[Cryptography] In the event of my death, master password

[Phillip Hallam-Baker]

On Fri, Mar 1, 2019 at 6:24 AM Jordan <jordocote at gmail.com> wrote:

> This UDF business is a terrifyingly proprietary stack of protocols
> introducing no novelty or usefulness.
>

Such as?

There is absolutely nothing proprietary.

Do you actually read anything before you respond with accusations?

As for novelty, name another technology that makes it possible to bind an
arbitrary Internet address to a particular root of trust. Name another
technology that allows QR codes to be used to provide access to a resource
of arbitrary size with (essentially) the same degree of security as if the
data was in the QR code.

Come on, name them.

It requires a web service to be maintained by the user. How can the user
> maintain it, if he’s dead?
>

It does not actually. All it requires is HTTPS. Read the spec.


> The problem can be solved up to the same specs by storing an encrypted
> file in the cloud. All those machinations do is confuse and restrict the
> data format to a few bytes. It’s not as though I feel anyone would actually
> use this, but for those who might be reading a bit further into these
> discussions than the literal I would dissuade people from getting carried
> away with this Philip character’s use of “random” example keys and acronyms
> like “SINs” that are overloaded contrived and inappropriate
>

Looks like someone is projecting here.

You misrepresent my work and then tell them not to read it. Very
interesting.

What are you selling eh? All my work is open source and unencumbered.
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