Firm invites experts to punch holes in ballot software

[Michael_Heyman at NAI.com]

> From: owner-cryptography at metzdowd.com 
> [mailto:owner-cryptography at metzdowd.com] On Behalf Of Trei, Peter
> Sent: Wednesday, April 07, 2004 1:17 PM
> [SNIP] 
> 
> Frankly, the whole online-verification step seems like an 
> unnecessary complication.
>
Except to those of us who don't trust the system.

Implemented correctly it could be cheap and complications could be
hidden from the voter. It could be cheaper - no need to pay people to do
an audit when "the people" will do it for you. You only need a small
fraction of "the people" to verify their votes to get a high level of
confidence that the election is valid. You only need one failure to cast
doubt on the election. This requires an un-forgeable receipt that cannot
be used for coercion. Un-forgeable we have been doing for a while now
with lots of different PK options. A receipt that cannot be used for
coercion cannot give any indication to others of who you voted for.
Right now this is a big complication (at least to me - I don't know how
to create such a receipt that doesn't require mental gymnastics on the
part of the voter).

-Michael Heyman

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