[Cryptography] Proof-of-Satoshi fails Proof-of-Proof.

[Peter Todd]

On Fri, May 06, 2016 at 10:25:25PM -0700, Tony Arcieri wrote:
> On Fri, May 6, 2016 at 12:06 PM, Ron Garret <ron at flownet.com> wrote:
> 
> > > But with all forms of DH based signatures, a random number is generated
> > and that affects the signature value. In effect, every signature has a salt
> > value.
> 
> 
> Interesting sidebar: ECDSA nonces were one of the sources of Bitcoin's
> transaction malleability. The (massive pile of hacks that is) segregated
> witness feature being added to Bitcoin has an added side effect of removing
> signatures from the hash of a transaction, and with it the associated
> malleability.
> 
> All that said, if you're designing a new system today, pick Ed25519.

While ECDSA nonces are a "source" of Bitcoin tx malleability, they aren't a
source that can be fixed, even by Ed25519, because you can't force the signer
to use the deterministic signing method vs. using another number; if Bitcoin
had used Ed25519 from the start we would still have a signature malleability
problem.

-- 
https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
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