[Cryptography] traffic analysis

Kevin W. Wall kevin.w.wall at gmail.com
Tue Jan 27 22:58:30 EST 2015

On Jan 27, 2015 3:44 PM, "Ben Laurie" <benl at google.com> wrote:
> On 27 January 2015 at 18:35, Jerry Leichter <leichter at lrw.com> wrote:
>> Different network designs can also help.  If you own the link and both
of its ends, it costs you exactly the same to send continuous random bits
as to leave the line idle.  Any encrypted traffic (assuming an encryptor
whose output is indistinguishable from random noise() is then safe from
observation.  The Hot Line between the US and Moscow was, I believe,
designed to work this way.  How this extends to a packet-switched network,
especially one where you can't trust the switches, is unclear.
> Yeah, but ... who can realistically afford that bandwidth? To every
possible recipient? Clearly you have to make a tradeoff.

It's a crying shame no one can figure out how to re-purpose all the
existing spam traffic as cover traffic. Sigh.

Sent from my Droid; please excuse typos.
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