[Cryptography] HSM's

[Thierry Moreau]

Tony Arcieri wrote:
> On Sun, Jan 19, 2014 at 10:54 AM, Bill Frantz <frantz at pwpconsult.com 
> <mailto:frantz at pwpconsult.com>> wrote:
> 
>     There seem to be at least three approaches to the problem: (1) Split
>     the key into enough pieces that a single rogue HSM can't compromise
>     security. (2) Isolate the HSM(s) such that they can't communicate
>     the key or perform rogue signatures. (3) Require signatures from all
>     the HSMs for validity.
> 
> 
> Just want to say I love #3: multisignature trust, because it completely 
> decentralizes the problem and no one machine ever has to reassemble a 
> master secret.
>  

On the other hand, each relying party has to reassemble a public key set 
with each elementary public key subject to revocation, rollover, and the 
like. Not a trivial task for a large population of relying parties.

-- 
- Thierry Moreau