September 2010 Archives by thread

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Starting: Wed Sep 1 02:16:54 EDT 2010
Ending: Thu Sep 30 21:41:22 EDT 2010
Messages: 151

• RSA question   Francois Grieu
• RSA question   Bill Stewart
  • RSA question   travis+ml-cryptography at subspacefield.org
    • RSA question   Sampo Syreeni
      • RSA question   Joseph Ashwood
      • RSA question   Victor Duchovni
      • RSA question   Steven Bellovin
      • RSA question   Francois Grieu
      • RSA question   Francois Grieu
• questions about RNGs and FIPS 140   Nicolas Williams
• Nearly $1,000,000 stolen electronically from the University of Virginia   Perry E. Metzger
  • Nearly $1,000,000 stolen electronically from the University of Virginia   Anne & Lynn Wheeler
• RSA question   Perry E. Metzger
• Merkle Signature Scheme is the most secure signature scheme possible for general-purpose use   Ben Laurie
  • Merkle Signature Scheme is the most secure signature scheme possible for general-purpose use   Zooko O'Whielacronx
    • Merkle Signature Scheme is the most secure signature scheme possible for general-purpose use   Ben Laurie
      • Merkle Signature Scheme is the most secure signature scheme possible for general-purpose use   Jack Lloyd
      • Merkle Signature Scheme is the most secure signature scheme possible for general-purpose use   mheyman at gmail.com
      • Merkle Signature Scheme is the most secure signature scheme possible for general-purpose use   Jon Callas
      • Merkle Signature Scheme is the most secure signature scheme possible for general-purpose use   Marsh Ray
      • Merkle Signature Scheme is the most secure signature scheme possible for general-purpose use   Ben Laurie
      • Merkle Signature Scheme is the most secure signature scheme possible for general-purpose use   Marsh Ray
      • Merkle Signature Scheme is the most secure signature scheme possible for general-purpose use   Dave Horsfall
      • Merkle Signature Scheme is the most secure signature scheme possible for general-purpose use   Perry E. Metzger
• Haystack redux   Alec Muffett
  • Haystack redux   Steve Weis
    • Haystack redux   Alec Muffett
    • Haystack redux   Jacob Appelbaum
      • Haystack redux   Jim Youll
      • Haystack redux   Adam Fields
      • Haystack redux   Jacob Appelbaum
      • Haystack redux   Jim Youll
      • Haystack redux   Jens Kubieziel
      • Haystack (helping "dissidents"?)   M.R.
      • Haystack (helping "dissidents"?)   Adam Shostack
      • Haystack (helping "dissidents"?)   Bill Stewart
      • Haystack redux   Florian Weimer
• questions about RNGs and FIPS 140   Ben Laurie
  • questions about RNGs and FIPS 140   Thierry Moreau
• Randomness, Quantum Mechanics - and Cryptography   Jerry Leichter
  • Randomness, Quantum Mechanics - and Cryptography   John Denker
    • Randomness, Quantum Mechanics - and Cryptography   Marsh Ray
      • Randomness, Quantum Mechanics - and Cryptography   John Denker
      • Randomness, Quantum Mechanics - and Cryptography   Perry E. Metzger
      • Randomness, Quantum Mechanics - and Cryptography   John Denker
      • Randomness, Quantum Mechanics - and Cryptography   Perry E. Metzger
      • Randomness, Quantum Mechanics - and Cryptography   Marsh Ray
      • Randomness, Quantum Mechanics - and Cryptography   Marsh Ray
    • Randomness, Quantum Mechanics - and Cryptography   Jerry Leichter
      • Randomness, Quantum Mechanics - and Cryptography   Perry E. Metzger
      • Randomness, Quantum Mechanics - and Cryptography   Victor Duchovni
• Fw: Request for Comments - NIST Draft SP 800-135: Recommendation for Application-Specific Key Derivation Functions   Perry E. Metzger
• Hashing algorithm needed   flj at mail.dnttm.ro
  • Hashing algorithm needed   Nicolas Williams
  • Hashing algorithm needed   Marsh Ray
  • Hashing algorithm needed   Ben Laurie
    • Hashing algorithm needed   James A. Donald
      • Hashing algorithm needed   Ben Laurie
  • Hashing algorithm needed   Chris Palmer
• ADMIN: please do not "dual post"   Perry E. Metzger
• customizing Live CD images   John Denker
• Hashing algorithm needed   flj at mail.dnttm.ro
  • Hashing algorithm needed   Ian G
    • Hashing algorithm needed   Marsh Ray
      • Hashing algorithm needed   Ian G
      • Hashing algorithm needed   Ben Laurie
      • Hashing algorithm needed   Marsh Ray
      • Hashing algorithm needed   Nicolas Williams
      • Hashing algorithm needed   Ben Laurie
      • Hashing algorithm needed   Ben Laurie
      • Hashing algorithm needed   Erwan Legrand
• more digitally-signed malware   Steven Bellovin
• Fwd: [ PRIVACY Forum ] 'Padding Oracle' Crypto Attack Affects Millions of ASP.NET Apps   Steven Bellovin
• 'Padding Oracle' Crypto Attack Affects Millions of ASP.NET Apps   =JeffH
  • 'Padding Oracle' Crypto Attack Affects Millions of ASP.NET Apps   Peter Gutmann
    • 'Padding Oracle' Crypto Attack Affects Millions of ASP.NET Apps   Perry E. Metzger
      • 'Padding Oracle' Crypto Attack Affects Millions of ASP.NET Apps   Tom Ritter
      • 'Padding Oracle' Crypto Attack Affects Millions of ASP.NET Apps   Peter Gutmann
      • 'Padding Oracle' Crypto Attack Affects Millions of ASP.NET Apps   Thai Duong
      • 'Padding Oracle' Crypto Attack Affects Millions of ASP.NET Apps   Kevin W. Wall
• Intel plans crypto-walled-garden for x86   John Gilmore
  • Intel plans crypto-walled-garden for x86   Ben Laurie
  • Intel plans crypto-walled-garden for x86   Peter Gutmann
    • Intel plans crypto-walled-garden for x86   ian.farquhar at rsa.com
  • Intel plans crypto-walled-garden for x86   David G. Koontz
  • Intel plans crypto-walled-garden for x86   Bill Frantz
  • Intel plans crypto-walled-garden for x86   Steven Bellovin
• Debian encouraging use of 4096 bit RSA keys   Perry E. Metzger
  • Debian encouraging use of 4096 bit RSA keys   Peter Gutmann
  • Debian encouraging use of 4096 bit RSA keys   Ben Laurie
  • Debian encouraging use of 4096 bit RSA keys   Henrique de Moraes Holschuh
    • Debian encouraging use of 4096 bit RSA keys   Werner Koch
• Debian encouraging use of 4096 bit RSA keys   Perry E. Metzger
  • Folly of looking at CA cert lifetimes   Paul Hoffman
    • Folly of looking at CA cert lifetimes   Thor Lancelot Simon
      • Folly of looking at CA cert lifetimes   Paul Hoffman
• Debian encouraging use of 4096 bit RSA keys   Perry E. Metzger
• HDCP master key supposedly leaked   Steven Bellovin
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part III   Peter Gutmann
  • A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part III   Andy Steingruebl
    • A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part III   James A. Donald
    • A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part III   Carl Ellison
• ADMIN: Heavy-handed moderation   Perry E. Metzger
• More on padding oracles   Peter Gutmann
• Something you have, something else you have, and, uh, something else you have   Peter Gutmann
  • Something you have, something else you have, and, uh, something else you have   Steven Bellovin
    • Something you have, something else you have, and, uh, something else you have   John Gilmore
    • Something you have, something else you have, and, uh, something else you have   Sean Donelan
  • Something you have, something else you have, and, uh, something else you have   Bernie Cosell
• Czech intel agency allegedly offered "tax free cash" to local crypto vendor to incorporate defects   Matt Blaze
• Slides on the SHA-3 competition   Steven Bellovin
• ciphers with keys modifying control flow?   Steven Bellovin
  • ciphers with keys modifying control flow?   Jerry Leichter
  • ciphers with keys modifying control flow?   Florian Weimer
• [spock at cs.stevens.edu: WECSR 2011 CFP - Deadline Oct 15, 2010 - please disseminate]   R. Hirschfeld
• ANNOUNCING Tahoe, the Least-Authority File System, v1.8.0   Zooko O'Whielacronx
• Certificate-stealing Trojan   Steven Bellovin
  • Certificate-stealing Trojan   Rose, Greg
    • Certificate-stealing Trojan   Marsh Ray
      • Certificate-stealing Trojan   Thierry Moreau
• Former Stasi Cryptographers Now Develop Technology for NATO   Eugen Leitl
• Obama administration revives Draconian communications intercept plans   Perry E. Metzger
  • The Demise of the Trusted Third Party Fallacy   M.R.
  • Obama administration revives Draconian communications intercept plans   David G. Koontz
  • Obama administration revives Draconian communications intercept plans   Florian Weimer
    • Obama administration revives Draconian communications intercept plans   Josh Rubin
    • Obama administration revives Draconian communications intercept plans   Ken Buchanan
• Obama administration wants encryption backdoors for domestic surveillance   David G. Koontz
  • Obama administration wants encryption backdoors for domestic surveillance   dan at geer.org
• 'Padding Oracle' Crypto Attack Affects Millions of ASP.NET Apps   Thai Duong
  • 'Padding Oracle' Crypto Attack Affects Millions of ASP.NET Apps   James A. Donald
• 'Padding Oracle' Crypto Attack Affects Millions of ASP.NET Apps   Thai Duong
  • 'Padding Oracle' Crypto Attack Affects Millions of ASP.NET Apps   Kevin W. Wall
• Stanford 10/7/2010 -- Lessons from the Haystack Affair   Bill Stewart
• 2048 bits, damn the electrons! [rt at openssl.org: [openssl.org #2354] [PATCH] Increase Default RSA Key Size to 2048-bits]   Thor Lancelot Simon
  • 2048 bits, damn the electrons! [rt at openssl.org: [openssl.org #2354] [PATCH] Increase Default RSA Key Size to 2048-bits]   Chris Palmer
    • 2048 bits, damn the electrons! [rt at openssl.org: [openssl.org #2354] [PATCH] Increase Default RSA Key Size to 2048-bits]   Thor Lancelot Simon
      • 2048 bits, damn the electrons! [rt at openssl.org: [openssl.org #2354] [PATCH] Increase Default RSA Key Size to 2048-bits]   Steven Bellovin
      • 2048 bits, damn the electrons! [rt at openssl.org: [openssl.org #2354] [PATCH] Increase Default RSA Key Size to 2048-bits]   Marsh Ray
      • 2048 bits, damn the electrons! [rt at openssl.org: [openssl.org #2354] [PATCH] Increase Default RSA Key Size to 2048-bits]   Paul Wouters
      • 2048 bits, damn the electrons! [rt at openssl.org: [openssl.org #2354] [PATCH] Increase Default RSA Key Size to 2048-bits]   Thor Lancelot Simon
      • 2048 bits, damn the electrons! [rt at openssl.org: [openssl.org #2354] [PATCH] Increase Default RSA Key Size to 2048-bits]   James Muir
      • 2048 bits, damn the electrons! [rt at openssl.org: [openssl.org #2354] [PATCH] Increase Default RSA Key Size to 2048-bits]   Samuel Neves
  • 2048 bits, damn the electrons! [rt at openssl.org: [openssl.org #2354] [PATCH] Increase Default RSA Key Size to 2048-bits]   Kevin W. Wall
• [tt] Random numbers created out of nothing   Eugen Leitl
• 2048 bits, damn the electrons! [rt at openssl.org: [openssl.org #2354] [PATCH] Increase Default RSA Key Size to 2048-bits]   Thor Lancelot Simon
  • 2048 bits, damn the electrons! [rt at openssl.org: [openssl.org #2354] [PATCH] Increase Default RSA Key Size to 2048-bits]   Samuel Neves
  • 2048 bits, damn the electrons! [rt at openssl.org: [openssl.org #2354] [PATCH] Increase Default RSA Key Size to 2048-bits]   Jack Lloyd
  • 2048 bits, damn the electrons! [rt at openssl.org: [openssl.org #2354] [PATCH] Increase Default RSA Key Size to 2048-bits]   Victor Duchovni
• Wrong Direction on Privacy - using NSLs to obtain communication transactional information   =JeffH
• ADMIN: Don't Top Post. Trim Quoted Material.   Perry E. Metzger

Last message date: Thu Sep 30 21:41:22 EDT 2010
Archived on: Sun Aug 7 18:27:02 EDT 2011

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