[Cryptography] A naming and key distribution infrastructure for the Mesh

[Phillip Hallam-Baker]

On Sat, Sep 26, 2020 at 1:47 AM Richard Outerbridge <outer at interlog.com>
wrote:

> Maybe only if some chain also followed the number around through number
> reassignments,
> iotw if each number had its own chain of number reassignments?
>

Here is how I would see things going.

First off, nobody uses telephone numbers for dialing any more. They are
used to establish an initial connection and then get stored in a contacts
list.

Secondly, if you build on the legacy telephone infrastructure, you are
going to end up finding yourself regulated under CALEA. Not good.

So let us imagine that parallel to the Mesh naming system, there is a Mesh
telephone number tracking system. I can register my telephone number and
bind it to a Mesh account. And this is authenticated and periodically
re-authenticated by means of a callback. Maybe the service tracks the SS7
system to see if things have been reassigned.

Alice has +1-617-666-1234 registered in this service and it binds to
alice at service.

So now lets imagine that Bob is using his Mesh enabled comms app to call
Alice. She is not in her contacts, he dials the number on her business card
+1-617-666-1234

* Consult the telephone number registry, the name is there, use the Mesh
VOIP protocol to establish an end to end secure voice call to alice at service.

* (Optional) try other non telephone providers.

* If not found, drop down to standard SIP based VOIP telephony (however
that works) through her telephony provider. Since Alice doesn't know Bob
(yet) this is likely to be a voicemail box because the legacy telephone
system is so spammy these days it is dying and will soon be dead, dead,
dead.

The advantage of going through the Mesh first is of course we can then
achieve end-to-end secure and have the ability to shift to a different
modality (message, video) if desired. And since Alice doesn't know Bob in
this use case, she can require him to perform a contact request first
unless Bob has a credential from some group Alice has put in her accept
policy.

The way I see things, traditional telephone and SMTP email are dying
because they are too spammy to live. And the only thing keeping them alive
for now is the fact that they are the only open, interoperable game in
town. If there is a viable spam free alternative that is open, it will
start to acquire users and will be supported by a large number of ISPs etc.
who realize that they are not going to establish themselves as the monopoly
provider of the replacement system.
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