Scientists question electronic voting

[Ed Gerck]

Henry Norr had an interesting article today at
http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2003/03/03/BU122767.DTL&type=business

Printing a paper receipt that the voter can see is a proposal that addresses
one of the major weaknesses of electronic voting. However, it creates
problems that are even harder to solve than the silent subversion of e-records.

For example, using the proposed system a voter can easily, by using a
small concealed camera or a cell phone with a camera, obtain a copy of
that receipt and use it to get money for the vote, or keep the job. And
no one would know or be able to trace it.

Of course, proponents of the paper ballot copy, like Peter Neumann and
Rebecca Mercuri, will tell you the same thing that Peter affirmed in an official
testimony  before the California Assembly Elections & Reapportionment Committee
on January 17, 2001, John Longville, Chair, session on touch-screen (DRE)
voting systems, as recorded by C-SPAN (video available):

  "...I have an additional constraint on it [a voter approved paper ballot produced
  by a DRE machine] that  it  is behind reflective glass so that if you try to
  photograph it with a little secret camera hidden in your tie so you can go out and
  sell your vote for a bottle of whiskey or whatever it is, you will get a blank image.
  Now this may sound ridiculous from the point of view of trying to protect the
  voter, but this problem of having a receipt in some way that verifies that what
  seems to be your vote actually was recorded properly, is a fundamental issue."

I was also in Sacramento that same day, and this was my reply, in the next panel,
also with a C-SPAN videotape:

  ".. I would like to point out that it is very hard sometimes to take opinions, even
  though from a valued expert, at face value. I was hearing the former panel [on
  touch screen DRE systems] and Peter Neumann, who is a man beyond all best
  qualifications, made the affirmation that we cannot photograph what we can see.
  As my background is in optics, with a doctorate in optics, I certainly know that is
  not correct. If we can see the ballot we can photograph it, some way or another."

But, look, it does not require a Ph.D. in physics to point out that what Peter says is
incorrect -- of course you can photograph what you see. In other words, Peter's
"solution" goes as much of this DRE discussion has also gone -- it's paying lip service
to science but refutes basic scientific principles and progress.  After all, what's the
scientific progress behind storing a piece of paper as evidence? And, by the way, are
not paper ballots what were mis-counted, mis-placed and lost in Florida?

Finally, what we see in this discussion is also exactly what we in IT security
know that we need to avoid. Insecure statements that create a false sense of
security -- not to mention a real sense of angst. This statement, surely vetted by
many people before it was printed, points out how much we need to improve in
terms of a real-world model for voting.

This opinion is my own, and is not a statement by any company.

Cheers,
Ed Gerck

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