Firm invites experts to punch holes in ballot software

Paul Zuefeldt paul.zuefeldt at ClearLogicSolutions.com
Wed Apr 7 17:23:38 EDT 2004


Maybe the receipt should only allow the voter to check that his vote has
been counted. To get the detail you could require him to appear in person
with his receipt AND a photo ID or some such, then only allow him to view
his detail -- not print it.

Paul Zuefeldt

----- Original Message -----
From: <Michael_Heyman at NAI.com>
To: <cryptography at metzdowd.com>; <cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net>
Sent: Wednesday, April 07, 2004 3:14 PM
Subject: RE: Firm invites experts to punch holes in ballot software


> From: owner-cryptography at metzdowd.com
> [mailto:owner-cryptography at metzdowd.com] On Behalf Of Trei, Peter
> Sent: Wednesday, April 07, 2004 1:17 PM
> [SNIP]
>
> Frankly, the whole online-verification step seems like an
> unnecessary complication.
>
Except to those of us who don't trust the system.

Implemented correctly it could be cheap and complications could be
hidden from the voter. It could be cheaper - no need to pay people to do
an audit when "the people" will do it for you. You only need a small
fraction of "the people" to verify their votes to get a high level of
confidence that the election is valid. You only need one failure to cast
doubt on the election. This requires an un-forgeable receipt that cannot
be used for coercion. Un-forgeable we have been doing for a while now
with lots of different PK options. A receipt that cannot be used for
coercion cannot give any indication to others of who you voted for.
Right now this is a big complication (at least to me - I don't know how
to create such a receipt that doesn't require mental gymnastics on the
part of the voter).

-Michael Heyman

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