[Cryptography] Traffic Analysis (was Re: PRISM PROOF Email)

Perry E. Metzger perry at piermont.com
Mon Aug 26 09:26:08 EDT 2013


On Sun, 25 Aug 2013 23:40:35 -0400 Phillip Hallam-Baker
<hallam at gmail.com> wrote:
> There has to be a layered approach.
> 
> Traffic analysis is probably going to demand steganography and that
> is almost by definition outside standards work.

I'm unaware of anyone who has seriously proposed steganography for
that purpose -- I'm not even sure it would have the desired effect.
Recall that the problem in blocking traffic analysis is to conceal
that two endpoints are communicating.

Mix networks are, however, a well technique. Onion networks,
which are related, are widely deployed right now in the form of Tor,
and work well. I see little reason to believe mix networks would not
also work well for instant messages and email (see my other thread,
begun yesterday.)

I'm not particularly interested in standards work per se. If
something becomes successful, that is probably the time to consider
standardization if warranted.

Perry
-- 
Perry E. Metzger		perry at piermont.com


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