September 2010 Archives by subject

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Starting: Wed Sep 1 02:16:54 EDT 2010
Ending: Thu Sep 30 21:41:22 EDT 2010
Messages: 151

• 'Padding Oracle' Crypto Attack Affects Millions of ASP.NET Apps   =JeffH
• 'Padding Oracle' Crypto Attack Affects Millions of ASP.NET Apps   Peter Gutmann
• 'Padding Oracle' Crypto Attack Affects Millions of ASP.NET Apps   Perry E. Metzger
• 'Padding Oracle' Crypto Attack Affects Millions of ASP.NET Apps   Tom Ritter
• 'Padding Oracle' Crypto Attack Affects Millions of ASP.NET Apps   Peter Gutmann
• 'Padding Oracle' Crypto Attack Affects Millions of ASP.NET Apps   Thai Duong
• 'Padding Oracle' Crypto Attack Affects Millions of ASP.NET Apps   Kevin W. Wall
• 'Padding Oracle' Crypto Attack Affects Millions of ASP.NET Apps   Thai Duong
• 'Padding Oracle' Crypto Attack Affects Millions of ASP.NET Apps   Thai Duong
• 'Padding Oracle' Crypto Attack Affects Millions of ASP.NET Apps   James A. Donald
• 'Padding Oracle' Crypto Attack Affects Millions of ASP.NET Apps   Kevin W. Wall
• 2048 bits, damn the electrons! [rt at openssl.org: [openssl.org #2354] [PATCH] Increase Default RSA Key Size to 2048-bits]   Thor Lancelot Simon
• 2048 bits, damn the electrons! [rt at openssl.org: [openssl.org #2354] [PATCH] Increase Default RSA Key Size to 2048-bits]   Thor Lancelot Simon
• 2048 bits, damn the electrons! [rt at openssl.org: [openssl.org #2354] [PATCH] Increase Default RSA Key Size to 2048-bits]   Thor Lancelot Simon
• 2048 bits, damn the electrons! [rt at openssl.org: [openssl.org #2354] [PATCH] Increase Default RSA Key Size to 2048-bits]   Thor Lancelot Simon
• 2048 bits, damn the electrons! [rt at openssl.org: [openssl.org #2354] [PATCH] Increase Default RSA Key Size to 2048-bits]   Victor Duchovni
• 2048 bits, damn the electrons! [rt at openssl.org: [openssl.org #2354] [PATCH] Increase Default RSA Key Size to 2048-bits]   Chris Palmer
• 2048 bits, damn the electrons! [rt at openssl.org: [openssl.org #2354] [PATCH] Increase Default RSA Key Size to 2048-bits]   Kevin W. Wall
• 2048 bits, damn the electrons! [rt at openssl.org: [openssl.org #2354] [PATCH] Increase Default RSA Key Size to 2048-bits]   Steven Bellovin
• 2048 bits, damn the electrons! [rt at openssl.org: [openssl.org #2354] [PATCH] Increase Default RSA Key Size to 2048-bits]   Marsh Ray
• 2048 bits, damn the electrons! [rt at openssl.org: [openssl.org #2354] [PATCH] Increase Default RSA Key Size to 2048-bits]   Paul Wouters
• 2048 bits, damn the electrons! [rt at openssl.org: [openssl.org #2354] [PATCH] Increase Default RSA Key Size to 2048-bits]   James Muir
• 2048 bits, damn the electrons! [rt at openssl.org: [openssl.org #2354] [PATCH] Increase Default RSA Key Size to 2048-bits]   Samuel Neves
• 2048 bits, damn the electrons! [rt at openssl.org: [openssl.org #2354] [PATCH] Increase Default RSA Key Size to 2048-bits]   Samuel Neves
• 2048 bits, damn the electrons! [rt at openssl.org: [openssl.org #2354] [PATCH] Increase Default RSA Key Size to 2048-bits]   Jack Lloyd
• [spock at cs.stevens.edu: WECSR 2011 CFP - Deadline Oct 15, 2010 - please disseminate]   R. Hirschfeld
• [tt] Random numbers created out of nothing   Eugen Leitl
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part III   Peter Gutmann
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part III   Andy Steingruebl
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part III   James A. Donald
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part III   Carl Ellison
• ADMIN: Don't Top Post. Trim Quoted Material.   Perry E. Metzger
• ADMIN: Heavy-handed moderation   Perry E. Metzger
• ADMIN: please do not "dual post"   Perry E. Metzger
• ANNOUNCING Tahoe, the Least-Authority File System, v1.8.0   Zooko O'Whielacronx
• Certificate-stealing Trojan   Steven Bellovin
• Certificate-stealing Trojan   Rose, Greg
• Certificate-stealing Trojan   Marsh Ray
• Certificate-stealing Trojan   Thierry Moreau
• ciphers with keys modifying control flow?   Steven Bellovin
• ciphers with keys modifying control flow?   Jerry Leichter
• ciphers with keys modifying control flow?   Florian Weimer
• customizing Live CD images   John Denker
• Czech intel agency allegedly offered "tax free cash" to local crypto vendor to incorporate defects   Matt Blaze
• Debian encouraging use of 4096 bit RSA keys   Perry E. Metzger
• Debian encouraging use of 4096 bit RSA keys   Peter Gutmann
• Debian encouraging use of 4096 bit RSA keys   Ben Laurie
• Debian encouraging use of 4096 bit RSA keys   Perry E. Metzger
• Debian encouraging use of 4096 bit RSA keys   Henrique de Moraes Holschuh
• Debian encouraging use of 4096 bit RSA keys   Perry E. Metzger
• Debian encouraging use of 4096 bit RSA keys   Werner Koch
• Folly of looking at CA cert lifetimes   Paul Hoffman
• Folly of looking at CA cert lifetimes   Thor Lancelot Simon
• Folly of looking at CA cert lifetimes   Paul Hoffman
• Former Stasi Cryptographers Now Develop Technology for NATO   Eugen Leitl
• Fw: Request for Comments - NIST Draft SP 800-135: Recommendation for Application-Specific Key Derivation Functions   Perry E. Metzger
• Fwd: [ PRIVACY Forum ] 'Padding Oracle' Crypto Attack Affects Millions of ASP.NET Apps   Steven Bellovin
• Hashing algorithm needed   flj at mail.dnttm.ro
• Hashing algorithm needed   Nicolas Williams
• Hashing algorithm needed   Marsh Ray
• Hashing algorithm needed   Ben Laurie
• Hashing algorithm needed   Chris Palmer
• Hashing algorithm needed   James A. Donald
• Hashing algorithm needed   Ben Laurie
• Hashing algorithm needed   flj at mail.dnttm.ro
• Hashing algorithm needed   Ian G
• Hashing algorithm needed   Marsh Ray
• Hashing algorithm needed   Ian G
• Hashing algorithm needed   Ben Laurie
• Hashing algorithm needed   Erwan Legrand
• Hashing algorithm needed   Marsh Ray
• Hashing algorithm needed   Nicolas Williams
• Hashing algorithm needed   Ben Laurie
• Hashing algorithm needed   Ben Laurie
• Haystack (helping "dissidents"?)   M.R.
• Haystack (helping "dissidents"?)   Adam Shostack
• Haystack (helping "dissidents"?)   Bill Stewart
• Haystack redux   Alec Muffett
• Haystack redux   Steve Weis
• Haystack redux   Alec Muffett
• Haystack redux   Jacob Appelbaum
• Haystack redux   Jim Youll
• Haystack redux   Adam Fields
• Haystack redux   Jacob Appelbaum
• Haystack redux   Jim Youll
• Haystack redux   Jens Kubieziel
• Haystack redux   Florian Weimer
• HDCP master key supposedly leaked   Steven Bellovin
• Intel plans crypto-walled-garden for x86   John Gilmore
• Intel plans crypto-walled-garden for x86   Ben Laurie
• Intel plans crypto-walled-garden for x86   Peter Gutmann
• Intel plans crypto-walled-garden for x86   David G. Koontz
• Intel plans crypto-walled-garden for x86   Bill Frantz
• Intel plans crypto-walled-garden for x86   Steven Bellovin
• Intel plans crypto-walled-garden for x86   ian.farquhar at rsa.com
• Merkle Signature Scheme is the most secure signature scheme possible for general-purpose use   Ben Laurie
• Merkle Signature Scheme is the most secure signature scheme possible for general-purpose use   Zooko O'Whielacronx
• Merkle Signature Scheme is the most secure signature scheme possible for general-purpose use   Ben Laurie
• Merkle Signature Scheme is the most secure signature scheme possible for general-purpose use   Jack Lloyd
• Merkle Signature Scheme is the most secure signature scheme possible for general-purpose use   Marsh Ray
• Merkle Signature Scheme is the most secure signature scheme possible for general-purpose use   Ben Laurie
• Merkle Signature Scheme is the most secure signature scheme possible for general-purpose use   Marsh Ray
• Merkle Signature Scheme is the most secure signature scheme possible for general-purpose use   Dave Horsfall
• Merkle Signature Scheme is the most secure signature scheme possible for general-purpose use   Perry E. Metzger
• Merkle Signature Scheme is the most secure signature scheme possible for general-purpose use   mheyman at gmail.com
• Merkle Signature Scheme is the most secure signature scheme possible for general-purpose use   Jon Callas
• more digitally-signed malware   Steven Bellovin
• More on padding oracles   Peter Gutmann
• Nearly $1,000,000 stolen electronically from the University of Virginia   Perry E. Metzger
• Nearly $1,000,000 stolen electronically from the University of Virginia   Anne & Lynn Wheeler
• Obama administration revives Draconian communications intercept plans   Perry E. Metzger
• Obama administration revives Draconian communications intercept plans   David G. Koontz
• Obama administration revives Draconian communications intercept plans   Florian Weimer
• Obama administration revives Draconian communications intercept plans   Josh Rubin
• Obama administration revives Draconian communications intercept plans   Ken Buchanan
• Obama administration wants encryption backdoors for domestic surveillance   David G. Koontz
• Obama administration wants encryption backdoors for domestic surveillance   dan at geer.org
• questions about RNGs and FIPS 140   Nicolas Williams
• questions about RNGs and FIPS 140   Ben Laurie
• questions about RNGs and FIPS 140   Thierry Moreau
• Randomness, Quantum Mechanics - and Cryptography   Jerry Leichter
• Randomness, Quantum Mechanics - and Cryptography   John Denker
• Randomness, Quantum Mechanics - and Cryptography   Marsh Ray
• Randomness, Quantum Mechanics - and Cryptography   John Denker
• Randomness, Quantum Mechanics - and Cryptography   Perry E. Metzger
• Randomness, Quantum Mechanics - and Cryptography   John Denker
• Randomness, Quantum Mechanics - and Cryptography   Marsh Ray
• Randomness, Quantum Mechanics - and Cryptography   Perry E. Metzger
• Randomness, Quantum Mechanics - and Cryptography   Marsh Ray
• Randomness, Quantum Mechanics - and Cryptography   Jerry Leichter
• Randomness, Quantum Mechanics - and Cryptography   Perry E. Metzger
• Randomness, Quantum Mechanics - and Cryptography   Victor Duchovni
• RSA question   Francois Grieu
• RSA question   Bill Stewart
• RSA question   Perry E. Metzger
• RSA question   travis+ml-cryptography at subspacefield.org
• RSA question   Sampo Syreeni
• RSA question   Joseph Ashwood
• RSA question   Victor Duchovni
• RSA question   Steven Bellovin
• RSA question   Francois Grieu
• RSA question   Francois Grieu
• Slides on the SHA-3 competition   Steven Bellovin
• Something you have, something else you have, and, uh, something else you have   Peter Gutmann
• Something you have, something else you have, and, uh, something else you have   Steven Bellovin
• Something you have, something else you have, and, uh, something else you have   Bernie Cosell
• Something you have, something else you have, and, uh, something else you have   Sean Donelan
• Something you have, something else you have, and, uh, something else you have   John Gilmore
• Stanford 10/7/2010 -- Lessons from the Haystack Affair   Bill Stewart
• The Demise of the Trusted Third Party Fallacy   M.R.
• Wrong Direction on Privacy - using NSLs to obtain communication transactional information   =JeffH

Last message date: Thu Sep 30 21:41:22 EDT 2010
Archived on: Sun Aug 7 18:27:02 EDT 2011

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