Obama administration revives Draconian communications intercept plans

David G. Koontz david_koontz at xtra.co.nz
Mon Sep 27 19:19:54 EDT 2010


On 28/09/10 1:26 AM, Perry E. Metzger wrote:

> From the New York Times, word that the Obama administration wants to
> compel access to encrypted communications.
> 
> http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/27/us/27wiretap.html

Someone should beat up the FBI for using specious arguments:

> But as an example, one official said, an investigation into a drug cartel 
> earlier this year was stymied because smugglers used peer-to-peer software,
> which is difficult to intercept because it is not routed through a central
> hub. Agents eventually installed surveillance equipment in a suspect’s
> office, but that tactic was “risky,” the official said, and the delay
> “prevented the interception of pertinent communications.”

You could note that the communications either went through a phone system or
through an ISP. The qualifier 'delay "prevented the interception of
pertinent communications"' means they couldn't get a wiretap instantly.
Seems they wouldn't either if they asked for a court order first.

This sort of argumentation is why privacy advocates won in the Clipper
debate.  The FBI isn't arguing 'for' rationally, but then again they'd
probably have a hard time winning without resorting to propaganda.

> And their envisioned decryption mandate is modest, they contended, because
> service providers — not the government — would hold the key.
>
> “No one should be promising their customers that they will thumb their nose
>  at a U.S. court order,” Ms. Caproni said. “They can promise strong
> encryption. They just need to figure out how they can provide us plain text.”

Sounds like an effort to legitmize and institutionalize the ability of
government to perform SSL MITM with service providers footing the bill.

There's also a Declan McCullagh article "Report: Feds to push for Net
encryption backdoors".  http://news.cnet.com/8301-31921_3-20017671-281.html


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