January 2009 Archives by subject

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Starting: Thu Jan 1 14:45:22 EST 2009
Ending: Sat Jan 31 21:33:54 EST 2009
Messages: 113

• "Attack of the Wireless Worms"   Donald Eastlake
• "Attack of the Wireless Worms"   Jerry Leichter
• "Attack of the Wireless Worms"   Peter Gutmann
• [heise online UK] Secure deletion: a single overwrite will do it   Stefan Kelm
• [heise online UK] Secure deletion: a single overwrite will do it   Jason
• [heise online UK] Secure deletion: a single overwrite will do it   Dave Kleiman
• [heise online UK] Secure deletion: a single overwrite will do it   dan at geer.org
• [Opensim-dev] Technical assessment of Cable Beach asset server   Eugen Leitl
• [tmoore at seas.harvard.edu: [fc-announce] Financial Crypto February 23-26 in Barbados, Early Registration Deadline Approaching]   R. Hirschfeld
• A History of U.S. Communications Security   Marcus Brinkmann
• BIS looking for feedback on export controls   Noah Salzman
• Bitcoin v0.1 released   Satoshi Nakamoto
• Bitcoin v0.1 released   Hal Finney
• Bitcoin v0.1 released   Satoshi Nakamoto
• Bitcoin v0.1 released   Jonathan Thornburg
• Bitcoin v0.1 released   Hal Finney
• Bitcoin v0.1 released   Bill Frantz
• Bitcoin v0.1 released   Satoshi Nakamoto
• Bitcoin v0.1 released   dan at geer.org
• CodeCon 2009 Call for Presentations   Len Sassaman
• enigma simulator in flash   Perry E. Metzger
• feds try to argue touch tone content needs no wiretap order   Perry E. Metzger
• feds try to argue touch tone content needs no wiretap order   Steven M. Bellovin
• full-disk encryption standards released   Steven M. Bellovin
• full-disk encryption standards released   Arshad Noor
• full-disk encryption standards released   Peter Gutmann
• full-disk encryption standards released   Paul Crowley
• full-disk subversion standards released   Thor Lancelot Simon
• full-disk subversion standards released   Taral
• full-disk subversion standards released   Nicolas Williams
• full-disk subversion standards released   Thor Lancelot Simon
• full-disk subversion standards released   Peter Gutmann
• full-disk subversion standards released   David G. Koontz
• full-disk subversion standards released   John Gilmore
• full-disk subversion standards released   Jonathan Thornburg
• full-disk subversion standards released   John Gilmore
• hash trees to protect court evidence for genocide trials   Perry E. Metzger
• MD5 considered harmful today   Len Sassaman
• MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow   Dustin D. Trammell
• MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow   Victor Duchovni
• MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow   Weger, B.M.M. de
• MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow   Victor Duchovni
• MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow   James A. Donald
• MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow   Peter Gutmann
• MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow   Weger, B.M.M. de
• MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow   Marcus Brinkmann
• MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow   Steven M. Bellovin
• MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow   Paul Hoffman
• MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow   Bodo Moeller
• MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow   Darren J Moffat
• MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow   Paul Hoffman
• MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow   Victor Duchovni
• MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow   Steven M. Bellovin
• MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow   Peter Gutmann
• MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow   Jon Callas
• MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow   Nicolas Williams
• MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow   Peter Gutmann
• MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow   Ben Laurie
• MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow   Victor Duchovni
• MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow   Eric Rescorla
• MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow   Peter Gutmann
• MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow   Ben Laurie
• MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow   Eric Rescorla
• Obama's secure PDA   Ivan Krstić
• Obama's secure PDA   Paul Hoffman
• Obama's secure PDA   Thor Lancelot Simon
• Obama's secure PDA   Jerry Leichter
• Obama's secure PDA   Jerry Leichter
• Obama's secure PDA   Nicolas Williams
• Obama's secure PDA   Steven M. Bellovin
• Obama's secure PDA   Peter Gutmann
• Obama's secure PDA   Perry E. Metzger
• Obama's secure PDA   Jerry Leichter
• Obama's secure PDA   ian.farquhar at rsa.com
• Obama's secure PDA   David G. Koontz
• Obama's secure PDA   Ivan Krstić
• On the topic of "Asking the drunk"...   Peter Gutmann
• On the topic of "Asking the drunk"...   Jerry Leichter
• On the topic of "Asking the drunk"...   Peter Gutmann
• OpenPGP:SDK v0.9 released   Ben Laurie
• Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon   John Gilmore
• Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon   John Levine
• Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon   Zooko O'Whielacronx
• Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon   Hal Finney
• Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon   John Levine
• Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon   Jerry Leichter
• Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon   Nicolas Williams
• Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon   Bill Frantz
• Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon   John Levine
• Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon   Ben Laurie
• Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon   Thomas Coppi
• Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon   John Levine
• Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon   Bill Stewart
• Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon   Russ Nelson
• Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon   Steven M. Bellovin
• Security by asking the drunk whether he's drunk   Paul Hoffman
• UCE - a simpler approach using just digital signing?   Ray Dillinger
• UCE - a simpler approach using just digital signing?   Jerry Leichter
• UCE - a simpler approach using just digital signing?   John Levine
• UCE - a simpler approach using just digital signing?   Taral
• UCE - a simpler approach using just digital signing?   Sascha Silbe
• UCE - a simpler approach using just digital signing?   John Levine
• very high speed hardware RNG   Ivan Krstić
• What EV certs are good for   Jerry Leichter
• What EV certs are good for   Ben Laurie
• What EV certs are good for   Jerry Leichter
• What EV certs are good for   William Soley
• What EV certs are good for   The Fungi
• What EV certs are good for   Ben Laurie
• What EV certs are good for   John Levine
• What risk is being defended against here?   Jerry Leichter
• What risk is being defended against here?   Perry E. Metzger
• What risk is being defended against here?   Florian Weimer

Last message date: Sat Jan 31 21:33:54 EST 2009
Archived on: Sun Aug 7 18:26:02 EDT 2011

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