Linux RNG paper

[markus reichelt]

* Jason Holt <jason at lunkwill.org> wrote:

> >On Thu, 04 May 2006 18:14:09 +0200, markus reichelt <ml at mareichelt.de>
> >wrote:
> >>Agreed; but regarding unix systems, I know of none crypto
> >>implementation that does integrity checking. Not just de/encrypt the
> >>data, but verify that the encrypted data has not been tampered with.
> 
> There's also ecryptfs:
> 
> http://ecryptfs.sourceforge.net/

Thanks to you both; and good to see that ecryptfs is actively
maintained. I might check it out myself but I'll definitely link it.

I'm interested as well in watermark/dictionary attacks (like on
mainline cryptoloop) on ecryptfs. Something like mentioned here,
http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/2005-11/msg00016.html

Users of ecrypt are also encouraged to share their views on
stability/reliability of ecryptfs.

-- 
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