[Cryptography] asymmetric attacks on crypto-protocols - the rough consensus attack

[Dan McDonald]

On 1 August 2015 at 21:27, ianG <iang at iang.org> wrote:
> Can anyone suggest a way to get around this?  I think this really puts a
> marker on the map - you simply can't do a security/crypto protocol under
> rough consensus in open committee, when there is an attacker out there
> willing to put in the resources to stop it.
> 
> Thoughts?

It's a problem, like terrorism is a real problem.  ALSO like terrorism, the mere threat of such a problem can be used by people with strong NIH infections to push their own terrible alternatives simply by waving the threat of the "rough consensus attacker" around.

This has happened in Real Life before, and it will happen again.  It doesn't diminish the actual problem of a rough-consensus attack, but the concept is rife for hiding other abuses.  (Were I real tinfoil-hat-wearer, I might argue a rough consensus attacker would use NIH fanatics as a second prong.)

Dan