[Cryptography] "we need to protect [our dox] by at least encrypting them"

Ian G iang at iang.org
Wed Nov 9 05:07:00 EST 2016

On 08/11/2016 20:53, Ray Dillinger wrote:

> On 11/07/2016 04:57 PM, ianG wrote:
>> On 07/11/2016 18:57, Arnold Reinhold wrote:
>> Most or all intel agencies won't futz with the American election.  Most
>> or all foreign governments will not have a preference for one or other
>> candidate.
> I disagree vehemently with this.  There are numerous actors
> who could easily believe that they'd have a freer hand to
> dominate and exploit others in their area, should one
> candidate or another take office in the US.  There are
> numerous actors who could easily believe that they'd have
> better chances of negotiating more favorable treaties etc
> if one candidate or another should take office.  There are
> numerous actors who have strong preferences for or against
> a candidate who questions the legitimacy or desirability of
> NATO, NAFTA, the TransPacific Partnership, military aid to
> Israel, etc.  There are numerous actors who could easily
> believe that should the US military commander-in-chief be
> one candidate or the other, that there would be a greater
> or lesser chance of them achieving (or being left alone
> while achieving) their military goals.  Virtually everybody
> in the world is evaluating the American election in terms
> of its potential for danger of financial or military
> crisis in their part of the world.
> The US elections face an array of persistent, motivated
> sophisticated, and highly resourced attackers - nation
> states, criminal organizations, downballot candidates for
> other offices, and the list goes on and on.

I think you're probably right on the motivations.  However I think that 
foreign countries would likely stick to propaganda, which is an accepted 
means of peddling influence.

This isn't to say that the elections will be easy - there is insider attack.

> And what have we built for security?  The voting machines
> are still suspect but have been mostly audited by now. But
> after the elections they process those ballot counts on
> f***  windows boxes.
Maybe David Chaum was right.  Even those we can't figure out a correct 
cryptographic solution to the problem of political voting, we should 
still try.


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