[Cryptography] Insecure Chip 'n' PIN starts tomorrow

Phillip Hallam-Baker phill at hallambaker.com
Thu Oct 1 19:54:43 EDT 2015


On Thu, Oct 1, 2015 at 2:19 PM, Tony Arcieri <bascule at gmail.com> wrote:

> On Thu, Oct 1, 2015 at 5:27 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <
> phill at hallambaker.com> wrote:
>
>> Are there any attacks against EMV that don't involve using the payment
>> mechanisms that only require the card number?
>>
>
> Yes, there is a rich history of attacks on EMV, e.g.:
>
> http://sec.cs.ucl.ac.uk/users/smurdoch/papers/oakland14chipandskim.pdf
> http://krebsonsecurity.com/2015/04/revolution-crimeware-emv-replay-attacks/
>
>
Both papers describe attacks on the legacy or transitional features.

If the banks are checking the transactions correctly, the counter based
fraud is detectable. And the rest is the 'fallback fraud' that depends on
being able to circumvent the EMV system completely.

Neither is a good reason to delay deployment of EMV.

The most important change that comes with EMV is realigning ability to
impose security measures with liability for the loss. The fact that a bank
can screw up and get defrauded is irrelevant AFAIC f they are going to be
bearing the responsibility for the loss. Companies that sell crap POS
terminals will get sured out of business.

Which is of course where most of the complaining about Chip and Signature
comes.

Incidentally, it seems Chip and Sign is actually a better security solution
overall because Chip and PIN encourages people to enter their PIN into
things that are not ATMs. And the ATMs are taking the longest to get
switched over from magstripe.
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