Scientists question electronic voting

[Ian Brown]

Ed Gerck wrote:
> Printing a paper receipt that the voter can see is a proposal 
> that addresses one of the major weaknesses of electronic 
> voting. However, it creates problems that are even harder to 
> solve than the silent subversion of e-records.
> 
> For example, using the proposed system a voter can easily, by 
> using a small concealed camera or a cell phone with a camera, 
> obtain a copy of that receipt and use it to get money for the 
> vote, or keep the job. And no one would know or be able to trace it.

As a voter could record what they did with pencil-and-paper or a
mechanical voting machine.

The partial defence in all three systems is that the voter should be
able to void the vote after photographing a "receipt" to hand over later
to the vote-buyer, and then cast a real vote. In the UK, for example,
you can obtain a new ballot paper from a polling station official in
exchange for a "spoiled" one. I believe Rebecca Mercuri has always
suggested that a voter should be able to confirm whether a receipt
printed by an electronic voting machine correctly records their intended
vote, and if not to void it.



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