[Cryptography] stego mechanism used in real life (presumably), then outed

Tom Mitchell mitch at niftyegg.com
Fri Jun 9 15:27:47 EDT 2017


On Thu, Jun 8, 2017 at 11:56 AM, Gary Mulder <flyingkiwiguy at gmail.com> wrote:
> So what methods are effective for defeating physical print tracking?
.....
> Textual steganography is a bit worrisome, but I guess you could run it
> through Google translate twice to obfuscate. Not ideal.

There is also logo stenography.
The server that presents the logo to be included
in the header, footer and more can be unique to each
user, reader, printer, date and time.

In a number of trusted systems you can only see the contents of
a directory that matches your credentials.   Thus the #incude
that Word/TeX and more use is sufficient.

Fonts are another hackable.  Your Times Roman may be dithered or
rendered just a bit differently than mine.   Even web content printed
from screens can play.
https://css-tricks.com/set-font-size-based-on-word-count/

In a world of pervasive hacking trackable fonts and such might be
inserted into a suspect system and become proof enough for a
drone strike near or far.  Paranoia can run deep if you let it...




-- 
  T o m    M i t c h e l l


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