[Cryptography] Proof-of-Satoshi fails Proof-of-Proof.

[Allen]

> Interesting sidebar: ECDSA nonces were one of the sources of Bitcoin's
transaction malleability.
> The (massive pile of hacks that is) segregated witness feature being
added to Bitcoin has an added
> side effect of removing signatures from the hash of a transaction, and
with it the associated malleability.
> All that said, if you're designing a new system today, pick Ed25519.

FYI, while Ed25519 specifies that the nonce should be set
deterministically, a signer can set it randomly and the signature will
still verify.  In fact, I don't see any way for a verifier to know if a
signature was generated with a deterministic or a random nonce, so using
Ed25519 might not solve malleability.
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