August 2009 Archives by date

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Starting: Sat Aug 1 08:01:26 EDT 2009
Ending: Mon Aug 31 20:34:22 EDT 2009
Messages: 137

• Manipulation and abuse of the consumer credit reporting agencies   Jerry Leichter
• Fast MAC algorithms?   Joseph Ashwood
• Fast MAC algorithms?   Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
• The clouds are not random enough   Jerry Leichter
• AES, RC4   PETER SCHWEITZER
• ANNOUNCING Tahoe, the Lofty-Atmospheric Filesystem, v1.5   Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
• Malware using good crypto   Udhay Shankar N
• AES, RC4   Joseph Ashwood
• Fast MAC algorithms?   James A. Donald
• Fast MAC algorithms?   Joseph Ashwood
• Protocol Construction WAS Re: Fast MAC algorithms?   Joseph Ashwood
• GPGPU MD5 collision search shown at Black Hat   Perry E. Metzger
• The clouds are not random enough   Ben Laurie
• Unattended reboots (was Re: The clouds are not random enough)   Arshad Noor
• Unattended reboots (was Re: The clouds are not random enough)   Richard Salz
• Unattended reboots (was Re: The clouds are not random enough)   Arshad Noor
• Unattended reboots   james hughes
• Unattended reboots (was Re: The clouds are not random enough)   lists at notatla.org.uk
• Unattended reboots (was Re: The clouds are not random enough)   Darren J Moffat
• Attacks against GOST? Was: Protocol Construction   Alexander Klimov
• Unattended reboots (was Re: The clouds are not random enough)   Richard Salz
• unattended reboot (was: clouds ...)   John Denker
• Unattended reboots (was Re: The clouds are not random enough)   Ali, Saqib
• Unattended reboots (was Re: The clouds are not random enough)   Philipp Gühring
• New Attacks against AES-256   I)ruid
• Unattended reboots (was Re: The clouds are not random enough)   Peter Gutmann
• New Attacks against AES-256   Robert Holmes
• Vulnerable keyboards   Jerry Leichter
• Malware using good crypto   mheyman at gmail.com
• Client Certificate UI for Chrome?   Ben Laurie
• cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption is Overrated   Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
• ANNOUNCE: New book on software protection   Christian Collberg
• Attacks against GOST? Was: Protocol Construction   Joseph Ashwood
• cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption is Overrated   Ben Laurie
• Client Certificate UI for Chrome?   James A. Donald
• Client Certificate UI for Chrome?   Peter Gutmann
• Client Certificate UI for Chrome?   Anne & Lynn Wheeler
• Client Certificate UI for Chrome?   Thomas Hardjono
• cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption is Overrated   james hughes
• Client Certificate UI for Chrome?   James A. Donald
• Client Certificate UI for Chrome?   James A. Donald
• cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption is Overrated   Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
• All your notebook belong to us   Jerry Leichter
• cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption is Overrated   Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
• cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption is Overrated   Jerry Leichter
• brute force physics Was: cleversafe...   Alexander Klimov
• [tahoe-dev] cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption isOverrated   Jason Resch
• cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption is Overrated   Jason Resch
• Client Certificate UI for Chrome?   Peter Gutmann
• [tahoe-dev] cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption isOverrated   Jason Resch
• [tahoe-dev] cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption isOverrated   Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
• [tahoe-dev] cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption isOverrated   Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
• Client Certificate UI for Chrome?   James A. Donald
• FW: cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption is Overrated   Jason Resch
• Client Certificate UI for Chrome?   Frank Siebenlist
• Client Certificate UI for Chrome?   James A. Donald
• Entropy USB key   Alex Pankratov
• Client Certificate UI for Chrome?   Peter Gutmann
• Client Certificate UI for Chrome?   Thomas Hardjono
• Ultimate limits to computation   Hal Finney
• strong claims about encryption safety Re: [tahoe-dev] cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption isOverrated   Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
• brute force physics Was: cleversafe...   Jerry Leichter
• Ultimate limits to computation   Jerry Leichter
• Client Certificate UI for Chrome?   James A. Donald
• brute force physics Was: cleversafe...   David Wagner
• strong claims about encryption safety Re: [tahoe-dev] cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption isOverrated   Jason Resch
• Client Certificate UI for Chrome?   Wes Felter
• brute force physics Was: cleversafe...   Alexander Klimov
• brute force physics Was: cleversafe...   Florian Weimer
• Kahn's "Seizing the Enigma" back in print -- with a catch   Steven Bellovin
• Kahn's "Seizing the Enigma" back in print -- with a catch   John Levine
• Ultimate limits to computation   Your Monkey Overlord
• Crypto'09 Rump session to be webcast   james hughes
• Seizing the Enigma   John Levine
• Client Certificate UI for Chrome?   Peter Gutmann
• Client Certificate UI for Chrome?   James A. Donald
• So how do *you* manage your keys, then? Re: [tahoe-dev] cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption isOverrated   Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
• 512 bit RSA key used for TI 83+ auth cracked   Jack Lloyd
• 2 serving time in UK prisons for refusing to decrypt on demand   John Gilmore
• Client Certificate UI for Chrome?   Peter Gutmann
• Crypto'09 Rump session to be webcast   james hughes
• Tahoe-LAFS key management, part 2: Tahoe-LAFS is like encrypted git   Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
• [tahoe-dev] Tahoe-LAFS key management, part 2: Tahoe-LAFS is like encrypted git   Jack Lloyd
• [tahoe-dev] Tahoe-LAFS key management, part 2: Tahoe-LAFS is like encrypted git   Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
• Re (security fix): A Basic Rabin-Williams Digital Signature Specification   Thierry Moreau
• [tahoe-dev] Tahoe-LAFS key management, part 2: Tahoe-LAFS is like encrypted git   Perry E. Metzger
• Crypto '09 rump session summary?   Perry E. Metzger
• [tahoe-dev] Tahoe-LAFS key management, part 2: Tahoe-LAFS is like encrypted git   James A. Donald
• SHA-1 and Git (was Re: [tahoe-dev] Tahoe-LAFS key management, part 2: Tahoe-LAFS is like encrypted git)   Perry E. Metzger
• Crypto '09 rump session summary?   Greg Rose
• Certainty   Paul Hoffman
• Crypto '09 rump session summary?   Paul Hoffman
• Certainty   Perry E. Metzger
• Certainty   james hughes
• Certainty   Greg Rose
• Client Certificate UI for Chrome? [OT anonymous-transaction bull***t]   Ray Dillinger
• Certainty   John Gilmore
• Client Certificate UI for Chrome? -- OT anonymous-transaction   Anne & Lynn Wheeler
• NIST Requests Public Comments   Perry E. Metzger
• Certainty   Paul Hoffman
• SHA-1 and Git (was Re: [tahoe-dev] Tahoe-LAFS key management, part 2: Tahoe-LAFS is like encrypted git)   Ben Laurie
• SHA-1 and Git   Perry E. Metzger
• SHA-1 and Git (was Re: [tahoe-dev] Tahoe-LAFS key management, part 2: Tahoe-LAFS is like encrypted git)   Jonathan Thornburg
• SHA-1 and Git (was Re: [tahoe-dev] Tahoe-LAFS key management, part 2: Tahoe-LAFS is like encrypted git)   Darren J Moffat
• SHA-1 and Git   Paul Hoffman
• Certainty   Hal Finney
• SHA-1 and Git (was Re: [tahoe-dev] Tahoe-LAFS key management, part 2: Tahoe-LAFS is like encrypted git)   Thor Lancelot Simon
• SHA-1 and Git (was Re: [tahoe-dev] Tahoe-LAFS key management, part 2: Tahoe-LAFS is like encrypted git)   Nicolas Williams
• Small-key DSA variant   Hal Finney
• SHA-1 and Git (was Re: [tahoe-dev] Tahoe-LAFS key management, part 2: Tahoe-LAFS is like encrypted git)   James A. Donald
• Certainty   Perry E. Metzger
• Client Certificate UI for Chrome?   Ben Laurie
• Client Certificate UI for Chrome?   Stefan Santesson
• a crypto puzzle about digital signatures and future compatibility   Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
• a crypto puzzle about digital signatures and future compatibility   Richard Salz
• SHA-1 and Git (was Re: [tahoe-dev] Tahoe-LAFS key management, part 2: Tahoe-LAFS is like encrypted git)   Jon Callas
• SHA-1 and Git (was Re: [tahoe-dev] Tahoe-LAFS key management, part 2: Tahoe-LAFS is like encrypted git)   Peter Gutmann
• Client Certificate UI for Chrome?   James A. Donald
• SHA-1 and Git (was Re: [tahoe-dev] Tahoe-LAFS key management, part 2: Tahoe-LAFS is like encrypted git)   James A. Donald
• a crypto puzzle about digital signatures and future compatibility   Jerry Leichter
• AES-GMAC as a hash   Darren J Moffat
• SHA-1 and Git (was Re: [tahoe-dev] Tahoe-LAFS key management, part 2: Tahoe-LAFS is like encrypted git)   Thor Lancelot Simon
• [tahoe-dev] a crypto puzzle about digital signatures and future compatibility   Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
• Bringing Tahoe ideas to HTTP   Brian Warner
• Cloud Security: Alice and Bob Go to Washington   R.A. Hettinga
• [tahoe-dev] a crypto puzzle about digital signatures and future compatibility   James A. Donald
• [tahoe-dev] Bringing Tahoe ideas to HTTP   Michael Walsh
• [tahoe-dev] Bringing Tahoe ideas to HTTP   Brian Warner
• Practical attack on WPA?   Jerry Leichter
• "Defending Against Sensor-Sniffing Attacks on Mobile Phones"   Jerry Leichter
• Fwd: Important Information for PGP® Desktop Users Running Mac OS X   R.A. Hettinga
• Fwd: [Macgpg-users] GPGMail & Snow Leopard   R.A. Hettinga
• Source for Skype Trojan released   Jerry Leichter
• [tahoe-dev] a crypto puzzle about digital signatures and future compatibility   Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
• AES-GMAC as a hash   Hal Finney
• Source for Skype Trojan released   Stephan Neuhaus
• [Macgpg-users] GPGMail & Snow Leopard   David Shaw

Last message date: Mon Aug 31 20:34:22 EDT 2009
Archived on: Sun Aug 7 18:26:23 EDT 2011

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