MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow

[Peter Gutmann]

"Steven M. Bellovin" <smb at cs.columbia.edu> writes:

>So -- who supports TLS 1.2?

Not a lot, I think.  The problem with 1.2 is that it introduces a pile of
totally gratuitous incompatible changes to the protocol that require quite a
bit of effort to implement (TLS 1.1 -> 1.2 is at least as big a step, if not a
bigger step, than the change from SSL to TLS), complicate an implementation,
are difficult to test because of the general lack of implementations
supporting it, and provide no visible benefit.  Why would anyone rush to
implement this when what we've got now works[0] just fine?

Peter.

[0] For whatever level of "works" applies to SSL/TLS, in the sense that 1.2
    won't "work" any better than 1.1 does.

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