[Cryptography] Why not the DNS? (was Re: Implementations, attacks on DHTs, Mix Nets?)

[Perry E. Metzger]

On Wed, 28 Aug 2013 10:43:24 -0400 Jerry Leichter <leichter at lrw.com>
wrote:
> On Aug 28, 2013, at 8:34 AM, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
> 
> > On Tue, 27 Aug 2013 23:39:51 -0400 Jerry Leichter
> > <leichter at lrw.com> wrote:
> >> It's not as if this isn't a design we have that we know works:
> >> DNS.
> Read what I said:  There's a *design* that works.
> 
> I never suggested *using DNS* - either its current physical
> instantiation, or even necessarily the raw code.  In fact, I
> pointed out some of the very problems you mention.
> 
> What defines the DNS model - and is in contrast to the DHT model -
> is:
> 
> - Two basic classes of participants, those that track potentially
> large amounts of data and respond to queries and those that simply
> cache for local use;
> - Caching of responses for authoritative-holder-limited amounts of
> time to avoid re-querying;
> - A hierarchical namespace and a corresponding hierarchy of caches.
> 
> DNS and DNSSEC as implemented assume a single hierarchy, and they
> map the hierarchy to authority.  These features are undesirable and
> should be avoided.

I'm unsure how to use a DNS-like model when there is no real linkage
between hierarchy in the names used and the storage location of
particular mappings. In particular, if I have names like
foo at example.com, and I want just anyone to be able to enroll at any
time without administrator input, and I don't want state
authorities to be able to shut down or alter the contents of the
system, I don't see how to accomplish all my goals with something
DNS-like.

That said, if you have a concrete proposal, I would of course find it
interesting to hear about.

-- 
Perry E. Metzger		perry at piermont.com