[Cryptography] Robust Linked Timestamps without Proof of Work.

[Ray Dillinger]

On 08/19/2016 05:55 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:

> ​Explain the attack more fully. Assume that each server is signing each
> output value and has a trust relationship with the parties it exchanges
> values with.​
> 
> The key servers are not anonymous entries or random bloggers.

So you have Trent instead of Sibyl.  Technically either is just as bad,
and nobody wants to take the time and trouble to deal with Trent.  The
whole point of the Proof-of-work thing is that Sibyl can't do damage
for free.  If you're using a Trusted system with gatekeepers who can
screw it over or keep people out, then you don't have Sibyl in the first
place.  But that doesn't mean you have a problem that's any smaller.

					Bear

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