Firm invites experts to punch holes in ballot software

[Ed Gerck]

The principle here is that no one should be able to prove how 
the voter voted, not even the voter. 

Yes, votes need to be verified and voters are certainly one party 
that can do it. However, you never want to allow the voter to 
take any kind of "receipt" out of the voting station if that 
receipt can be used to determine how the voter voted, e.g. by 
matching a number or pattern on the ballot, even if to the voter. 
Otherwise, vote selling and coercion cannot be prevented.

Cheers,
Ed Gerck

Ian Grigg wrote:
> 
> Trei, Peter wrote:
> > Frankly, the whole online-verification step seems like an
> > unneccesary complication.
> 
> It seems to me that the requirement for after-the-vote
> verification ("to prove your vote was counted") clashes
> rather directly with the requirement to protect voters
> from coercion ("I can't prove I voted in a particular
> way.") or other incentives-based attacks.
> 
> You can have one, or the other, but not both, right?
> 
> It would seem that the former must give way to the latter,
> at least in political voting.  I.e., no verification after
> the vote.
> 
> iang
> 
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