April 2004 Archives by thread

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Starting: Thu Apr 1 02:06:25 EST 2004
Ending: Fri Apr 30 17:06:39 EDT 2004
Messages: 152

• Israeli coders, Arab testers   Barney Wolff
• Verisign CRL single point of failure   Dirk-Willem van Gulik
• The 'Privacy' Jihad   R. A. Hettinga
• Did American slaves use steganography?   K.Ellis
  • Did American slaves use steganography?   Walter Wart
• [IP] U.S. may need to step in, says cybersecurity report   R. A. Hettinga
• Bouncing to crypto world domination   R. A. Hettinga
  • Bouncing to crypto world domination   Florian Weimer
• Privacy Concerns for UWB technology?   Damien O'Rourke
  • Privacy Concerns for UWB technology?   dj at deadhat.com
• Spy Letters from the American Revolution   Steve Bellovin
• [IP] U.S. may need to step in, says cybersecurity report   R. A. Hettinga
• Do Cryptographers burn?   Hadmut Danisch
  • Do Cryptographers burn?   Victor.Duchovni at morganstanley.com
  • Do Cryptographers burn?   Ian Grigg
  • Do Cryptographers burn?   Greg Rose
  • Do Cryptographers burn?   Dave Howe
    • Do Cryptographers burn?   Hadmut Danisch
      • Do Cryptographers burn?   Ian Grigg
      • Do Cryptographers burn?   Dave Howe
• SETS sets up shop in Chennai   R. A. Hettinga
• [Mac_crypto] Apple should use SHA! (or stronger) to authenticate software releases   R. A. Hettinga
  • [Mac_crypto] Apple should use SHA! (or stronger) to authenticate software releases   Don Davis
    • [Mac_crypto] Apple should use SHA! (or stronger) to authenticate software releases   Arnold G. Reinhold
    • [Mac_crypto] Apple should use SHA! (or stronger) to authenticate software releases   Anton Stiglic
      • [Mac_crypto] Apple should use SHA! (or stronger) to authenticate software releases   Anton Stiglic
• Mixmaster RFC   Len Sassaman
• Gutmann: operating under the radar   R. A. Hettinga
• [Mac_crypto] Apple should use SHA! (or stronger) to authenticate software releases   R. A. Hettinga
• [Mac_crypto] Apple should use SHA! (or stronger) to authenticate software releases   R. A. Hettinga
  • [Mac_crypto] Apple should use SHA! (or stronger) to authenticate software releases   Zefram
• [Publicity-list] DIMACS Tutorial on Social Choice and Computer Science   Linda Casals
• [Mac_crypto] Apple should use SHA! (or stronger) to authenticate software releases   Arnold G. Reinhold
  • [Mac_crypto] Apple should use SHA! (or stronger) to authenticate software releases   Nicko van Someren
• Firm invites experts to punch holes in ballot software   R. A. Hettinga
• [Mac_crypto] Apple should use SHA! (or stronger) to authenticate software releases   R. A. Hettinga
  • [Mac_crypto] Apple should use SHA! (or stronger) to authenticate software releases   Joseph Ashwood
    • [Mac_crypto] Apple should use SHA! (or stronger) to authenticate software releases   Andy Isaacson
• Firm invites experts to punch holes in ballot software   Trei, Peter
• Blind signatures with DSA/ECDSA?   Eric Rescorla
• VoteHere Release Audit Trail Code   R. A. Hettinga
• Firm invites experts to punch holes in ballot software   Trei, Peter
  • Firm invites experts to punch holes in ballot software   Ian Grigg
    • Firm invites experts to punch holes in ballot software   Ed Gerck
    • Firm invites experts to punch holes in ballot software   Brian McGroarty
      • Firm invites experts to punch holes in ballot software   Ian Grigg
    • Firm invites experts to punch holes in ballot software   R. Hirschfeld
• Firm invites experts to punch holes in ballot software   Trei, Peter
• Firm invites experts to punch holes in ballot software   Michael_Heyman at NAI.com
  • Firm invites experts to punch holes in ballot software   Paul Zuefeldt
    • Firm invites experts to punch holes in ballot software   Roland C. Dowdeswell
• voting   Perry E. Metzger
  • voting   l.crypto at stewart.org
  • voting   Ed Gerck
  • voting   Florian Weimer
• voting   Trei, Peter
  • voting   Perry E. Metzger
    • voting   Arnold G. Reinhold
• Lottery Numbers   R. A. Hettinga
• See-Through Voting Software   R. A. Hettinga
• voting   Major Variola (ret)
• eCompute ECC2-109 Project has PROBABLE solution   Anne & Lynn Wheeler
  • eCompute ECC2-109 Project has PROBABLE solution (now official)   Anne & Lynn Wheeler
• voting   Trei, Peter
  • voting   Jerrold Leichter
• voting, KISS, etc.   Perry E. Metzger
  • voting, KISS, etc.   Adam Fields
• TCFS available for NetBSD-1.6.2   VaX#n8
  • TCFS available for NetBSD-1.6.2   Ivan Krstic
• Spy agency launches recruiting campaign   R. A. Hettinga
• my periodic rant on quantum crypto   Perry E. Metzger
  • my periodic rant on quantum crypto   David Honig
• PET Registration Now Open -- Workshop on Privacy Enhancing Technologies 2004   David Martin
• Cryptonomicon.Net - Key Splitting : First (and Second) Person Key Escrow   R. A. Hettinga
  • Cryptonomicon.Net - Key Splitting : First (and Second) Person Key Escrow   Peter Gutmann
• DRM of the mirror universe   Jani Nurminen
  • DRM of the mirror universe   Paul A.S. Ward
  • DRM of the mirror universe   Barney Wolff
  • DRM of the mirror universe   David Wagner
• AES suitable for protecting Top Secret information   Steve Bellovin
  • AES suitable for protecting Top Secret information   Vin McLellan
    • AES suitable for protecting Top Secret information   Arnold G. Reinhold
• Definitions of "Security"?   hadmut at danisch.de
  • Definitions of "Security"?   Thierry Moreau
  • Definitions of "Security"?   Lars Eilebrecht
  • Definitions of "Security"?   Anne & Lynn Wheeler
  • Definitions of "Security"?   Arnold G. Reinhold
• [Mac_crypto] Apple should use SHA! (or stronger) to authenticate software releases   R. A. Hettinga
• voting   John Kelsey
  • voting   Bill Frantz
  • voting   Ed Gerck
    • voting   David Jablon
      • voting   Ed Gerck
      • voting   Yeoh Yiu
      • voting   Ed Gerck
    • voting   Matt Crawford
• DIMACS Workshop on Electronic Voting -- Theory and Practice   Linda Casals
• voting   Trei, Peter
• [Announce] Libgcrypt-1.2.0 released   R. A. Hettinga
• Payment system and security conference   R. A. Hettinga
• Speakers: Payment Systems and Security 04 - June 18/19 2004   R. A. Hettinga
• Financial Cryptography Update: El Qaeda substitution ciphers   Ian Grigg
• [ISN] Hackers introduce colourful new players to Indonesia's elections   R. A. Hettinga
• Workshop on Economics and Information Security, May 13-14, Minneapolis   Andrew Odlyzko
• Cryptography Research Granted Patents for Safer Smart Cards   R. A. Hettinga
• ECC'04 -- Second announcement   R. A. Hettinga
• Cryptography Expert Paul Kocher Warns: Future DVDs Prime Target for Piracy, Pay TV Foreshadows Challenges   R. A. Hettinga
  • Cryptography Expert Paul Kocher Warns: Future DVDs Prime Target for Piracy, Pay TV Foreshadows Challenges   Steve Schear
  • Cryptography Expert Paul Kocher Warns: Future DVDs Prime Target for Piracy, Pay TV Foreshadows Challenges   Bill Frantz
• Paying for drinks with wave <br> of the hand   R. A. Hettinga
  • Paying for drinks with wave <br> of the hand   sunder
• [Publicity-list]: DIMACS Workshop on Mobile and Wireless Security   Linda Casals
• Bank Transfer via Quantum Cryptography Based on Entangled Photons   R. A. Hettinga
• Bank transfer via quantum crypto   Ivan Krstic
  • Bank transfer via quantum crypto   Ian Grigg
• <nettime> diebold law firm aware of lgal risks   R. A. Hettinga
• United States Patent: 6,721,423   R. A. Hettinga
• Diebold could be voted out of state   R. A. Hettinga
• Blind signatures with DSA/ECDSA?   privacy.at Anonymous Remailer
• Blind signatures with DSA/ECDSA?   An Metet
• Diebold knew of legal risks   R. A. Hettinga
• Is there a Brands certificate reference implementation?   R. A. Hettinga
  • Is there a Brands certificate reference implementation?   Anton Stiglic
  • Credentica (Re: Is there a Brands certificate reference implementation?)   Christian Paquin
• Cracking secrets   R. A. Hettinga
• How to WASTE and want not   R. A. Hettinga
• The future of security   Graeme Burnett
  • The future of security   Hadmut Danisch
  • The future of security   geer at world.std.com
    • The future of security   Graeme Burnett
• Certicom Announces Elliptic Curve Cryptography Challenge Winner   R. A. Hettinga
• Mathematicians From Around the World Collaborate to Solve Latest RSA Factoring Challenge   R. A. Hettinga
• [Politech] A criticism of Gmail and a call for encryption everywhere [priv]   R. A. Hettinga
• Can Skype be wiretapped by the authorities?   Axel H Horns
  • Can Skype be wiretapped by the authorities?   Joseph Ashwood
  • Can Skype be wiretapped by the authorities?   Enzo Michelangeli
  • Can Skype be wiretapped by the authorities?   Arnold G. Reinhold
• UC San Diego Engineering Professor Wins Guggenheim Fellowship   R. A. Hettinga
• [Publicity-list] DIMACS Workshop on Security Analysis of Protocols   Linda Casals
• [Neuclear-general] ANNOUNCE: Released version 0.7 of NeuClear Commons   R. A. Hettinga
• [Neuclear-general] ANNOUNCE: NeuClear XMLSig 0.13 Released   R. A. Hettinga
• Brands' private credentials   Jason Holt
• The crypto whiz   R. A. Hettinga
• RSA-576 Factored   R. A. Hettinga
• How to WASTE and want not   iang at systemics.com
• message, but also test   R. A. Hettinga
• Security Architect Position at National Archives   Rich Salz
• iTunes 4.5: "24 hours after I downloaded it... I've broken it"   R. A. Hettinga
• Signs Point to Worm Attack on SSL Vulnerability   R. A. Hettinga
• RFC 3766 Determining Strengths For Public Keys Used For Exchanging Symmetric Keys   Anne & Lynn Wheeler
• [Publicity-list]: DATE CHANGE- DIMACS Workshop on Mobile and Wireless Security   Linda Casals
• Fwd: [ISN] Mobile flaws expose executives to bugging   R. A. Hettinga

Last message date: Fri Apr 30 17:06:39 EDT 2004
Archived on: Sun Aug 7 18:24:10 EDT 2011

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