Microsoft: Palladium will not limit what you can run

[Eugen Leitl]

On Sat, 15 Mar 2003, Anonymous wrote:

> Microsoft's point with regard to DRM has always been that Palladium had
> other uses besides that one which everyone was focused on.  Obviously

Of course it's useful. Does the usefulness outweigh the support for 
special interests (DRM, governments, software monopolies)? There is no 
value for the end user which can't be achieved with smart cards, which 
have the additional potential of being removable and transportable.

> they fully expect people to use the technology.
> 
> I'm not sure where you get the part about it being deployed under costs.
> Is this more of the XBox analogy?  That's a video game system, where

No, I meant it's a nonnegligible incremental cost on the system. It
increases the chipcount and/or the design complexity, and requires strong
encryption on interchip and intercomponent bus traffic. I don't know what
the increased cost on a motherboard is, but it's probably in the dollar
range at least.  Very nonegligible for an industry learned caution by low
profit margins. There's clearly a long-term political motivation present.

> the economics are totally dissimilar to commodity PC's.  All video game
> consoles are sold under cost today.  PCs generally are not.  This is a
> misleading analogy.

I notice that the technology is primarily rolled out in high-margin areas
first like notbooks (and in game consoles where considerable front
investments need to be protected).
 
> In any case, DRM does not limit what programs people can run, at least
> not to a greater degree than does any program which encrypts its data.

This is a gross misrepresentation. Content (whether executable code or
media, it doesn't really matter as the difference is blurring) can be
keyed to individual machines. This kills copying. There's an intense
battle going on between open science proponents and the likes of Elsevier.
Distribution range of documents can be limited. Access to documents can be
limited to specific time window. Secrets inserted at manufacture time ask
for legislation demanding subpoenable records. Hardware can be made which
prefers a specific vendor by selective disclosure of information.
Capability for strong authentication asks for legislation making it
nonfacultative, basically outlawing anonymity. Etc. etc. 

There are many way by which this envelope of technologies here informally
called Pd will limit dissemination of information and increase control on
side of governments and large companies. Above off-the-cuff list indicates 
it's a giant, yet untapped can of worms.

Unlike subsidized smartcard readers to initial fax effect the user can
only lose.
 
> > Right. It's all completely voluntary. There will be no attempts whatsoever 
> > to lock-in, despite decades of attempts and considerable economic 
> > interests involved. 
> 
> Yes, it is completely voluntary, and we should all remain vigilant to
> make sure it stays that way.  And no doubt there will be efforts to
> lock-in customers, just as there have been in the past.  There is no
> contradiction between these two points.

This is an intensely political technology, and as such ignoring the 
political component by just focusing on fair and useful side of it will 
result in a very skewed estimate of its future impacts. It doesn't pay to 
be naive.

Under the circumstances, it is much better to just block it.


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