Firm invites experts to punch holes in ballot software

[R. Hirschfeld]

> Date: Wed, 07 Apr 2004 15:42:47 -0400
> From: Ian Grigg <iang at systemics.com>
> 
> It seems to me that the requirement for after-the-vote
> verification ("to prove your vote was counted") clashes
> rather directly with the requirement to protect voters
> from coercion ("I can't prove I voted in a particular
> way.") or other incentives-based attacks.
> 
> You can have one, or the other, but not both, right?

What you can have is for the voter to be able to verify that his/her
vote was properly counted without being able to prove it to anybody
else.

In that case, an individual claim that a vote was improperly counted
wouldn't be convincing, but a wide enough outcry might trigger a
recount.

I think this would add unnecessary and undesired complexity to a
political election voting system, though.

Ray

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