[Cryptography] reliable broadcast channel

Karl gmkarl at gmail.com
Wed Nov 11 06:44:38 EST 2020


On Mon, Nov 9, 2020, 7:42 PM <jamesd at echeque.com> wrote:

> > On Mon, Nov 9, 2020 at 4:29 PM <jamesd at echeque.com> wrote:
> >> We want all bilateral transactions in the circle to complete, or no
> >> bilateral transactions in the circle to complete.  Insider check kiting
> >> is that the circle fails in such a way that some people's transactions
> >> complete, and other people's transactions do not, and a large cloud of
> >> fog is manufactured over whose transactions completed and whose did not.
>
> On 2020-11-10 07:53, Karl wrote:
> > I get confused a lot, but my understanding is that the Lightning
> > network is _designed_ to make that not happen via constraints all the
> > participants control, or somesuch.  I'm curious what you know that
> > leads you to believe otherwise.
>
>
> Any one gateway transaction is trustless, unlike correspondence banking.
>  That is a huge difference.
>
> But the trouble is that does not make a circle of gateway transactions
> trustless.
>
> It is a hard problem, and I am far from happy with the lightning
> network's design as currently implemented.
>
> It is a considerably harder problem if you want the lightning network to
> remedy the ready observability of transactions on the blockchain.
>
> The lightning network relies on trust excessively, and the participants
> do not really know who they are trusting, thus is apt to suffer from the
> problems that occurred with correspondence banking - the big problem
> being that everyone winds up relying on big well known entities that are
> unlikely to burn their reputation over small amounts of money - but also
> likely to be vulnerable to coercive power.
>

With regard to the lightning network, the concern you describe can be
resolved.  It's simply nobody was worrying about it.  In fact, it may not
be hard to do so.

Do you need help starting that process of resolution?

>
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