[Cryptography] traffic analysis

[StealthMonger]

John Denker <jsd at av8n.com> writes:

> On 01/26/2015 06:17 AM, StealthMonger wrote:

>> The only way I know to stay anonymous is to use chains of anonymizing
>> remailers

> Suppose a typical HTTP session lasts half a minute.

What does HTTP have to do with it?  Remailers accept traffic by SMTP.

> Without a rigorous regimen of cover traffic, the 
> special message would stick out like a sore thumb.

> Things like remailers and tor rely on hiding a
> tree in a forest.  The works best if the trees
> are indistinguishable.

Well, of course.  That's been part of mixmaster forever.  The mixmaster
"dummy" parameter gives a piece of cover traffic indistinguishable from
live traffic until it is decrypted by the last remailer in the chain.
Those seriously wanting anonymity use a "rigorous regimen of cover
traffic" year after year.  A live mail is /substituted/ for a dummy that
would have gone out, not /added/ to the pattern.

Or one runs a remailer herself and just adds her traffic to the flow,
statistically compensating received dummies, which she drops on the
floor.

That's for outbound cover traffic.  For inbound, one arranges that each
message is encrypted and broadcast somehow for all the world to see.  A
way to do this is to post it to Usenet newsgroup alt.anonymous.messages.
The user takes a full feed of a.a.m without interruption year after year
and separates the wheat from the chaff only after it's behind closed
doors.

Read mailto:stealthsuite[..]nym.mixmin.net?subject=send%20index.html.

> Amusing story about remailers and the limitations
> thereof:
>   http://calteches.library.caltech.edu/34/3/FeynmanLosAlamos.htm
> Search for the word "ticket".

<heh> Reminds me of the story about Washington D.C. pizza deliverers
being able to predict military operations by the increased orders from
the pentagon.


-- 


 -- StealthMonger
    Long, random latency is part of the price of Internet anonymity.


Key: mailto:stealthsuite at nym.mixmin.net?subject=send%20stealthmonger-key

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