October 2015 Archives by thread

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Starting: Thu Oct 1 00:57:52 EDT 2015
Ending: Sat Oct 31 23:57:29 EDT 2015
Messages: 342

• [Cryptography] Insecure Chip 'n' PIN starts tomorrow   Tony Arcieri
  • [Cryptography] Insecure Chip 'n' PIN starts tomorrow   Phillip Hallam-Baker
    • [Cryptography] Insecure Chip 'n' PIN starts tomorrow   Tony Arcieri
      • [Cryptography] Insecure Chip 'n' PIN starts tomorrow   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] Insecure Chip 'n' PIN starts tomorrow   John Levine
      • [Cryptography] Insecure Chip 'n' PIN starts tomorrow   Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • [Cryptography] Insecure Chip 'n' PIN starts tomorrow   John Levine
    • [Cryptography] Insecure Chip 'n' PIN starts tomorrow   Ron Garret
      • [Cryptography] Insecure Chip 'n' PIN starts tomorrow   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] Insecure Chip 'n' PIN starts tomorrow   Tom Mitchell
• [Cryptography] blockchain and trustworthy computing   Natanael
  • [Cryptography] blockchain and trustworthy computing   Peter Todd
    • [Cryptography] blockchain and trustworthy computing   phm
      • [Cryptography] blockchain and trustworthy computing   Peter Todd
    • [Cryptography] blockchain and trustworthy computing   ianG
      • [Cryptography] blockchain and trustworthy computing   Peter Todd
      • [Cryptography] blockchain and trustworthy computing   ianG
      • [Cryptography] blockchain and trustworthy computing   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] blockchain and trustworthy computing   Peter Todd
  • [Cryptography] blockchain and trustworthy computing   Bryan Bishop
  • [Cryptography] blockchain and trustworthy computing   ianG
    • [Cryptography] blockchain and trustworthy computing   Natanael
  • [Cryptography] blockchain and trustworthy computing   Lodewijk andré de la porte
• [Cryptography] [bart.preneel at esat.kuleuven.be: [fc-announce] Financial Cryptography 2016 - deadline extension until October 11]   R. Hirschfeld
• [Cryptography] Why is ECC secure?   Bill Cox
  • [Cryptography] Why is ECC secure?   Bill Cox
• [Cryptography] Paper check security   Arnold Reinhold
  • [Cryptography] Paper check security   Tom Mitchell
    • [Cryptography] Paper check security   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] Paper check security   Dave Horsfall
      • [Cryptography] Paper check security   Brian Gladman
      • [Cryptography] Paper check security   Bill Stewart
    • [Cryptography] Paper check security   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Paper check security   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] Paper check security   John Levine
      • [Cryptography] Paper check security   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] Paper check security   John Levine
    • [Cryptography] Paper check security   Arnold Reinhold
      • [Cryptography] Paper check security   John Levine
      • [Cryptography] Paper check security   Arnold Reinhold
      • [Cryptography] Paper check security   Thierry Moreau
      • [Cryptography] Paper check security   Arnold Reinhold
• [Cryptography] Hyper-V claims to protect tenant secrets ??   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] Hyper-V claims to protect tenant secrets ??   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] Hyper-V claims to protect tenant secrets ??   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] Hyper-V claims to protect tenant secrets ??   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Hyper-V claims to protect tenant secrets ??   Ray Dillinger
• [Cryptography] Happy birthday, Martin Hellman!   Dave Horsfall
• [Cryptography] RFID Protocols   Ryan Carboni
  • [Cryptography] RFID Protocols   Darkpassenger
  • [Cryptography] RFID Protocols   Bill Stewart
  • [Cryptography] RFID Protocols   John Denker
• [Cryptography] Microsoft's new, free, crypto library dubbed FourQ   Rob Schneier
  • [Cryptography] Microsoft's new, free, crypto library dubbed FourQ   Rob Schneier
• [Cryptography] Edwards curves are just ellipses - and why ECC works   Bill Cox
  • [Cryptography] Edwards curves are just ellipses - and why ECC works   Bill Cox
    • [Cryptography] Edwards curves are just ellipses - and why ECC works   Bill Cox
  • [Cryptography] Edwards curves are just ellipses - and why ECC works   Peter Fairbrother
    • [Cryptography] Edwards curves are just ellipses - and why ECC works   Bill Cox
      • [Cryptography] Edwards curves are just ellipses - and why ECC works   Bill Cox
      • [Cryptography] Edwards curves are just ellipses - and why ECC works   Bill Cox
      • [Cryptography] Edwards curves are just ellipses - and why ECC works   Bill Cox
• [Cryptography] of possible interest to list members in the Boston area   R. Hirschfeld
• [Cryptography] Turing Bombes Enigma   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] Turing Bombes Enigma   Darkpassenger
• [Cryptography] Spec for SSLv1   Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • [Cryptography] Spec for SSLv1   Phillip Hallam-Baker
    • [Cryptography] Spec for SSLv1   ianG
      • [Cryptography] Spec for SSLv1   Phillip Hallam-Baker
• [Cryptography] OpenPGP SEIP downgrade attack   Jonas Magazinius
  • [Cryptography] [openpgp] OpenPGP SEIP downgrade attack   Werner Koch
    • [Cryptography] [openpgp] OpenPGP SEIP downgrade attack   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] [openpgp] OpenPGP SEIP downgrade attack   David Leon Gil
      • [Cryptography] [openpgp] OpenPGP SEIP downgrade attack   Werner Koch
      • [Cryptography] [openpgp] OpenPGP SEIP downgrade attack   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] [openpgp] OpenPGP SEIP downgrade attack   Werner Koch
      • [Cryptography] [openpgp] OpenPGP SEIP downgrade attack   Jon Callas
      • [Cryptography] [openpgp] OpenPGP SEIP downgrade attack   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] [openpgp] OpenPGP SEIP downgrade attack   Werner Koch
      • [Cryptography] [openpgp] OpenPGP SEIP downgrade attack   Watson Ladd
  • [Cryptography] [openpgp] OpenPGP SEIP downgrade attack   Peter Gutmann
• [Cryptography] Publicly affirm your support for strong encryption   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Aussie scientists put quantum computing onto silicon   Dave Horsfall
• [Cryptography] Future GPG/PGP   Rællic Systems
  • [Cryptography] Future GPG/PGP   Miroslav Kratochvil
• [Cryptography] Reproducible results   Robert L. Wilson
  • [Cryptography] Reproducible results, scientific method, fraud enforcement, etc.   John Denker
    • [Cryptography] Reproducible results, scientific method, fraud enforcement, etc.   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] Reproducible results, scientific method, fraud enforcement, etc.   ianG
      • [Cryptography] Reproducible results, scientific method, fraud enforcement, etc.   Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • [Cryptography] Reproducible results   Gary Mulder
• [Cryptography] NSA Releases 21 Oral History Interviews   John Young
  • [Cryptography] NSA Releases 21 Oral History Interviews   Rick Smith, Cryptosmith
    • [Cryptography] NSA Releases 21 Oral History Interviews   Charles Jackson
• [Cryptography] Axe Campaigne Oral History   John Young
• [Cryptography] Collisions w/SHA-1 ~$100,000 TODAY   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] Collisions w/SHA-1 ~$100,000 TODAY   ianG
    • [Cryptography] Collisions w/SHA-1 ~$100,000 TODAY   Philipp Jovanovic
    • [Cryptography] Collisions w/SHA-1 ~$100,000 TODAY   Scott Elcomb
      • [Cryptography] Collisions w/SHA-1 ~$100,000 TODAY   ianG
      • [Cryptography] Collisions w/SHA-1 ~$100,000 TODAY   arxlight
      • [Cryptography] Collisions w/SHA-1 ~$100,000 TODAY   Philipp Jovanovic
    • [Cryptography] Collisions w/SHA-1 ~$100,000 TODAY   Alexandre Anzala-Yamajako
    • [Cryptography] Collisions w/SHA-1 ~$100,000 TODAY   Jeroen van der Ham
    • [Cryptography] Collisions w/SHA-1 ~$100,000 TODAY   Dave Horsfall
      • [Cryptography] Collisions w/SHA-1 ~$100,000 TODAY   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Collisions w/SHA-1 ~$100,000 TODAY   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] Collisions w/SHA-1 ~$100,000 TODAY   Hubert A. Le Van Gong
      • [Cryptography] Collisions w/SHA-1 ~$100,000 TODAY   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] Collisions w/SHA-1 ~$100,000 TODAY   Peter Gutmann
  • [Cryptography] Collisions w/SHA-1 ~$100,000 TODAY   Ryan Carboni
  • [Cryptography] Collisions w/SHA-1 ~$100,000 TODAY   Bart Preneel
• [Cryptography] Elliptic Curve Key Sharing   Nathaniel McCallum
  • [Cryptography] Elliptic Curve Key Sharing   Phillip Hallam-Baker
• [Cryptography] Usable Security Based On Sufficient Endpoint-Specific Unpredictability   Ralf Senderek
  • [Cryptography] Usable Security Based On Sufficient Endpoint-Specific Unpredictability   Natanael
  • [Cryptography] Usable Security Based On Sufficient Endpoint-Specific Unpredictability   Ray Dillinger
  • [Cryptography] Usable Security Based On Sufficient Endpoint-Specific Unpredictability   Ralf Senderek
  • [Cryptography] Usable Security Based On Sufficient Endpoint-Specific Unpredictability   Ralf Senderek
• [Cryptography] Fwd: Adaptive Echo (AE) Routing & Alibi Routing   Tom A.
• [Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Usable Security Based On Sufficient Endpoint-Specific Unpredictability   Ralf Senderek
  • [Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Usable Security Based On Sufficient Endpoint-Specific Unpredictability   Ron Garret
• [Cryptography] (fwd) a tale of software maintenance: OpenSSL and EVP_CHECK_DES_KEY   ianG
  • [Cryptography] (fwd) a tale of software maintenance: OpenSSL and EVP_CHECK_DES_KEY   Ryan Carboni
• [Cryptography] Cryptome for sale with access log files from 1996 for $50, 000, 000   John Young
• [Cryptography] How does the size of a set of target results influence the complexity of a preimage attack?   Rob Meijer
  • [Cryptography] How does the size of a set of target results influence the complexity of a preimage attack?   Ryan Carboni
    • [Cryptography] How does the size of a set of target results influence the complexity of a preimage attack?   Dave Horsfall
    • [Cryptography] How does the size of a set of target results influence the complexity of a preimage attack?   Rob Meijer
      • [Cryptography] How does the size of a set of target results influence the complexity of a preimage attack?   Natanael
      • [Cryptography] How does the size of a set of target results influence the complexity of a preimage attack?   Natanael
      • [Cryptography] How does the size of a set of target results influence the complexity of a preimage attack?   Zooko Wilcox-OHearn
      • [Cryptography] How does the size of a set of target results influence the complexity of a preimage attack?   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] How does the size of a set of target results influence the complexity of a preimage attack?   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] How does the size of a set of target results influence the complexity of a preimage attack?   Zooko Wilcox-OHearn
      • [Cryptography] How does the size of a set of target results influence the complexity of a preimage attack?   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] multicollision resistance in protocol design?   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] multicollision resistance in protocol design?   Ron Garret
• [Cryptography] Fwd: freedom-to-tinker.com: How is NSA breaking so much crypto?   Arnold Reinhold
  • [Cryptography] Fwd: freedom-to-tinker.com: How is NSA breaking so much crypto?   Arnold Reinhold
  • [Cryptography] Fwd: freedom-to-tinker.com: How is NSA breaking so much crypto?   Dan McDonald
    • [Cryptography] Fwd: freedom-to-tinker.com: How is NSA breaking so much crypto?   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] Fwd: freedom-to-tinker.com: How is NSA breaking so much crypto?   Dan McDonald
      • [Cryptography] Fwd: freedom-to-tinker.com: How is NSA breaking so much crypto?   Peter Fairbrother
      • [Cryptography] Fwd: freedom-to-tinker.com: How is NSA breaking so much crypto?   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] Fwd: freedom-to-tinker.com: How is NSA breaking so much crypto?   Paul Wouters
      • [Cryptography] Fwd: freedom-to-tinker.com: How is NSA breaking so much crypto?   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] Fwd: freedom-to-tinker.com: How is NSA breaking so much crypto?   Watson Ladd
    • [Cryptography] Fwd: freedom-to-tinker.com: How is NSA breaking so much crypto?   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] Fwd: freedom-to-tinker.com: How is NSA breaking so much crypto?   Watson Ladd
      • [Cryptography] Fwd: freedom-to-tinker.com: How is NSA breaking so much crypto?   John-Mark Gurney
      • [Cryptography] freedom-to-tinker.com: How is NSA breaking so much crypto?   Louis Kowolowski
      • [Cryptography] freedom-to-tinker.com: How is NSA breaking so much crypto?   John-Mark Gurney
      • [Cryptography] freedom-to-tinker.com: How is NSA breaking so much crypto?   Louis Kowolowski
      • [Cryptography] Fwd: freedom-to-tinker.com: How is NSA breaking so much crypto?   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: Fwd: freedom-to-tinker.com: How is NSA breaking so much crypto?   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] Fwd: freedom-to-tinker.com: How is NSA breaking so much crypto?   Natanael
      • [Cryptography] Fwd: freedom-to-tinker.com: How is NSA breaking so much crypto?   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] Fwd: freedom-to-tinker.com: How is NSA breaking so much crypto?   Peter Gutmann
  • [Cryptography] Fwd: freedom-to-tinker.com: How is NSA breaking so much crypto?   Ryan Carboni
• [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Thierry Moreau
  • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Joshua Hill
    • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Watson Ladd
      • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Joshua Hill
    • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Ray Dillinger
  • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Peter Gutmann
    • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Watson Ladd
    • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] "We need crypto code training" and other obviosities.   ianG
      • [Cryptography] "We need crypto code training" and other obviosities.   John-Mark Gurney
      • [Cryptography] "We need crypto code training" and other obviosities.   Max Kington
      • [Cryptography] "We need crypto code training" and other obviosities.   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] "We need crypto code training" and other obviosities.   John-Mark Gurney
      • [Cryptography] "We need crypto code training" and other obviosities.   Jean-Philippe Aumasson
      • [Cryptography] "We need crypto code training" and other obviosities.   ianG
      • [Cryptography] "We need crypto code training" and other obviosities.   Jean-Philippe Aumasson
      • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Philipp Gühring
      • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   John-Mark Gurney
      • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   ianG
  • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Ralf Senderek
  • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   John Denker
    • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Natanael
    • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   ianG
  • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Arnold Reinhold
    • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   John Denker
    • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   John-Mark Gurney
      • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Arnold Reinhold
      • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   John-Mark Gurney
      • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Ron Garret
      • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Yann Droneaud
      • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Arnold Reinhold
      • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Viktor Dukhovni
    • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Michael Kjörling
      • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   John-Mark Gurney
      • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   John Denker
      • [Cryptography] How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code (was: Re: Other obvious issues being ignored?)   Michael Kjörling
      • [Cryptography] How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   Bertrand Mollinier Toublet
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   Michael Kjörling
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   Mansour Moufid
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   Watson Ladd
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   Mansour Moufid
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   Rob Meijer
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   Christian Huitema
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   Thierry Moreau
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   Thierry Moreau
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   Christian Huitema
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   Bertrand Mollinier Toublet
      • [Cryptography] cryptography Digest, Vol 30, Issue 25   Nemo
      • [Cryptography] letter versus spirit of the law ... UB delenda est   John Denker
      • [Cryptography] letter versus spirit of the law ... UB delenda est   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] letter versus spirit of the law ... UB delenda est   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] letter versus spirit of the law ... UB delenda est   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] letter versus spirit of the law ... UB delenda est   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] letter versus spirit of the law ... UB delenda est   Ron Garret
      • [Cryptography] letter versus spirit of the law ... UB delenda est   D. Hugh Redelmeier
      • [Cryptography] letter versus spirit of the law ... Eventus incertus delendus est   John Denker
      • [Cryptography] letter versus spirit of the law ... Eventus incertus delendus est   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] letter versus spirit of the law ... Eventus incertus delendus est   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] letter versus spirit of the law ... Eventus incertus delendus est   Michael Kjörling
      • [Cryptography] letter versus spirit of the law ... Eventus incertus delendus est   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] letter versus spirit of the law ... Eventus incertus delendus est   Peter Todd
    • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   John Gilmore
      • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Watson Ladd
      • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Werner Koch
      • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Thierry Moreau
      • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Watson Ladd
      • [Cryptography] portable, reliable code ... Eventus incertus delendus est   John Denker
      • [Cryptography] portable, reliable code ... Eventus incertus delendus est   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   John-Mark Gurney
  • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   John Denker
    • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Ron Garret
      • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   John Denker
      • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   John Denker
  • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Ralf Senderek
  • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   John Denker
    • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   ianG
      • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   dan at geer.org
      • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Known Hardware (was Other obvious issues being ignored?)   Thierry Moreau
    • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Tom Mitchell
  • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Bill Frantz
  • [Cryptography] Other obvious issues being ignored?   Peter Fairbrother
  • [Cryptography] Fwd: Other obvious issues being ignored?   Tom Mitchell
• [Cryptography] WikiLeaks Hosts Cryptome with Search   John Young
• [Cryptography] Interesting discussion over on oss-security re: primes   Dave Horsfall
• [Cryptography] WikiLeaks is not hosting Cryptome, search service only   John Young
• [Cryptography] WikiLeaks of "spying related" to its Cryptome search is click bait   John Young
  • [Cryptography] WikiLeaks of "spying related" to its Cryptome search is click bait   phm
• [Cryptography] Recovering x from y on Ed448   Nathaniel McCallum
• [Cryptography] A Riddle Wrapped in an Enigma - Elliptic curves, NSA and post quantum cryptography   Joachim Strömbergson
• [Cryptography] Randomness for crypto, github repositories   Sandy Harris
  • [Cryptography] Randomness for crypto, github repositories   Sandy Harris
• [Cryptography] Attacking Elliptic Curve Crypto on the infinity symbol   Bill Cox
  • [Cryptography] Attacking Elliptic Curve Crypto on the infinity symbol   covariant
    • [Cryptography] Attacking Elliptic Curve Crypto on the infinity symbol   Bill Cox
• [Cryptography] Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society, May 2, 1996   John Young
• [Cryptography] Security Standard for Safety Critical Software   Adrian McCullagh
  • [Cryptography] Security Standard for Safety Critical Software   Darkpassenger
  • [Cryptography] Security Standard for Safety Critical Software   Adrian McCullagh
  • [Cryptography] Security Standard for Safety Critical Software   ianG
• [Cryptography] attacks on packet length may be surprisingly good: Hookt on fon-iks   ianG
• [Cryptography] Making secure devices.   Ray Dillinger
  • [Cryptography] Making secure devices.   Peter Todd
• [Cryptography] composing EC & RSA encryption?   ianG
  • [Cryptography] composing EC & RSA encryption?   Ron Garret
  • [Cryptography] composing EC & RSA encryption?   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] composing EC & RSA encryption?   ianG
    • [Cryptography] composing EC & RSA encryption?   Bill Cox
  • [Cryptography] composing EC & RSA encryption?   Tony Arcieri
    • [Cryptography] composing EC & RSA encryption?   Bill Cox
      • [Cryptography] composing EC & RSA encryption?   Tony Arcieri
    • [Cryptography] composing EC & RSA encryption?   ianG
      • [Cryptography] composing EC & RSA encryption?   Tony Arcieri
      • [Cryptography] composing EC & RSA encryption?   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] composing EC & RSA encryption?   Hanno Böck
    • [Cryptography] composing EC & RSA encryption?   Watson Ladd
      • [Cryptography] composing EC & RSA encryption?   Tony Arcieri
  • [Cryptography] composing EC & RSA encryption?   Ryan Carboni
    • [Cryptography] composing EC & RSA encryption?   Lodewijk andré de la porte
  • [Cryptography] composing EC & RSA encryption?   Peter Gutmann
    • [Cryptography] composing EC & RSA encryption?   Phillip Hallam-Baker
• [Cryptography] "Digital" Love Locks?   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] "Digital" Love Locks?   Natanael
• [Cryptography] EFF press release: Wednesday Hearing in NSA Spying Case   John Gilmore
  • [Cryptography] EFF press release: Wednesday Hearing in NSA Spying Case   James S. Tyre
• [Cryptography] The Energy Budget for Wireless Security shows cryptography is cheap   Ryan Carboni
  • [Cryptography] [FORGED] The Energy Budget for Wireless Security shows cryptography is cheap   Peter Gutmann
    • [Cryptography] [FORGED] The Energy Budget for Wireless Security shows cryptography is cheap   ianG
    • [Cryptography] [FORGED] The Energy Budget for Wireless Security shows cryptography is cheap   dj at deadhat.com
• [Cryptography] WhatApp metadata broken; on deck: voice encryption   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] RIP Tommy Flowers   Dave Horsfall
  • [Cryptography] RIP Tommy Flowers   D. Hugh Redelmeier
    • [Cryptography] RIP Tommy Flowers   John Levine
• [Cryptography] Oracle archeologists discover memory tagging   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] Oracle archeologists discover memory tagging   John Gilmore
    • [Cryptography] Oracle archeologists discover memory tagging   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Hiding parties identities   Christian Huitema
  • [Cryptography] Hiding parties identities   Peter Gutmann
    • [Cryptography] Hiding parties identities   Christian Huitema
  • [Cryptography] Hiding parties identities   ryan.pear at ownbay.net
  • [Cryptography] Hiding parties identities   Ray Dillinger
  • [Cryptography] Hiding parties identities   Ralf Senderek
  • [Cryptography] Hiding parties identities   Ben Laurie
• [Cryptography] Criptyque touts all-in-one secure comms app   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] New email feature: NSA speedbumps   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] letter versus spirit of the law ...   Arnold Reinhold
• [Cryptography] Are zero knowledge authentication systems safe?   Phillip Hallam-Baker

Last message date: Sat Oct 31 23:57:29 EDT 2015
Archived on: Sun Nov 1 00:00:10 EDT 2015

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