Quantum direct communication: secrecy without key distribution

dan at geer.org dan at geer.org
Fri Dec 5 19:06:01 EST 2008

 > The most obvious flaw is that when we're talking fiber optics the
 > eavesdropper might as well be a man in the middle, and so...  well, see
 > the list archive.

...possibly OT...

well-placed but UNCORROBORATED informant sez that
day before yesterday (3 dec):

5 hours of CheckFree traffic redirected and likely
captured in full

half of IP addresses for CheckFree left in place, half
re-directed to Ukraine, i.e., partial MITM entirely
at the routing protocol layer

as is so often the case, slight amateurish fuckup at
the Ukrainian end raised the alarm -- would not otherwise
have been found for days

[the important part] it appears that in the last few hours
a method has been ?found/?released that makes possible the
MITM completely transparent with all traffic forwarded on
as if there was just an extra hop in the path; MITM via an
effective attack on routing protocols, per se, would be no joke





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