August 2013 Archives by date
Starting: Fri Aug 9 16:07:42 EDT 2013
Ending: Sat Aug 31 23:02:26 EDT 2013
Messages: 169
- [Cryptography] LeastAuthority.com announces PRISM-proof storage service
Zooko Wilcox-OHearn
- [Cryptography] LeastAuthority.com announces PRISM-proof storage service
arxlight
- [Cryptography] Open Letter to Phil Zimmermann and Jon Callas of Silent Circle, On The Closure of the “Silent Mail” Service
Zooko Wilcox-OHearn
- [Cryptography] What is the state of patents on elliptic curve cryptography?
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] What is the state of patents on elliptic curve cryptography?
Zooko Wilcox-OHearn
- [Cryptography] What is the state of patents on elliptic curve cryptography?
Phillip Hallam-Baker
- [Cryptography] What is the state of patents on elliptic curve cryptography?
Jerry Leichter
- [Cryptography] What is the state of patents on elliptic curve cryptography?
James A. Donald
- [Cryptography] What is the state of patents on elliptic curve cryptography?
Phillip Hallam-Baker
- [Cryptography] PRISM PROOF Email
Phillip Hallam-Baker
- [Cryptography] PRISM PROOF Email
Carl Ellison
- [Cryptography] PRISM PROOF Email
Philip Whitehouse
- [Cryptography] PRISM PROOF Email
Phillip Hallam-Baker
- [Cryptography] PRISM PROOF Email
Phillip Hallam-Baker
- [Cryptography] PRISM PROOF Email
Ben Laurie
- [Cryptography] PRISM PROOF Email
Phillip Hallam-Baker
- [Cryptography] PRISM PROOF Email
Ray Dillinger
- [Cryptography] Implementations, attacks on DHTs, Mix Nets?
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] Implementations, attacks on DHTs, Mix Nets?
Ralph Holz
- [Cryptography] Traffic Analysis (was Re: PRISM PROOF Email)
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] Thoughts about keys
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] "Hey! You! Get off of the cloud!"
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] PRISM PROOF Email
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks
Christian Huitema
- [Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] Implementations, attacks on DHTs, Mix Nets?
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] Implementations, attacks on DHTs, Mix Nets?
Christian Huitema
- [Cryptography] Implementations, attacks on DHTs, Mix Nets?
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] Implementations, attacks on DHTs, Mix Nets?
Christian Huitema
- [Cryptography] Implementations, attacks on DHTs, Mix Nets?
James A. Donald
- [Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks
Jerry Leichter
- [Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks
Jerry Leichter
- [Cryptography] Traffic Analysis (was Re: PRISM PROOF Email)
Phillip Hallam-Baker
- [Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks
Moritz
- [Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks
Richard Clayton
- [Cryptography] Implementations, attacks on DHTs, Mix Nets?
Ralph Holz
- [Cryptography] Good private email
Richard Salz
- [Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks
Phillip Hallam-Baker
- [Cryptography] Implementations, attacks on DHTs, Mix Nets?
Phillip Hallam-Baker
- [Cryptography] Traffic Analysis (was Re: PRISM PROOF Email)
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] Formal Verification (was Re: Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks)
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks
Jerry Leichter
- [Cryptography] Implementations, attacks on DHTs, Mix Nets?
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] Good private email
Alexandre Anzala-Yamajako
- [Cryptography] ADMIN: What is top posting, and why should you avoid it?
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] Good private email
Tamzen Cannoy
- [Cryptography] Good private email
Ray Dillinger
- [Cryptography] Good private email
Jerry Leichter
- [Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks
Ray Dillinger
- [Cryptography] Implementations, attacks on DHTs, Mix Nets?
Tony Arcieri
- [Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks
Peter Saint-Andre
- [Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks
Ray Dillinger
- [Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] Good private email
Richard Salz
- [Cryptography] Good private email
Ray Dillinger
- [Cryptography] Good private email
Jerry Leichter
- [Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks
Eugen Leitl
- [Cryptography] Using Raspberry Pis
Phillip Hallam-Baker
- [Cryptography] Implementations, attacks on DHTs, Mix Nets?
The Doctor
- [Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks
The Doctor
- [Cryptography] Is Traffic Analysis the problem (was Re: Good private email)
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] Traffic Analysis (was Re: PRISM PROOF Email)
The Doctor
- [Cryptography] Using Raspberry Pis
Sandy Harris
- [Cryptography] Using Raspberry Pis
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] Using Raspberry Pis
Phillip Hallam-Baker
- [Cryptography] Using Raspberry Pis
Mark Smith
- [Cryptography] Traffic Analysis (was Re: PRISM PROOF Email)
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] Using Raspberry Pis
Peter Gutmann
- [Cryptography] Implementations, attacks on DHTs, Mix Nets?
Peter Gutmann
- [Cryptography] Using Raspberry Pis
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] Traffic Analysis (was Re: PRISM PROOF Email)
Wendy M. Grossman
- [Cryptography] Using Raspberry Pis
Bill Stewart
- [Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks
Phill
- [Cryptography] Good private email
Sebastian Krahmer
- [Cryptography] Implementations, attacks on DHTs, Mix Nets?
Ralph Holz
- [Cryptography] Good private email
The Doctor
- [Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks
ianG
- [Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks
Wendy M. Grossman
- [Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks
radix42 at gmail.com
- [Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks
Greg Broiles
- [Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks
Phillip Hallam-Baker
- [Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks
radix42 at gmail.com
- [Cryptography] Implementations, attacks on DHTs, Mix Nets?
Jerry Leichter
- [Cryptography] Implementations, attacks on DHTs, Mix Nets?
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] Implementations, attacks on DHTs, Mix Nets?
Jonathan Thornburg
- [Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks
Peter Saint-Andre
- [Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks
Peter Saint-Andre
- [Cryptography] Implementations, attacks on DHTs, Mix Nets?
Peter Saint-Andre
- [Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks
Wendy M. Grossman
- [Cryptography] Implementations, attacks on DHTs, Mix Nets?
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] Unsubscribe
Jordan
- [Cryptography] Implementations, attacks on DHTs, Mix Nets?
Phillip Hallam-Baker
- [Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] Implementations, attacks on DHTs, Mix Nets?
Jerry Leichter
- [Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks
Jerry Leichter
- [Cryptography] Implementations, attacks on DHTs, Mix Nets?
Christian Huitema
- [Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks
Christian Huitema
- [Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks
danimoth
- [Cryptography] Petnames & Zooko's triangle -- theory v. practice (was Email and IM are...)
ianG
- [Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks
Jerry Leichter
- [Cryptography] Why not the DNS? (was Re: Implementations, attacks on DHTs, Mix Nets?)
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] human readable IDs, revokable keys (Re: Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks)
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] Why human-readable IDs (was Re: Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks)
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] Why human-readable IDs (was Re: Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks)
Faré
- [Cryptography] Separating concerns
Phill
- [Cryptography] Why human-readable IDs (was Re: Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks)
Jerry Leichter
- [Cryptography] Why human-readable IDs (was Re: Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks)
Jerry Leichter
- [Cryptography] Why human-readable IDs (was Re: Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks)
Christian Huitema
- [Cryptography] Why not the DNS? (was Re: Implementations, attacks on DHTs, Mix Nets?)
Jerry Leichter
- [Cryptography] Implementations, attacks on DHTs, Mix Nets?
The Doctor
- [Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks
Jonathan Thornburg
- [Cryptography] Why human-readable IDs (was Re: Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks)
Dave Horsfall
- [Cryptography] Why human-readable IDs (was Re: Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks)
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] Petnames & Zooko's triangle -- theory v. practice (was Email and IM are...)
Steve Furlong
- [Cryptography] Why human-readable IDs (was Re: Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks)
Phill
- [Cryptography] IPv6 and IPSEC
Phill
- [Cryptography] Separating concerns
Faré
- [Cryptography] Separating concerns
Phill
- [Cryptography] IPv6 and IPSEC
Lucky Green
- [Cryptography] Source for protocol compiler
Phillip Hallam-Baker
- [Cryptography] Petnames & Zooko's triangle -- theory v. practice (was Email and IM are...)
James A. Donald
- [Cryptography] Separating concerns
ianG
- [Cryptography] IPv6 and IPSEC
Moritz
- [Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks
Jerry Leichter
- [Cryptography] Separating concerns
Jerry Leichter
- [Cryptography] Separating concerns
Phillip Hallam-Baker
- [Cryptography] Keeping backups (was Re: Separating concerns
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] Why human-readable IDs (was Re: Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks)
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] Why not the DNS? (was Re: Implementations, attacks on DHTs, Mix Nets?)
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] IPv6 and IPSEC
Taral
- [Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks
Callme Whatiwant
- [Cryptography] Keeping backups (was Re: Separating concerns
zooko
- [Cryptography] Separating concerns
Phillip Hallam-Baker
- [Cryptography] IPv6 and IPSEC
Phillip Hallam-Baker
- [Cryptography] The Case for Formal Verification
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] IPv6 and IPSEC
Taral
- [Cryptography] Keeping backups (was Re: Separating concerns
Phillip Hallam-Baker
- [Cryptography] IPv6 and IPSEC
Phillip Hallam-Baker
- [Cryptography] The Case for Formal Verification
Phillip Hallam-Baker
- [Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks
Phillip Hallam-Baker
- [Cryptography] IPv6 and IPSEC
Richard Guy Briggs
- [Cryptography] Why human-readable IDs (was Re: Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks)
Dave Horsfall
- [Cryptography] Communicating public keys: A functional specification
James A. Donald
- [Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks
Jon Callas
- [Cryptography] Unsubscribe
Jurjen Grosmann
- [Cryptography] Functional specification for email client?
Ray Dillinger
- [Cryptography] Keeping backups (was Re: Separating concerns
Eugen Leitl
- [Cryptography] The Case for Formal Verification
Jerry Leichter
- [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis
Jerry Leichter
- [Cryptography] IPv6 and IPSEC
Taral
- [Cryptography] Functional specification for email client?
Jonathan Thornburg
- [Cryptography] Functional specification for email client?
Ray Dillinger
- [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis
Aaron Zauner
- [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis
David I. Emery
- [Cryptography] Functional specification for email client?
ianG
- [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis
ianG
- [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis
Ray Dillinger
- [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis
John Kelsey
- [Cryptography] Functional specification for email client?
John Kelsey
- [Cryptography] Keeping backups (was Re: Separating concerns
Peter Saint-Andre
- [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis
James A. Donald
- [Cryptography] Thoughts about keys
Jeremy Stanley
- [Cryptography] Backup is completely separate
Phill
- [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis
Jerry Leichter
- [Cryptography] Thoughts about keys
James A. Donald
Last message date:
Sat Aug 31 23:02:26 EDT 2013
Archived on: Sat Aug 31 23:40:22 EDT 2013
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