[Cryptography] New White Paper: GhostLine - Information-Theoretically Secure Multi-Party Chat

[Patrick Chkoreff]

On 9/7/25 2:46 AM, Pierre Abbat wrote:

> ... How do you get truly random numbers for the OTP?

(I say the following tongue-in-cheek so please don't throw anything at 
me, yet.)

What you do is roll 64 of those 16-sided dice to produce an initial 256 
bit seed.  Then you run that seed through SHA256 to produce the next 256 
bit seed, and continue that chain indefinitely.

The first 256 bit block is "truly" random; the subsequent blocks are 
"pseuo" random but nevertheless "random enough."  There's your OTP.  You 
could probably extend it for many terabytes.  Maybe even petabytes.

>  How do you distribute the OTP?

You scribble down the initial 256 bit seed onto a small slip of paper in 
hex notation, meet with your counterparty, and give her the paper.


====>  OK, now for one serious question:  in the hash chain sequence I 
describe above, in what way is that NOT suitable for use as an OTP?

I understand the higher risk of key compromise:  namely, that if you 
know any one of the 256 bit blocks in the OTP sequence, you therefore 
know all the subsequent blocks to infinity.  There are ways to mitigate 
that.  I'm just asking about the "randomness" quality of the OTP 
material itself.


-- Patrick