[Cryptography] "we need to protect [our dox] by at least encrypting them"

Ray Dillinger bear at sonic.net
Tue Nov 8 14:53:43 EST 2016

On 11/07/2016 04:57 PM, ianG wrote:
> On 07/11/2016 18:57, Arnold Reinhold wrote:
> Most or all intel agencies won't futz with the American election.  Most
> or all foreign governments will not have a preference for one or other
> candidate.  

I disagree vehemently with this.  There are numerous actors
who could easily believe that they'd have a freer hand to
dominate and exploit others in their area, should one
candidate or another take office in the US.  There are
numerous actors who could easily believe that they'd have
better chances of negotiating more favorable treaties etc
if one candidate or another should take office.  There are
numerous actors who have strong preferences for or against
a candidate who questions the legitimacy or desirability of
NATO, NAFTA, the TransPacific Partnership, military aid to
Israel, etc.  There are numerous actors who could easily
believe that should the US military commander-in-chief be
one candidate or the other, that there would be a greater
or lesser chance of them achieving (or being left alone
while achieving) their military goals.  Virtually everybody
in the world is evaluating the American election in terms
of its potential for danger of financial or military
crisis in their part of the world.

The US elections face an array of persistent, motivated
sophisticated, and highly resourced attackers - nation
states, criminal organizations, downballot candidates for
other offices, and the list goes on and on.

And what have we built for security?  The voting machines
are still suspect but have been mostly audited by now. But
after the elections they process those ballot counts on
f***  windows boxes.


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