May 2006 Archives by thread

• Messages sorted by: [ subject ] [ author ] [ date ]
• More info on this list...

Starting: Mon May 1 01:46:24 EDT 2006
Ending: Wed May 31 21:47:06 EDT 2006
Messages: 157

• PGP "master keys"   Travis H.
  • encrypted file system issues (was Re: PGP "master keys")   Perry E. Metzger
    • encrypted file system issues (was Re: PGP "master keys")   Travis H.
      • encrypted file system issues   Perry E. Metzger
    • encrypted file system issues (was Re: PGP "master keys")   Bill Frantz
• Disk Encryption (was: Re: PGP "master keys")   Jeffrey I. Schiller
• PGP "master keys"   leichter_jerrold at emc.com
  • PGP "master keys"   Anne & Lynn Wheeler
• what's wrong with HMAC?   Travis H.
  • what's wrong with HMAC?   Thierry Moreau
• Windows XP product activation, product keys, installation IDs, &c.   Travis H.
• what's wrong with HMAC?   Hal Finney
  • what's wrong with HMAC?   William Allen Simpson
    • what's wrong with HMAC?   Bart Preneel
• fyi: Deniable File System - Rubberhose   Ivan Krstic
  • fyi: Deniable File System - Rubberhose   Travis H.
  • fyi: Deniable File System - Rubberhose   Joachim Strombergson
    • fyi: Deniable File System - Rubberhose   dan at geer.org
      • fyi: Deniable File System - Rubberhose   Peter Gutmann
• Intel microcode update encryption   Travis H.
• [RFIDSec 06] Call for Papers - Submission Deadline Reminder   Elisabeth Oswald
• Status of attacks on AES?   Joachim Strombergson
  • Status of attacks on AES?   Marcos el Ruptor
    • Status of attacks on AES?   John R. Black
      • Status of attacks on AES?   Taral
      • Status of attacks on AES?   Marcos el Ruptor
  • Status of attacks on AES?   Elisabeth Oswald
  • Status of attacks on AES?   Max
• Linux RNG paper   markus reichelt
  • Linux RNG paper   Steven M. Bellovin
    • Linux RNG paper   Jason Holt
      • Linux RNG paper   markus reichelt
      • Linux RNG paper   Travis H.
  • Linux RNG paper   Travis H.
    • encrypted filesystem integrity threat-model (Re: Linux RNG paper)   Adam Back
    • Linux RNG paper   Victor Duchovni
      • Encrypted disk storage   John Gilmore
    • Linux RNG paper   Florian Weimer
• Linux RNG paper   Kuehn, Ulrich
• Linux RNG paper   leichter_jerrold at emc.com
• Get a boarding pass, steal someone's identity   Perry E. Metzger
  • Get a boarding pass, steal someone's identity   John Levine
  • Get a boarding pass, steal someone's identity   Steven M. Bellovin
    • "boarding passes", identity, and security   John Gilmore
• Get a boarding pass, steal someone's identity   leichter_jerrold at emc.com
• MetriCon 1.0   dan at geer.org
• Get a boarding pass, steal someone's identity   Perry E. Metzger
  • Get a boarding pass, steal someone's identity   Steven M. Bellovin
  • Get a boarding pass, steal someone's identity   John Levine
    • Get a boarding pass, steal someone's identity   John R. Black
• Piercing network anonymity in real time   leichter_jerrold at emc.com
  • Piercing network anonymity in real time   StealthMonger
  • Piercing network anonymity in real time   Ivan Krstic
    • Piercing network anonymity in real time   StealthMonger
      • Piercing network anonymity in real time   Ivan Krstic
• Get a boarding pass, steal someone's identity   alex at alten.org
• Status of attacks on AES?   John R. Black
• NSA knows who you've called.   Perry E. Metzger
  • NSA knows who you've called.   William Allen Simpson
    • NSA knows who you've called.   Daniel F. Fisher
  • NSA knows who you've called.   dan at geer.org
    • NSA knows who you've called.   Perry E. Metzger
      • NSA knows who you've called.   Nick Owen
      • NSA knows who you've called.   dan at geer.org
    • NSA knows who you've called.   alan
  • NSA knows who you've called.   Steve Schear
• fyi: Workshop on the Economics of Information Security ("WEIS" June 2006)   Jeff.Hodges at KingsMountain.com
• NSA knows who you've called.   dan at geer.org
  • NSA knows who you've called.   alan
    • NSA knows who you've called.   dan at geer.org
      • NSA knows who you've called.   Anne & Lynn Wheeler
      • NSA knows who you've called.   Russ Nelson
• "Consumers Losing Trust in Internet Banking"   leichter_jerrold at emc.com
• NSA knows who you've called.   dan at geer.org
• There are no limits to human stupidity.   Perry E. Metzger
  • There are no limits to human stupidity.   Florian Weimer
• PQCrypto: Schedule Available   Christopher Wolf
• Bamford on the NSA and the Greek mobile phone tapping scandal   John Ioannidis
• picking a hash function to be encrypted   Travis H.
  • picking a hash function to be encrypted   Victor Duchovni
    • picking a hash function to be encrypted   Travis H.
      • picking a hash function to be encrypted   Victor Duchovni
      • picking a hash function to be encrypted   Florian Weimer
      • picking a hash function to be encrypted   Eric Rescorla
  • picking a hash function to be encrypted   Eric Rescorla
    • picking a hash function to be encrypted   Travis H.
    • picking a hash function to be encrypted   James A. Donald
• the meaning of linearity, was Re: picking a hash function to be encrypted   Travis H.
  • the meaning of linearity   Florian Weimer
  • the meaning of linearity, was Re: picking a hash function to be encrypted   James Muir
    • Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)   Anne & Lynn Wheeler
• Surprise! Another serious hole in Diebold voting machines...   Bill Squier
• Piercing network anonymity in real time   leichter_jerrold at emc.com
• the meaning of linearity, was Re: picking a hash function to be encrypted   leichter_jerrold at emc.com
  • the meaning of linearity, was Re: picking a hash function to be encrypted   Travis H.
• Government using call records to go after reporter's sources.   Perry E. Metzger
• picking a hash function to be encrypted   Hal Finney
• anyone have "New Hash Functions and their Use in Authentication and Set Equality"   Travis H.
• the meaning of linearity, was Re: picking a hash function to be encrypted   Kuehn, Ulrich
  • the meaning of linearity, was Re: picking a hash function to be encrypted   Travis H.
    • the meaning of linearity, was Re: picking a hash function to be encrypted   Travis H.
• IPICS summer course in Computer Security   George Danezis
• PET 2006: Call for Participation   George Danezis
• "It's funny because it's true..."   Perry E. Metzger
• Political Cartoon of the Day   Perry E. Metzger
  • Political Cartoon of the Day   Ben Pfaff
• UK Government to force disclosure of encryption keys.   Perry E. Metzger
  • UK Government to force disclosure of encryption keys.   Roy M. Silvernail
• statistical inferences and PRNG characterization   Travis H.
  • statistical inferences and PRNG characterization   Bill Tompkins
  • statistical inferences and PRNG characterization   Matt Crawford
  • statistical inferences and PRNG characterization   David Malone
• Crypto hardware with secure key storage   Thor Lancelot Simon
  • Crypto hardware with secure key storage   John Ioannidis
    • Crypto hardware with secure key storage   Jonathan Thornburg
• New UK law makes a wide range of software illegal.   Perry E. Metzger
• statistical inferences and PRNG characterization   leichter_jerrold at emc.com
• May 24: National Day of Outrage at NSA/Telco surveillance   John Gilmore
• Phil Zimmerman and voice encryption; a Skype problem?   Steven M. Bellovin
  • Phil Zimmerman and voice encryption; a Skype problem?   Paul Hoffman
  • Phil Zimmerman and voice encryption; a Skype problem?   dan at geer.org
• Secure phones from VectroTel?   Perry E. Metzger
  • Secure phones from VectroTel?   Steven M. Bellovin
  • Secure phones from VectroTel?   Alex Pankratov
  • Secure phones from VectroTel?   George Danezis
  • Secure phones from VectroTel?   John Ioannidis
    • Secure phones from VectroTel?   mis at seiden.com
  • Secure phones from VectroTel?   Jon Callas
  • Is AES better than RC4   James A. Donald
    • Is AES better than RC4   Joseph Ashwood
      • Is AES better than RC4   James A. Donald
      • [!! SPAM] Re: Is AES better than RC4   Joseph Ashwood
      • Is AES better than RC4   Joseph Ashwood
      • Is AES better than RC4   Ed Gerck
      • Is AES better than RC4   Joseph Ashwood
    • Is AES better than RC4   Max
      • Is AES better than RC4   James A. Donald
    • Is AES better than RC4   Jon Callas
• Algebraic Attacks on Block Ciphers   James Muir
• Phil Zimmerman and voice encryption; a Skype problem?   Adler, Joseph
• Status of opportunistic encryption   Sandy Harris
  • Status of opportunistic encryption   Florian Weimer
    • Status of opportunistic encryption   Victor Duchovni
      • Status of opportunistic encryption   James A. Donald
      • Status of opportunistic encryption   Victor Duchovni
      • Status of SRP   James A. Donald
      • Status of SRP   Victor Duchovni
      • Status of SRP   Ka-Ping Yee
      • Status of SRP   Lance James
      • Status of SRP   Lance James
      • Status of SRP   Derek Atkins
      • Status of SRP   Joseph Ashwood
      • Status of SRP   Florian Weimer
• Hayden's statement from Oct 2002 on liberty and security   John Gilmore
• Status of opportunistic encryption   auto37159 at hushmail.com
  • Status of opportunistic encryption   Peter Gutmann
• Elizabethan traffic analysis   Steven M. Bellovin

Last message date: Wed May 31 21:47:06 EDT 2006
Archived on: Sun Aug 7 18:24:54 EDT 2011

• Messages sorted by: [ subject ] [ author ] [ date ]
• More info on this list...