December 2008 Archives by subject

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Starting: Mon Dec 1 13:26:39 EST 2008
Ending: Tue Dec 30 22:19:39 EST 2008
Messages: 106

• "Cryptol"   Perry E. Metzger
• [Forwarded] NIST Requests Comments   Perry E. Metzger
• A History of U.S. Communications Security   Pehr Söderman
• AES HDD encryption was XOR   Alexander Klimov
• AES HDD encryption was XOR   Jerry Leichter
• AES HDD encryption was XOR   William Allen Simpson
• AES HDD encryption was XOR   Jon Callas
• AES HDD encryption was XOR   Victor Duchovni
• AES HDD encryption was XOR   dan at geer.org
• Attacking a secure smartcard   Jerry Leichter
• CPRNGs and assurance...   Perry E. Metzger
• CPRNGs and assurance...   Jerry Leichter
• CPRNGs are still an issue.   Jack Lloyd
• CPRNGs are still an issue.   James A. Donald
• CPRNGs are still an issue.   Damien Miller
• CPRNGs are still an issue.   Bill Frantz
• CPRNGs are still an issue.   Steven M. Bellovin
• CPRNGs are still an issue.   Perry E. Metzger
• CPRNGs are still an issue.   Joachim Strömbergson
• CPRNGs are still an issue.   Paul Crowley
• CPRNGs are still an issue.   Sandy Harris
• CPRNGs are still an issue.   Jerry Leichter
• CPRNGs are still an issue.   William Allen Simpson
• CPRNGs are still an issue.   mheyman at gmail.com
• CPRNGs are still an issue.   Simon Josefsson
• CPRNGs are still an issue.   Charles Jackson
• CPRNGs are still an issue.   Jerry Leichter
• CPRNGs are still an issue.   Jerry Leichter
• CPRNGs are still an issue.   Damien Miller
• CPRNGs are still an issue.   Peter Gutmann
• CPRNGs are still an issue.   Peter Gutmann
• CPRNGs are still an issue.   Jerry Leichter
• CPRNGs are still an issue.   Perry E. Metzger
• CPRNGs are still an issue.   Steven M. Bellovin
• CPRNGs are still an issue.   David G. Koontz
• CPRNGs are still an issue.   Nicolas Williams
• CPRNGs are still an issue.   Roland Dowdeswell
• Domestic surveillance and warrantless wiretaps   Matt Blaze
• FBI "code"-cracking contest   Steven M. Bellovin
• Fw: [saag] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a rogue CA certificate   Steven M. Bellovin
• Fwd: [gsc] Trubanc Web Client Public Beta   R.A. Hettinga
• Lifting Some Restrictions on Encryption Exports   Ali, Saqib
• Lifting Some Restrictions on Encryption Exports   Tamzen Cannoy
• Lifting Some Restrictions on Encryption Exports   Florian Weimer
• Lifting Some Restrictions on Encryption Exports   David G. Koontz
• Lifting Some Restrictions on Encryption Exports   Allen
• Matt Blaze blog entry about NSA warrantless wiretapping   Perry E. Metzger
• MD5 considered harmful today   Jacob Appelbaum
• MD5 considered harmful today   Hal Finney
• MD5 considered harmful today   Eric Rescorla
• More on (no pun intended) D-wave quantum computer   Ali, Saqib
• OpenSSH patch against traffic analysis   Sebastian Krahmer
• Quantum direct communication: secrecy without key distribution   Eugen Leitl
• Quantum direct communication: secrecy without key distribution   Nicolas Williams
• Quantum direct communication: secrecy without key distribution   dan at geer.org
• Quantum direct communication: secrecy without key distribution   Jim Youll
• Request for Input (RFI)--National Cyber Leap Year   Bill Frantz
• Researchers Show How to Forge Site Certificates |   David G. Koontz
• Researchers Use PlayStation Cluster to Forge a Web Skeleton Key   David G. Koontz
• Security by asking the drunk whether he's drunk   Peter Gutmann
• Security by asking the drunk whether he's drunk   Adam Shostack
• Security by asking the drunk whether he's drunk   Peter Gutmann
• Security by asking the drunk whether he's drunk   Peter Gutmann
• Security by asking the drunk whether he's drunk   Peter Gutmann
• Security by asking the drunk whether he's drunk   Jerry Leichter
• Security by asking the drunk whether he's drunk   Peter Gutmann
• Security by asking the drunk whether he's drunk   Jerry Leichter
• Security by asking the drunk whether he's drunk   Ben Laurie
• Security by asking the drunk whether he's drunk   Florian Weimer
• Security by asking the drunk whether he's drunk   David Molnar
• Security by asking the drunk whether he's drunk   Jerry Leichter
• Security by asking the drunk whether he's drunk   Peter Gutmann
• Security by asking the drunk whether he's drunk   Ben Laurie
• Security by asking the drunk whether he's drunk   Peter Gutmann
• Security by asking the drunk whether he's drunk   Ben Laurie
• Security by asking the drunk whether he's drunk   Sidney Markowitz
• Security by asking the drunk whether he's drunk   Peter Gutmann
• Security by asking the drunk whether he's drunk   Jerry Leichter
• Security by asking the drunk whether he's drunk   dan at geer.org
• Short announcement: MD5 considered harmful today - Creating a rogue CA certificate   Weger, B.M.M. de
• Steve Bellovin on the MD5 Collision attacks, more on Wired   David G. Koontz
• The next time someone tells you "no one" would do something...   Perry E. Metzger
• The next time someone tells you "no one" would do something...   Peter Gutmann
• two bits of light holiday reading   Ivan Krstić
• two bits of light holiday reading   Steven M. Bellovin
• very high speed hardware RNG   Perry E. Metzger
• very high speed hardware RNG   Jerry Leichter
• very high speed hardware RNG   Jack Lloyd
• very high speed hardware RNG   Steven M. Bellovin
• very high speed hardware RNG   Jack Lloyd
• very high speed hardware RNG   Jon Callas
• very high speed hardware RNG   Jerry Leichter
• very high speed hardware RNG   Jon Callas
• Why the poor uptake of encrypted email?   Alec Muffett
• Why the poor uptake of encrypted email?   ji at tla.org
• Why the poor uptake of encrypted email?   StealthMonger
• Why the poor uptake of encrypted email?   Nicolas Williams
• Why the poor uptake of encrypted email?   Peter Gutmann
• Why the poor uptake of encrypted email?   James A. Donald
• Why the poor uptake of encrypted email?   James A. Donald
• Why the poor uptake of encrypted email?   Nicolas Williams
• Why the poor uptake of encrypted email? [Was: Re: Secrets and cell phones.]   StealthMonger
• Why the poor uptake of encrypted email? [Was: Re: Secrets and cell phones.]   JOHN GALT
• Why the poor uptake of encrypted email? [Was: Re: Secrets and cell phones.]   David G. Koontz
• Why the poor uptake of encrypted email? [Was: Re: Secrets and cell phones.]   Dirk-Willem van Gulik
• Why the poor uptake of encrypted email? [Was: Re: Secrets and cell phones.]   James A. Donald

Last message date: Tue Dec 30 22:19:39 EST 2008
Archived on: Sun Aug 7 18:25:58 EDT 2011

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