February 2018 Archives by thread

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Starting: Thu Feb 1 08:23:48 EST 2018
Ending: Wed Feb 28 21:34:43 EST 2018
Messages: 163

• [Cryptography] Spectre/Meltdown resistant 'Movfuscator' ?   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] Spectre/Meltdown resistant 'Movfuscator' ?   Dave Horsfall
    • [Cryptography] Spectre/Meltdown resistant 'Movfuscator' ?   Patrick Chkoreff
• [Cryptography] canonicalizing unicode strings.   Nico Williams
  • [Cryptography] canonicalizing unicode strings.   John Levine
    • [Cryptography] canonicalizing unicode strings.   Nico Williams
      • [Cryptography] canonicalizing unicode strings.   John Levine
      • [Cryptography] canonicalizing unicode strings.   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] canonicalizing unicode strings.   Nico Williams
    • [Cryptography] canonicalizing unicode strings.   Bill Frantz
    • [Cryptography] canonicalizing unicode strings.   jamesd at echeque.com
      • [Cryptography] canonicalizing unicode strings.   John Levine
  • [Cryptography] canonicalizing unicode strings.   jamesd at echeque.com
    • [Cryptography] canonicalizing unicode strings.   Nico Williams
• [Cryptography] Happy birthday, Ralph Merkle!   Dave Horsfall
• [Cryptography] Do some exploits require imagination/creativity or only craftsmanship?   Georgi Guninski
  • [Cryptography] Do some exploits require imagination/creativity or only craftsmanship?   Benjamin Kreuter
• [Cryptography] Berlin Cryptotraining (March 19 & 20)   Philipp Jovanovic
• [Cryptography] Samsung Begins Manufacturing ASIC Chips for Mining Cryptocurrency   Tom Mitchell
  • [Cryptography] Samsung Begins Manufacturing ASIC Chips for Mining Cryptocurrency   Natanael
• [Cryptography] RISC-V branch predicting   Arnold Reinhold
  • [Cryptography] RISC-V branch predicting   jamesd at echeque.com
  • [Cryptography] RISC-V branch predicting   John Levine
    • [Cryptography] RISC-V branch predicting   Arnold Reinhold
  • [Cryptography] RISC-V branch predicting   William Allen Simpson
  • [Cryptography] RISC-V branch predicting   Nemo
    • [Cryptography] RISC-V branch predicting   Nico Williams
  • [Cryptography] RISC-V branch predicting   Tony Arcieri
    • [Cryptography] RISC-V branch predicting   Ben Laurie
    • [Cryptography] RISC-V branch predicting   Nemo
      • [Cryptography] RISC-V branch predicting   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Spectre again (was Re: RISC-V branch predicting)   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Spectre again (was Re: RISC-V branch predicting)   Nemo
      • [Cryptography] Spectre again (was Re: RISC-V branch predicting)   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Spectre again (was Re: RISC-V branch predicting)   Nemo
      • [Cryptography] Spectre again (was Re: RISC-V branch predicting)   Arnold Reinhold
      • [Cryptography] RISC-V branch predicting   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] RISC-V branch predicting   Dan McDonald
• [Cryptography] How slow is pairing based crypto compared to 25519   jamesd at echeque.com
  • [Cryptography] How slow is pairing based crypto compared to 25519   Christian Huitema
    • [Cryptography] How slow is pairing based crypto compared to 25519   jamesd at echeque.com
• [Cryptography] Proof of Work is the worst way to do a BlockChain   Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • [Cryptography] Proof of Work is the worst way to do a BlockChain   Ray Dillinger
  • [Cryptography] Proof of Work is the worst way to do a BlockChain   jamesd at echeque.com
    • [Cryptography] Proof of Work is the worst way to do a BlockChain   jamesd at echeque.com
    • [Cryptography] Proof of Work is the worst way to do a BlockChain   Ray Dillinger
  • [Cryptography] Proof of Work is the worst way to do a BlockChain   Tony Arcieri
    • [Cryptography] Proof of Work is the worst way to do a BlockChain   jamesd at echeque.com
      • [Cryptography] PoW is the worst way to do a BlockChain, and pretending they're dollars isn't much better   John Levine
    • [Cryptography] Proof of Work is the worst way to do a BlockChain   Lee Clagett
  • [Cryptography] Proof of Work is the worst way to do a BlockChain   Ersin Taskin
    • [Cryptography] Proof of Work is the worst way to do a BlockChain   John Levine
      • [Cryptography] Proof of Work is the worst way to do a BlockChain   Allen
      • [Cryptography] Proof of Work is the worst way to do a BlockChain   John Levine
      • [Cryptography] Proof of Work is the worst way to do a BlockChain   Allen
      • [Cryptography] Proof of Work is the worst way to do a BlockChain   Richard Clayton
      • [Cryptography] Proof of Work is the worst way to do a BlockChain   Dave Horsfall
      • [Cryptography] Proof of Work is the worst way to do a BlockChain   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] Proof of Work is the worst way to do a BlockChain   jamesd at echeque.com
      • [Cryptography] Proof of Work is the worst way to do a BlockChain   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] Proof of Work is the worst way to do a BlockChain   John Levine
      • [Cryptography] Proof of Work is the worst way to do a BlockChain   Ersin Taskin
      • [Cryptography] Proof of Work is the worst way to do a BlockChain   John Levine
      • [Cryptography] Proof of Work is the worst way to do a BlockChain   sickpig at gmail.com
      • [Cryptography] Proof of Work is the worst way to do a BlockChain   Ersin Taskin
      • [Cryptography] Proof of Work is the worst way to do a BlockChain   Viktor Dukhovni
      • [Cryptography] A festival of WKBIs, was Proof of Work is the worst way to do a BlockChain   John Levine
      • [Cryptography] Proof of Work is the worst way to do a BlockChain   Ersin Taskin
    • [Cryptography] Proof of Work is the worst way to do a BlockChain   Ismail Kizir
      • [Cryptography] Proof of Work is the worst way to do a BlockChain   Ersin Taskin
      • [Cryptography] Proof of Work is the worst way to do a BlockChain   Ismail Kizir
    • [Cryptography] Proof of Work is the worst way to do a BlockChain   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] Proof of Work is the worst way to do a BlockChain   Ersin Taskin
      • [Cryptography] Proof of Work is the worst way to do a BlockChain   Ray Dillinger
    • [Cryptography] Proof of Work is the worst way to do a BlockChain   jamesd at echeque.com
      • [Cryptography] Proof of Work is the worst way to do a BlockChain   Ersin Taskin
      • [Cryptography] Proof of Work is the worst way to do a BlockChain   jamesd at echeque.com
      • [Cryptography] Proof of Work is the worst way to do a BlockChain   Ersin Taskin
      • [Cryptography] Proof of Work is the worst way to do a BlockChain   jamesd at echeque.com
      • [Cryptography] Proof of Work is the worst way to do a BlockChain   Ersin Taskin
      • [Cryptography] Proof of Work is the worst way to do a BlockChain   jamesd at echeque.com
      • [Cryptography] Proof of Work is the worst way to do a BlockChain   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] Proof of Work is the worst way to do a BlockChain   jamesd at echeque.com
      • [Cryptography] Proof of Work is the worst way to do a BlockChain   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] the people's money, not, was Proof of Work is the worst way to do a BlockChain   John Levine
      • [Cryptography] the people's money, not, was Proof of Work is the worst way to do a BlockChain   Ersin Taskin
• [Cryptography] Happy birthday, Harry Nyquist!   Dave Horsfall
• [Cryptography] Sometimes what’s missing is right in front of us, we only need to look.   Aram Perez
• [Cryptography] Quantum computers will never overcome noise issues?   Allen
  • [Cryptography] Quantum computers will never overcome noise issues?   John Denker
  • [Cryptography] Quantum computers will never overcome noise issues?   Jay Sulzberger
    • [Cryptography] Quantum computers will never overcome noise issues?   Jon Callas
      • [Cryptography] Quantum computers will never overcome noise issues?   jamesd at echeque.com
      • [Cryptography] Quantum computers will never overcome noise issues?   Viktor Dukhovni
      • [Cryptography] Quantum computers will never overcome noise issues?   jamesd at echeque.com
      • [Cryptography] Quantum computers will never overcome noise issues?   Viktor Dukhovni
      • [Cryptography] Quantum computers will never overcome noise issues?   Bill Cox
      • [Cryptography] Quantum computers will never overcome noise issues?   Allen
      • [Cryptography] Quantum computers will never overcome noise issues?   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] Quantum computers will never overcome noise issues?   Ron Garret
      • [Cryptography] Quantum computers will never overcome noise issues?   Peter Gutmann
  • [Cryptography] Quantum computers will never overcome noise issues?   Florian Weimer
• [Cryptography] changes in final NIST SP 800-90B   Alexander Klimov
• [Cryptography] Useless side channels   Perry E. Metzger
  • [Cryptography] Useless side channels   Alexander Klimov
    • [Cryptography] Useless side channels   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Useless side channels   Alexander Klimov
      • [Cryptography] Useless side channels   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Useless side channels   Ray Dillinger
  • [Cryptography] Aharonov-Bohm effect   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] Useless side channels   Ryan Carboni
• [Cryptography] Insufficient MAC randomization   Ryan Carboni
  • [Cryptography] Insufficient MAC randomization   Christian Huitema
• [Cryptography] Existence of point of order 4 in a Montgomery curve and its quadratic twist   Ondrej Mikle
  • [Cryptography] Existence of point of order 4 in a Montgomery curve and its quadratic twist   Ondrej Mikle
  • [Cryptography] Existence of point of order 4 in a Montgomery curve and its quadratic twist   Viktor Dukhovni
• [Cryptography] (Ir)responsible encryption   John Levine
  • [Cryptography] (Ir)responsible encryption   grarpamp
• [Cryptography] Hashgraph is cool, but over-hyped   Bill Cox
• [Cryptography] My hat's off to the Dutch intel services   alex at alten.org
• [Cryptography] Conjecture on mathematically evaluating the ideal cipher model   Ryan Carboni
• [Cryptography] Rieman-Rocch explanation   Jan Dušátko
• [Cryptography] RIP Claude Shannon, and the Zimmerman Telegram   Dave Horsfall
• [Cryptography] Anyone read and understood the proofs in "Ouroboros: A Provably Secure Proof-of-Stake Blockchain Protocol"?   Ondrej Mikle
• [Cryptography] Rolling code "Hello World"   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] A crypto machine on ePay   Dave Horsfall
  • [Cryptography] A crypto machine on ePay   Dave Horsfall
• [Cryptography] Review of UBIC   Ubicorn
  • [Cryptography] Review of UBIC   grarpamp
    • [Cryptography] Review of UBIC   grarpamp
      • [Cryptography] Review of UBIC   Howard Chu
      • [Cryptography] Review of UBIC   Ubicorn
      • [Cryptography] Review of UBIC   grarpamp
• [Cryptography] [dns-operations] IP address encryption: pseudonymization   Viktor Dukhovni
  • [Cryptography] [dns-operations] IP address encryption: pseudonymization   Christian Huitema
• [Cryptography] CRYPTACUS 2018: Call for participation   Ricardo Chaves
• [Cryptography] Paid SMTP (PSMTP)   Ersin Taskin
  • [Cryptography] Paid SMTP (PSMTP)   John Levine
    • [Cryptography] Paid SMTP (PSMTP)   Ersin Taskin
      • [Cryptography] Paid SMTP (PSMTP)   tifkap
  • [Cryptography] Paid SMTP (PSMTP)   Bertrand Mollinier Toublet
    • [Cryptography] Paid SMTP (PSMTP)   Ersin Taskin
      • [Cryptography] Paid SMTP (PSMTP)   tifkap
  • [Cryptography] Paid SMTP (PSMTP)   Tom Mitchell
    • [Cryptography] Paid SMTP (FUSSP)   John Levine
  • [Cryptography] Paid SMTP (PSMTP)   Kevin W. Wall
    • [Cryptography] Paid SMTP (PSMTP)   Ersin Taskin
  • [Cryptography] Paid SMTP (PSMTP)   John Levine
• [Cryptography] Bitcoins and lobbyists   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] Bitcoins and lobbyists   Bertrand Mollinier Toublet
  • [Cryptography] Bitcoins and lobbyists   Henry Baker
    • [Cryptography] Bitcoins and lobbyists   Karl
    • [Cryptography] Bitcoins and lobbyists   John Levine
      • [Cryptography] Bitcoins and lobbyists   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] Bitcoins and lobbyists   John Levine
      • [Cryptography] Bitcoins and lobbyists   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] Bitcoins and lobbyists   Bill Stewart
  • [Cryptography] Bitcoins and lobbyists   grarpamp
• [Cryptography] Any reason not to use key derivation to determine IV?   Phillip Hallam-Baker
• [Cryptography] Cellebrite claims it can unlock any iPhone   John Levine
• [Cryptography] ADMIN: Linguistic edict from your list administrator...   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] CA reseller emails 23, 000 client private keys to parent CA   Peter Gutmann
• [Cryptography] WSJ.com: SEC Launches Cryptocurrency Probe   John R. Levine

Last message date: Wed Feb 28 21:34:43 EST 2018
Archived on: Thu Mar 1 01:06:36 EST 2018

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