography] Generating random values in a particular range   Sidney Markowitz
      • [Cryptography] Generating random values in a particular range   Sidney Markowitz
      • [Cryptography] Generating random values in a particular range   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] Generating random values in a particular range   Bill Stewart
      • [Cryptography] Generating random values in a particular range   John-Mark Gurney
      • [Cryptography] Generating random values in a particular range   Sidney Markowitz
      • [Cryptography] Generating random values in a particular range   Tom Mitchell
    • [Cryptography] Generating random values in a particular range   dj at deadhat.com
      • [Cryptography] Generating random values in a particular range   Ray Dillinger
    • [Cryptography] Generating random values in a particular range   Watson Ladd
      • [Cryptography] Generating random values in a particular range   dj at deadhat.com
      • [Cryptography] Generating random values in a particular range   Ray Dillinger
  • [Cryptography] Generating random values in a particular range   Kent Borg
  • [Cryptography] Generating random values in a particular range   Ray Dillinger
    • [Cryptography] Generating random values in a particular range   Sidney Markowitz
  • [Cryptography] Generating random values in a particular range   Arnold Reinhold
  • [Cryptography] Generating random values in a particular range   Arnold Reinhold
• [Cryptography] Where to Find PQC Crypto Libraries?   Lucky Green
  • [Cryptography] Where to Find PQC Crypto Libraries?   Jeff Burdges
    • [Cryptography] Where to Find PQC Crypto Libraries?   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] Where to Find PQC Crypto Libraries?   Jeff Burdges
  • [Cryptography] Where to Find PQC Crypto Libraries?   Philipp Gühring
• [Cryptography] BBC to deploy detection vans to snoop on internet users   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] BBC to deploy detection vans to snoop on internet users   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] BBC to deploy detection vans to snoop on internet users   John Ioannidis
      • [Cryptography] BBC to deploy detection vans to snoop on internet users   Sampo Syreeni
      • [Cryptography] BBC to deploy detection vans to snoop on internet users   Dave Horsfall
      • [Cryptography] BBC to deploy detection vans to snoop on internet users   Dave Howe
      • [Cryptography] BBC to deploy detection vans to snoop on internet users   james hughes
      • [Cryptography] BBC to deploy detection vans to snoop on internet users   dj at deadhat.com
      • [Cryptography] BBC to deploy detection vans to snoop on internet users   Ray Dillinger
    • [Cryptography] BBC to deploy detection vans to snoop on internet users   Tom Mitchell
    • [Cryptography] BBC to deploy detection vans to snoop on internet users   Kristian Gjøsteen
      • [Cryptography] BBC to deploy detection vans to snoop on internet users   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] BBC to deploy detection vans to snoop on internet users   ianG
  • [Cryptography] BBC to deploy detection vans to snoop on [I]nternet users   Dave Horsfall
  • [Cryptography] BBC to deploy detection vans to snoop on internet users   Peter Gutmann
  • [Cryptography] BBC to deploy detection vans to snoop on internet users   mok-kong shen
• [Cryptography] Public-key auth as envisaged by first-year science students   Peter Gutmann
  • [Cryptography] Public-key auth as envisaged by first-year science students   Ron Garret
    • [Cryptography] Public-key auth as envisaged by first-year science students   John Denker
      • [Cryptography] Public-key auth as envisaged by first-year science students   David Kane-Parry
    • [Cryptography] Public-key auth as envisaged by first-year science students   Yui Hirasawa
      • [Cryptography] Public-key auth as envisaged by first-year science students   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Public-key auth as envisaged by first-year science students   Michael Kjörling
      • [Cryptography] Public-key auth as envisaged by first-year science students   Dave Howe
      • [Cryptography] Public-key auth as envisaged by first-year science students   Michael Kjörling
      • [Cryptography] Public-key auth as envisaged by first-year science students   Dave Howe
      • [Cryptography] Public-key auth as envisaged by first-year science students   mok-kong shen
      • [Cryptography] Public-key auth as envisaged by first-year science students   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] Public-key auth as envisaged by first-year science students   Christian Huitema
  • [Cryptography] Public-key auth as envisaged by first-year science students   Ralf Senderek
    • [Cryptography] Public-key auth as envisaged by first-year science students   Michael Kjörling
  • [Cryptography] Public-key auth as envisaged by first-year science students   Ralf Senderek
• [Cryptography] Apple iOS and Keychain Sharing Security   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] Pascal Coin: A P2P cryptocurrency without need of historical operations   BPascal BlockChain
• [Cryptography] N. Korean radio broadcasts string of random numbers   Jan Pechanec
  • [Cryptography] N. Korean radio broadcasts string of random numbers   grarpamp
    • [Cryptography] N. Korean radio broadcasts string of random numbers   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] N. Korean radio broadcasts string of random numbers   Bill Cox
      • [Cryptography] N. Korean radio broadcasts string of random numbers   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] N. Korean radio broadcasts string of random numbers   grarpamp
• [Cryptography] Electronic currency revived after 20-year hiatus   Robert Hettinga
  • [Cryptography] Electronic currency revived after 20-year hiatus   Allen
    • [Cryptography] Electronic currency revived after 20-year hiatus   Robert Hettinga
  • [Cryptography] Electronic currency revived after 20-year hiatus   Ray Dillinger
    • [Cryptography] Electronic currency revived after 20-year hiatus   Allen
      • [Cryptography] Electronic currency revived after 20-year hiatus   Tony Arcieri
      • [Cryptography] Electronic currency revived after 20-year hiatus   Peter Todd
    • [Cryptography] Electronic currency revived after 20-year hiatus   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] Electronic currency revived after 20-year hiatus   Allen
      • [Cryptography] Electronic currency revived after 20-year hiatus   Natanael
      • [Cryptography] Electronic currency revived after 20-year hiatus   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Electronic currency revived after 20-year hiatus   Natanael
      • [Cryptography] Electronic currency revived after 20-year hiatus   Peter Todd
      • [Cryptography] Electronic currency revived after 20-year hiatus   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] Electronic currency revived after 20-year hiatus   Peter Todd
      • [Cryptography] Electronic currency revived after 20-year hiatus   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Electronic currency revived after 20-year hiatus   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Electronic currency revived after 20-year hiatus   Peter Todd
      • [Cryptography] Electronic currency revived after 20-year hiatus   Allen
      • [Cryptography] Electronic currency revived after 20-year hiatus   Peter Todd
      • [Cryptography] Electronic currency revived after 20-year hiatus   Allen
      • [Cryptography] Electronic currency revived after 20-year hiatus   Peter Todd
      • [Cryptography] Electronic currency revived after 20-year hiatus   Ben Laurie
      • [Cryptography] Electronic currency revived after 20-year hiatus   Peter Todd
      • [Cryptography] Electronic currency revived after 20-year hiatus   Natanael
      • [Cryptography] Electronic currency revived after 20-year hiatus   Jehan Tremback
      • [Cryptography] Electronic currency revived after 20-year hiatus   Jehan Tremback
• [Cryptography] A conversation with Dan Boneh (2016-08-01 transcript)   Bryan Bishop
• [Cryptography] Shadow Brokers :: powerful NSA hacking tools leaked   John Denker
  • [Cryptography] Shadow Brokers :: powerful NSA hacking tools leaked   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] Shadow Brokers :: powerful NSA hacking tools leaked   Ray Dillinger
• [Cryptography] Phishing Attacks - Alice, HAL and Bob   Joseph Kilcullen
  • [Cryptography] Phishing Attacks - Alice, HAL and Bob   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] Phishing Attacks - Alice, HAL and Bob   Dirk-Willem van Gulik
    • [Cryptography] Phishing Attacks - Alice, HAL and Bob   Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • [Cryptography] Phishing Attacks - Alice, HAL and Bob   Joseph Kilcullen
    • [Cryptography] Phishing Attacks - Alice, HAL and Bob   Maxime MEYER
      • [Cryptography] Phishing Attacks - Alice, HAL and Bob   Joseph Kilcullen
• [Cryptography] Confidential Document Management, the right name or weaselly marketing?   Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • [Cryptography] Confidential Document Management, the right name or weaselly marketing?   Bill Frantz
    • [Cryptography] Confidential Document Management, the right name or weaselly marketing?   Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • [Cryptography] Confidential Document Management, the right name or weaselly marketing?   Natanael
• [Cryptography] Robust Linked Timestamps without Proof of Work.   Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • [Cryptography] Robust Linked Timestamps without Proof of Work.   Jameson Lopp
    • [Cryptography] Robust Linked Timestamps without Proof of Work.   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] Robust Linked Timestamps without Proof of Work.   Jameson Lopp
      • [Cryptography] Robust Linked Timestamps without Proof of Work.   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] Robust Linked Timestamps without Proof of Work.   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] Robust Linked Timestamps without Proof of Work.   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] Robust Linked Timestamps without Proof of Work.   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] Robust Linked Timestamps without Proof of Work.   Peter Todd
      • [Cryptography] Robust Linked Timestamps without Proof of Work.   Peter Todd
      • [Cryptography] Robust Linked Timestamps without Proof of Work.   John Levine
      • [Cryptography] Robust Linked Timestamps without Proof of Work.   Ron Garret
  • [Cryptography] Robust Linked Timestamps without Proof of Work.   Allen
    • [Cryptography] Robust Linked Timestamps without Proof of Work.   Allen
  • [Cryptography] Robust Linked Timestamps without Proof of Work.   Peter Todd
• [Cryptography] UK report on "Bulk Powers Review" of GCHQ interception   John Gilmore
• [Cryptography] What is the status quo of the zero trust model?   mok-kong shen
• [Cryptography] MaidSafe   J.M. Porup
  • [Cryptography] MaidSafe   Lee Clagett
• [Cryptography] What is the state of the art in policy specification systems?   John Ioannidis
  • [Cryptography] What is the state of the art in policy specification systems?   Randy Bush
• [Cryptography] Real-world crypto/PRNG problem: Bridge   Salz, Rich
  • [Cryptography] Real-world crypto/PRNG problem: Bridge   Christian Huitema
    • [Cryptography] Real-world crypto/PRNG problem: Bridge   Tom Mitchell
  • [Cryptography] Real-world crypto/PRNG problem: Bridge   Ray Dillinger
  • [Cryptography] Real-world crypto/PRNG problem: Bridge   Jon Callas
    • [Cryptography] Real-world crypto/PRNG problem: Bridge   Jon Callas
      • [Cryptography] Real-world crypto/PRNG problem: Bridge   Joshua Marpet
      • [Cryptography] Real-world crypto/PRNG problem: Bridge   Viktor Dukhovni
      • [Cryptography] Real-world crypto/PRNG problem: Bridge   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Real-world crypto/PRNG problem: Bridge   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] Real-world crypto/PRNG problem: Bridge   Jon Callas
      • [Cryptography] Real-world crypto/PRNG problem: Bridge   Nicolas Hammond
      • [Cryptography] Real-world crypto/PRNG problem: Bridge   Jon Callas
      • [Cryptography] Real-world crypto/PRNG problem: Bridge   Patrick
      • [Cryptography] Real-world crypto/PRNG problem: Bridge   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] Real-world crypto/PRNG problem: Bridge   Dave Horsfall
      • [Cryptography] Real-world crypto/PRNG problem: Bridge   Tom Mitchell
  • [Cryptography] Real-world crypto/PRNG problem: Bridge   Thierry Moreau
    • [Cryptography] Real-world crypto/PRNG problem: Bridge   Thierry Moreau
• [Cryptography] Voynich Manuscript to be published   Dave Horsfall
  • [Cryptography] Voynich Manuscript to be published   Chris Kuethe
  • [Cryptography] Voynich Manuscript to be published   John Levine
    • [Cryptography] Voynich Manuscript to be published   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] "NSA-linked Cisco exploit poses bigger threat than previously thought"   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] "NSA-linked Cisco exploit poses bigger threat than previously thought"   Kent Borg
    • [Cryptography] "NSA-linked Cisco exploit poses bigger threat than previously thought"   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] "NSA-linked Cisco exploit poses bigger threat than previously thought"   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] "NSA-linked Cisco exploit poses bigger threat than previously thought"   alex at alten.org
      • [Cryptography] "NSA-linked Cisco exploit poses bigger threat than previously thought"   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] "NSA-linked Cisco exploit poses bigger threat than previously thought"   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] "NSA-linked Cisco exploit poses bigger threat than previously thought"   Sebastian Krahmer
      • [Cryptography] "NSA-linked Cisco exploit poses bigger threat than previously thought"   Watson Ladd
      • [Cryptography] "NSA-linked Cisco exploit poses bigger threat than previously thought"   Kent Borg
      • [Cryptography] "NSA-linked Cisco exploit poses bigger threat than previously thought"   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] "NSA-linked Cisco exploit poses bigger threat than previously thought"   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] "NSA-linked Cisco exploit poses bigger threat than previously thought"   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] Programming language technology (was Re: "NSA-linked Cisco exploit poses bigger threat than previously thought")   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] programming languages and the people who (don't) love them, was "NSA-linked Cisco exploit poses bigger threat than previously thought"   John Levine
      • [Cryptography] programming languages and the people who (don't) love them, was "NSA-linked Cisco exploit poses bigger threat than previously thought"   Kent Borg
      • [Cryptography] programming languages and the people who (don't) love them, was "NSA-linked Cisco exploit poses bigger threat than previously thought"   John Levine
      • [Cryptography] programming languages and the people who (don't) love them, was "NSA-linked Cisco exploit poses bigger threat than previously thought"   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] programming languages and the people who (don't) love them, was "NSA-linked Cisco exploit poses bigger threat than previously thought"   Walter van Holst
      • [Cryptography] programming languages and the people who (don't) love them, was "NSA-linked Cisco exploit poses bigger threat than previously thought"   Brian Smith
      • [Cryptography] "NSA-linked Cisco exploit poses bigger threat than previously thought"   John Levine
      • [Cryptography] "NSA-linked Cisco exploit poses bigger threat than previously thought"   Viktor Dukhovni
      • [Cryptography] "NSA-linked Cisco exploit poses bigger threat than previously thought"   Ron Garret
      • [Cryptography] "NSA-linked Cisco exploit poses bigger threat than previously thought"   Steven M. Bellovin
      • [Cryptography] "NSA-linked Cisco exploit poses bigger threat than previously thought"   Patrick Chkoreff
    • [Cryptography] "NSA-linked Cisco exploit poses bigger threat than previously thought"   Peter Gutmann
  • [Cryptography] "NSA-linked Cisco exploit poses bigger threat than previously thought"   Dave Horsfall
    • [Cryptography] "NSA-linked Cisco exploit poses bigger threat than previously thought"   Steven M. Bellovin
      • [Cryptography] "NSA-linked Cisco exploit poses bigger threat than previously thought"   Kent Borg
      • [Cryptography] "NSA-linked Cisco exploit poses bigger threat than previously thought"   Ron Garret
      • [Cryptography] "NSA-linked Cisco exploit poses bigger threat than previously thought"   Dan McDonald
      • [Cryptography] tail recursion in C [was Re: "NSA-linked Cisco exploit poses bigger threat than previously thought"]   D. Hugh Redelmeier
      • [Cryptography] tail recursion in C [was Re: "NSA-linked Cisco exploit poses bigger threat than previously thought"]   Ron Garret
      • [Cryptography] tail recursion in C [was Re: "NSA-linked Cisco exploit poses bigger threat than previously thought"]   Howard Chu
      • [Cryptography] tail recursion in C [was Re: "NSA-linked Cisco exploit poses bigger threat than previously thought"]   Ron Garret
      • [Cryptography] tail recursion in C [was Re: "NSA-linked Cisco exploit poses bigger threat than previously thought"]   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] tail recursion in C [was Re: "NSA-linked Cisco exploit poses bigger threat than previously thought"]   Ron Garret
      • [Cryptography] tail recursion in C [was Re: "NSA-linked Cisco exploit poses bigger threat than previously thought"]   Howard Chu
      • [Cryptography] tail recursion in C [was Re: "NSA-linked Cisco exploit poses bigger threat than previously thought"]   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] tail recursion in C [was Re: "NSA-linked Cisco exploit poses bigger threat than previously thought"]   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] tail recursion in C [was Re: "NSA-linked Cisco exploit poses bigger threat than previously thought"]   John Levine
      • [Cryptography] tail recursion in C [was Re: "NSA-linked Cisco exploit poses bigger threat than previously thought"]   Ron Garret
      • [Cryptography] tail recursion in C [was Re: "NSA-linked Cisco exploit poses bigger threat than previously thought"]   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] tail recursion in C [was Re: "NSA-linked Cisco exploit poses bigger threat than previously thought"]   Ron Garret
    • [Cryptography] "NSA-linked Cisco exploit poses bigger threat than previously thought"   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] Insecure email might be an even bigger problem than we suspected   Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • [Cryptography] Insecure email might be an even bigger problem than we suspected   Ray Dillinger
    • [Cryptography] Insecure email might be an even bigger problem than we suspected   Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • [Cryptography] Insecure email might be an even bigger problem than we suspected   Tom Mitchell
    • [Cryptography] Insecure email might be an even bigger problem than we suspected   Ray Dillinger
• [Cryptography] Retire all 64-bit block ciphers.   Ray Dillinger
• [Cryptography] ORWL - The First Open Source, Physically Secure Computer   Russ Nelson
  • [Cryptography] ORWL - The First Open Source, Physically Secure Computer   Ray Dillinger
    • [Cryptography] ORWL - The First Open Source, Physically Secure Computer   Chris Kuethe
    • [Cryptography] ORWL - The First Open Source, Physically Secure Computer   J.M. Porup
      • [Cryptography] ORWL - The First Open Source, Physically Secure Computer   Peter Todd
      • [Cryptography] ORWL - The First Open Source, Physically Secure Computer   grarpamp
      • [Cryptography] ORWL - The First Open Source, Physically Secure Computer   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] ORWL - The First Open Source, Physically Secure Computer   Allen
      • [Cryptography] ORWL - The First Open Source, Physically Secure Computer   dj at deadhat.com
      • [Cryptography] What is a safe CPU? (was Re: ORWL - The First Open Source, Physically Secure Computer)   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] ORWL - The First Open Source, Physically Secure Computer   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] ORWL - The First Open Source, Physically Secure Computer   Ben Laurie
      • [Cryptography] ORWL - The First Open Source, Physically Secure Computer   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] ORWL - The First Open Source, Physically Secure Computer   Ben Laurie
      • [Cryptography] ORWL - The First Open Source, Physically Secure Computer   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] ORWL - The First Open Source, Physically Secure Computer   Ben Laurie
      • [Cryptography] ORWL - The First Open Source, Physically Secure Computer   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] Capability Systems (was Re: ORWL - The First Open Source, Physically Secure Computer)   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Capability Systems (was Re: ORWL - The First Open Source, Physically Secure Computer)   Ben Laurie
      • [Cryptography] Capability Systems (was Re: ORWL - The First Open Source, Physically Secure Computer)   Rob Meijer
      • [Cryptography] Capability Systems   Jeff Burdges
      • [Cryptography] ORWL - The First Open Source, Physically Secure Computer   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] ORWL - The First Open Source, Physically Secure Computer   Ron Garret
      • [Cryptography] ORWL - The First Open Source, Physically Secure Computer   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] ORWL - The First Open Source, Physically Secure Computer   Randy Bush
      • [Cryptography] ORWL - The First Open Source, Physically Secure Computer   Joseph Kilcullen
      • [Cryptography] ORWL - The First Open Source, Physically Secure Computer   grarpamp
  • [Cryptography] ORWL - The First Open Source, Physically Secure Computer   Dave Horsfall
  • [Cryptography] ORWL - The First Open Source, Physically Secure Computer   Ben Laurie
  • [Cryptography] ORWL - The First Open Source, Physically Secure Computer   Tom Mitchell
• [Cryptography] Say 'unguessable' not random   Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • [Cryptography] Say 'unguessable' not random   Ray Dillinger
    • [Cryptography] Say 'unguessable' not random   james hughes
  • [Cryptography] Say 'unguessable' not random   Patrick Chkoreff
    • [Cryptography] Say 'unguessable' not random   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] Say 'unguessable' not random   Kent Borg
• [Cryptography] Hashing with CTR mode?   Judson Lester
• [Cryptography] Secure VNC implementation   William Muriithi
  • [Cryptography] Secure VNC implementation   John Levine
    • [Cryptography] Secure VNC implementation   Albert Lunde
      • [Cryptography] Secure VNC implementation   William Muriithi
    • [Cryptography] Secure VNC implementation   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Secure VNC implementation   John Levine
• [Cryptography] Key meshing (Re: [Crypto-practicum] Retire all 64-bit block ciphers.)   Dmitry Belyavsky
  • [Cryptography] Key meshing (Re: [Crypto-practicum] Retire all 64-bit block ciphers.)   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] Key meshing (Re: [Crypto-practicum] Retire all 64-bit block ciphers.)   Dmitry Belyavsky
      • [Cryptography] Key meshing (Re: [Crypto-practicum] Retire all 64-bit block ciphers.)   Stanislav V. Smyshlyaev
  • [Cryptography] Key meshing (Re: [Crypto-practicum] Retire all 64-bit block ciphers.)   Phillip Hallam-Baker
    • [Cryptography] Key meshing (Re: [Crypto-practicum] Retire all 64-bit block ciphers.)   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] Key meshing (Re: [Crypto-practicum] Retire all 64-bit block ciphers.)   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] Key meshing (Re: [Crypto-practicum] Retire all 64-bit block ciphers.)   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] Key meshing (Re: [Crypto-practicum] Retire all 64-bit block ciphers.)   Stanislav V. Smyshlyaev
    • [Cryptography] Key meshing (Re: [Crypto-practicum] Retire all 64-bit block ciphers.)   Kristian Gjøsteen
      • [Cryptography] Key meshing (Re: [Crypto-practicum] Retire all 64-bit block ciphers.)   Natanael
• [Cryptography] foreign hacks of state election systems   John Denker
• [Cryptography] FBI says foreign hackers have penetrated US state election databases.   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Strength of 3DES?   Richard Outerbridge
  • [Cryptography] Strength of 3DES?   Scott G. Kelly
    • [Cryptography] Strength of 3DES?   Jon Callas
      • [Cryptography] Strength of 3DES?   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] Strength of 3DES?   Peter Gutmann
• [Cryptography] MATH: Unlikely correctness of paper will break some discrete logarithm over F_p^*   Georgi Guninski
  • [Cryptography] MATH: Unlikely correctness of paper will break some discrete logarithm over F_p^*   Kristian Gjøsteen

Last message date: Wed Aug 31 16:34:26 EDT 2016
Archived on: Wed Aug 31 16:46:26 EDT 2016

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