[Cryptography] HSM's

[Tony Arcieri]

On Sun, Jan 19, 2014 at 10:54 AM, Bill Frantz <frantz at pwpconsult.com> wrote:

> There seem to be at least three approaches to the problem: (1) Split the
> key into enough pieces that a single rogue HSM can't compromise security.
> (2) Isolate the HSM(s) such that they can't communicate the key or perform
> rogue signatures. (3) Require signatures from all the HSMs for validity.
>

Just want to say I love #3: multisignature trust, because it completely
decentralizes the problem and no one machine ever has to reassemble a
master secret.

-- 
Tony Arcieri
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