[Cryptography] Russian "ERA" cryptophone fiasco

[Phillip Hallam-Baker]

On Wed, Mar 30, 2022 at 12:45 AM John Denker via cryptography <
cryptography at metzdowd.com> wrote:

> Hi --
>
> Does anybody here know anything about the Russian "ERA" cryptophone???
>
> I ask because it seems we are watching infosec failure on a grand
> scale. It was FAPSI's job to arrange Russian tactical communications
> with high security and availability, and also to break Ukrainian
> communications.[1]
>
> It is widely reported that they failed coming and going:
> > Era is a super expensive cryptophone system that Russia introduced
> > in 2021 with great fanfare. It guaranteed work "in all conditions"
> > [2]
>
> ... however ...
>
> > The lack of foresight involved in the introduction of the Russian
> > army’s new Era encrypted-communications system [...]. Supposedly
> > secure, it relies on 3G towers—which Russia destroyed when it
> > invaded Ukraine. Because the system is simply not working, Russian
> > officers have to communicate in open speech by cellphone, as gleeful
> > Ukrainian volunteers listen in. [3]
>
> Uhhhh, why do cleartext cellphones work if the towers are down? At
> what point do we start to disbelieve what we are told about this? And
> isn't it a bit odd and a bit unwise for people to brag about such
> exploits before the war is over?
>

The Russian cryptophones required specific types of cell towers. Since cell
phone use has increased over time, more recent tower deployments have
denser towers with weaker signals to prevent interference. So the older
generation wireless is probably a bit more robust.

But I rather suspect that another effect is at work: Cryptoperfection.

Russia has incredibly high requirements for diplomatic communications. For
details see Sheymov's Tower of Secrets. These doctrines were likely
developed in response to the VENONA decrypts.

The operational requirements of these doctrines make them utterly
impractical for field communications. So instead of delivering a system
that delivers 'pretty good' security, they end up with a system that kinda
sorta works if the moon is in the right phase. And the battlefield
commanders end up using regular cell phones.


In other words what we did with S/MIME and PGP and IPSEC, making security
the absolute goal and delivering a system less than 0.001% of email users
will ever use regularly.

PHB
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