[Cryptography] New White Paper: GhostLine - Information-Theoretically Secure Multi-Party Chat

Ferecides de Siros filosofarte at protonmail.com
Mon Sep 8 22:18:21 EDT 2025


On Monday, September 8th, 2025 at 13:33, Pierre Abbat <phma at bezitopo.org> wrote: 
> Shannon's proof of perfect security does not apply if you use /dev/urandom

>  How well does the gentleman
> protocol work with long, variable latency and participants dropping out
> because of storms?

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Hi Pierre,

On randomness: You're absolutely right about the information-theoretic requirements. 
The implementation prioritizes hardware TRNGs when available. When only /dev/urandom 
or CSPRNGs are available, the security reduces to computational rather than perfect 
secrecy, though the protocol design itself maintains information-theoretic guarantees 
assuming proper random material.

On connectivity: The current Gentleman Protocol assumes reasonably stable networks. 
With high/variable latency or frequent dropouts:
- - Turn-taking becomes challenging (timeouts need adjustment)
- - Dropped participants cause desynchronization 
- - Re-synchronization mechanisms would be needed

For satellite/unstable networks like you describe, additional features would be required: 
heartbeat detection, adaptive timeouts, and re-sync protocols. The current implementation 
is optimized for stable networks but your real-world scenarios highlight important areas 
for future development.

Thanks for these practical considerations - they're crucial for real-world deployment.

Best,
Hitokiri
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