[Cryptography] PRISM PROOF Email

[Phillip Hallam-Baker]

On Fri, Aug 23, 2013 at 3:34 PM, Ben Laurie <ben at links.org> wrote:

>
> On 22 August 2013 10:36, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Preventing key substitution will require a combination of the CT ideas
>> proposed by Ben Laurie (so catenate proof notaries etc) and some form of
>> 'no key exists' demonstration.
>
>
> We have already outline how to make verifiable maps as well as verifiable
> logs, which I think is all you need.
> http://www.links.org/files/RevocationTransparency.pdf.
>

Yeah, I think it is just a matter of being clear about the requirements and
making sure that we fully justify the requirements for email rather than
assume that email is the same.


-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/
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