Firm invites experts to punch holes in ballot software

[Brian McGroarty]

On Wed, Apr 07, 2004 at 03:42:47PM -0400, Ian Grigg wrote:
> Trei, Peter wrote:
> >Frankly, the whole online-verification step seems like an
> >unneccesary complication.
> 
> It seems to me that the requirement for after-the-vote
> verification ("to prove your vote was counted") clashes
> rather directly with the requirement to protect voters
> from coercion ("I can't prove I voted in a particular
> way.") or other incentives-based attacks.
> 
> You can have one, or the other, but not both, right?

Suppose individual ballots weren't usable to verify a vote, but
instead confirming data was distributed across 2-3 future ballot
receipts such that all of them were needed to reconstruct another
ballot's vote.

It would then be possible to verify an election with reasonable
confidence if a large number of ballot receipts were collected, but
individual ballot receipts would be worthless.
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