[Cryptography] asymmetric attacks on crypto-protocols - the rough consensus attack

[ianG]

On 2/08/2015 16:56 pm, Dan McDonald wrote:
> On 1 August 2015 at 21:27, ianG <iang at iang.org> wrote:
>> Can anyone suggest a way to get around this?  I think this really puts a
>> marker on the map - you simply can't do a security/crypto protocol under
>> rough consensus in open committee, when there is an attacker out there
>> willing to put in the resources to stop it.
>>
>> Thoughts?
>
> It's a problem, like terrorism is a real problem.  ALSO like terrorism, the mere threat of such a problem can be used by people with strong NIH infections to push their own terrible alternatives simply by waving the threat of the "rough consensus attacker" around.
>
> This has happened in Real Life before, and it will happen again.  It doesn't diminish the actual problem of a rough-consensus attack, but the concept is rife for hiding other abuses.  (Were I real tinfoil-hat-wearer, I might argue a rough consensus attacker would use NIH fanatics as a second prong.)



This is a good point.  Were I to start accusing of a rough consensus 
attack on some WG, I'd probably be assisting that very same rough 
consensus attack...

NIH == not invented here?  Yes, I see that.



iang